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Abstract
Investigating potential purchases is often a substantial investment under
uncertainty. Standard market designs, such as simultaneous or English auc-
tions, compound this with uncertainty about the price a bidder will have to
pay in order to win. As a result they tend to confuse the process of search
both by leading to wasteful information acquisition on goods that have al-
ready found a good purchaser and by discouraging needed investigations of
objects, potentially eliminating all gains from trade. In contrast, we show that
the Dutch auction preserves all of its properties from a standard setting with-
out information costs because it guarantees, at the time of information acqui-
sition, a price at which the good can be purchased. Calibrations to start-up ac-
quisition and timber auctions suggest that in practice the social losses through
poor search coordination in standard formats are an order of magnitude or two
larger than the (negligible) inefficiencies arising from ex-ante bidder asymme-
tries.
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1 Introduction
Vickrey (1961) famously argued that “the common or progressive type of auc-
tion...provide(s) better chances for optimal allocation than the regressive or ‘Dutch’
auction.” Yet an important weakness of common ascending or simultaneous auc-
tions is that a bidder faces significant uncertainty about both the price she faces and
her chances of winning at any point in the auction process. By contrast in a Dutch
auction at any time the good is still available a participant knows that there is a
maximum price for which she can claim the good. In this paper we show that this
property implies an important efficiency benefit of the Dutch format when individ-
uals face costs of information acquisition, as it allows for rational planning about
whether to make such an investment in a way that is impossible under standard
formats. As a result, standard formats may eliminate all gains from trade when
costly information acquisition is necessary, while a Dutch format will always per-
form as well with information costs as without them. In calibrations to start-up
acquisition and US timber auctions we find that standard formats lose a few per-
cent of potential welfare from poor search coordination. However even these small
losses dwarf those highlighted by Vickrey from ex-ante bidder asymmetries in the
Dutch auction, which we find to be negligible.
Information acquisition costs play a large role in a variety of auction, assign-
ment and matching markets. Press reports indicate that due diligence costs for the
acquisition by a large technology company of a start-up are typically 20-40% of the
size of a deal and Salz (2015) finds through empirical estimation that search costs
represent a similar fraction of the total costs of waste haulage contracts. Any par-
ticipant on either side of the academic job market knows how costly information
acquisition is in that context. Conserving on such information costs is thus both
an important component of efficiency in these markets and is necessary to ensure
an efficient allocation, as it will be inefficient for individuals to expend these costs
unless they offer sufficient individual or social benefit.
To ensure such investments are not wasted it is important for a given bidder
to be confident there is not already some other bidder who greatly values the ob-
ject and therefore will end up being assigned it regardless of the outcome of that
bidder’s investigation. To analyze this risk, it is useful to adopt the framework of
Dixit and Pindyck (1994), who show that any irreversible investment under uncer-
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tainty may be viewed as a “real option”. In particular, for any bidder there will
be a “strike price” such that, if she knows she is able to buy the good at exactly
this strike price, she will find it just in her interest to investigate the object. Any
time the bidder is guaranteed to be able to buy the object weakly below this price,
the bidder will be able to eliminate all risk by selling a call option at this strike
price to an external party to fund her information acquisition and committing to
give to this external party any profits above this price. Any strategy that does not
“exercise this option in the money” will lead to lower utility than this “covered
call position” as it will expose the bidder to the risk of having wasted the cost of
information acquisition.
In Section 2, we formally develop this novel interpretation ofWeitzman (1979)’s
characterization of optimal information acquisition, combining ideas from Weber
(1992) and Olszewski and Weber (2015). This analysis immediately suggests that
standardmarket designs may perform poorly. In particular, simultaneous auctions
of any form, ascending price auctions and a sequential bargaining procedure pro-
posed by Bulow and Klemperer (2009) and Roberts and Sweeting (2013) all leave
bidders exposed, at the time of information acquisition, to the risk that the effec-
tive price they will face for purchase may be well above their strike price. In fact
we show in Section 3.1 that this exposure may destroy all of the gains from trade
in some examples for each of these mechanisms.
Of course efficient procedures in this context do exist based on dynamic ver-
sions of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves procedure (Bergemann and Välimäki, 2010; Athey and Segal,
2013). However, as Cavallo and Parkes (2008) and Crémer et al. (2009) detail, this
mechanism either depends on the designer having detailed information about bid-
ders’ value distributions or is extremely elaborate as it requires every individual to
communicate her full private information about the distribution of her values to a
central agent in order to determine the externalities each bidder creates on others.
Furthermore, even if the procedure could be simplified, it would suffer critiques
analogous to those of Levin and Skrzypacz (2016) for other dynamic Vickrey auc-
tions, that bidders have very weak incentives to provide truthful reports about
much information and thus may instead predate or collude with their rivals. It
thus seems unlikely that such a procedure would be used in practice, especially
when combinedwith other practical issues facing Vickrey auctions (Ausubel and Milgrom,
2005).
2
Luckily, though, these fully efficient procedures are not the only ones that pro-
tect bidders from exposure and thus permit a rational search procedure. In fact
many commonly-used, ad-hoc procedures in a variety of contexts provide partic-
ipants in markets with guarantees that protect their investments in information
acquisition. For example, in the academic job market participants are made firm
offers before they are asked to invest in determining which school they prefer and
in college admission early decision offers an opportunity for students to commit
to schools.
Our principal result, which we state and prove in Section 4, is that the Dutch
auction that Vickrey criticized has the benefit of preventing exposure. Intuitively,
a bidder never wishes to investigate her value until the price has dropped to her
strike price and by this time she knows she can secure the object at or below her
strike price. She thus is able to fully unload the risk by selling a call option. Any
equilibrium of the Dutch auction is thus welfare-equivalent to an equilibrium of an
auction without information acquisition where each individual’s value is replaced
by the value of her covered call position. This implies that all the desirable prop-
erties of the Dutch auction and its cousin the first-price auction (efficiency when
bidders are symmetric, approximate efficiency otherwise, etc.) when there are no
information costs carry over to our setting.1
Of course, none of this undermines Vickrey’s concerns that, when individuals
are asymmetric, the Dutch auction fails to achieve full efficiency because stronger
bidders will tend to shade their bids down by more than weaker bidders. There-
fore in Section 5 we consider the magnitudes of the benefits and costs of the Dutch
auction compared to alternatives in two quantitative models. The first is calibrated
to match press discussions of the start-up acquisition market. The second matches
the empirical moments recovered by Roberts and Sweeting (2013) in the US Tim-
ber auctions.
In these cases we find that bidder asymmetries have only a negligible impact on
the efficiency of the Dutch auction. In all but the most extreme scenarios, designed
deliberately to break this result, the efficiency loss due to asymmetries is less than a
percentage point and it is typically an order of magnitude or two smaller than this.
1Note, however, that the first-price auction, unlike the Dutch auction, does not achieve efficiency
in our context because it is simultaneous. This divergence and the tendency of the Dutch auction
to encourage more information acquisition and revenue were first observed by Miettinen (2013).
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On the other hand the inefficient search coordination created by standard formats
typically leads to losses of several percentage points of welfare in typical scenar-
ios and tens of percentage points in some extreme cases. This shows that in some
practical cases Vickrey’s reservations about the Dutch procedure may be negligi-
ble while the search benefits of the Dutch procedure are significant, though much
smaller than suggested by our worst case examples. Results on revenue, which are
less central to our analysis, favor the Dutch procedure much more strongly.
We conduct most of our analysis under a series of stylized assumptions that
simplify our exposition and sharpen our message. In particular we assume that
agents play an equilibrium, that there is only a single object for sale, that there is
only a single stage of information acquisition, that investigating an object is nec-
essary to claim it and that values are private. In Section 6 we show that our core
message about the value of descending price auctions over standard formats is
robust against substantial (non-nested) relaxations of these assumptions. We also
discuss why we believe descending prices are preferable to a fixed posted price,
which can also avoid the exposure problem.
Our paper focuses analytically on the relatively narrow problem of auctions;
that is environments where goods have to be assigned to individuals who can
freely transfer utility in the form of currency between them. However in Section
7 we use the connections drawn in recent years by the “market design” literature
between auctions andmechanisms for matching to suggest how our insights about
the value of descending prices might extend to those settings. However, such
broader implications for market design require significant additional research, es-
pecially related to issues of timing (viz. in practice inspections are not instanta-
neous) that our analysis largely abstracts from. We highlight the additional anal-
ysis we think would be most useful for reaching concrete design insights in our
conclusion, Section 8. Important details and that do not fit in the text appear in
appendices following it, as do all proofs not appearing inline and details of our
numerical methods.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we describe the baseline model we employ until Section 6 and use
this to develop the fundamental ideas behind our analysis.
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2.1 Model
A single item is for sale to one of n bidders. Bidders initially do not know their
values, but only some information about them in the form of a type, which also
determines a cost that must be paid in order to inspect and discover the value.
Formally, each bidder i initially draws a private type θi ∈ Θi. These are distributed
according to a common prior P on Θ1 × · · · ×Θn.
Each bidder i has a family of value distributions {Fθi : θi ∈ Θi} and a cost func-
tion ci : Θi → R+. When i’s type is θi, i’s value vi ∈ R for the item is drawn accord-
ing to Fθi . These values v1, . . . , vn are independent conditional on the type profile
(θ1, . . . , θn). However, they are not initially observable. At any time, any bidder
i may pay a cost ci(θi) to instantaneously inspect the item, learning her value vi.
Inspections are private and are not observed by other bidders. We will frequently
abuse notation and write ci in place of ci(θi), when the dependence on θi is under-
stood from context.
We use Ii as an indicator for individual i inspecting the object, Ai as an indicator
for the object being allocated to i and let (Z)+ := max{Z, 0}. Following Weitzman
(1979), we assume that if i obtains the item, i must pay the inspection cost, viz.
Ai = 1 =⇒ Ii = 1. We denote the expectation under the measure Fθi by Eθi .
All bidders have quasilinear utility, viz. i’s utility is
ui = Aivi − Iici − ti
where ti is the net payment made by i. We assume bidders are risk-neutral ex-
pected value maximizers.
2.2 Real option
Before considering the competitive interaction among bidders, we begin by charac-
terizing the structure of each bidder’s individual problem in terms of real options,
an analogy that simplifies the exposition of our results. While this problem is a
special case of Weitzman (1979)’s “Pandora’s box” problem, our characterization
applies only in the special case we focus on and to our knowledge our characteri-
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zation, and particular the analogy to real options, is novel.2
The decision by a bidder to invest in learning her value is irreversible and has
an uncertain payoff. As such it is an “investment under uncertainty” in the sense
of Dixit and Pindyck (1994). It may thus be viewed as a real option. It will be
worth exercising this option as long as the (opportunity) price that would have to
be paid for the object is sufficiently low. A natural way to quantify this is to define
the highest price such that it would still be advantageous to investigate the object
if the price were known with certainty. In particular, the bidder could finance her
full inspection cost by selling a “call option” on the value by guaranteeing that if,
upon investigation, she finds that the value of the object is above this level she will
give any profits above this “strike price” to the owner of the option.
Definition 1. The strike price of bidder i given θi is denoted σi and is the unique
solution to
Eθi
[
(vi − σi)
+
]
= ci.
This strike price is a special case of the (non-nested) indices proposed byWeitzman
and Gittins (1979) for more general optimal information acquisition problems. An-
other critical quantity often used in the broader analysis of information acquisition
problems, related to the “prevailing charge” introduced by Weber (1992) in his el-
egant proof of the Gittins Index Theorem, can be interpreted in terms of option
pricing in our setting. In particular, if a bidder does decide to sell a call option on
the object at its strike price and use the proceeds to fund her inspection, she is left
holding a position with no cost of information acquisition, but a limited upside
potential, with the rest of the upside potential being held by the owner of the call
option. This position is known in options trading as a “covered call position”. The
value of this position is the “covered call value”.
Definition 2. The covered call value of bidder i given realizations of θi and vi is
κi := min{σi, vi}.
In order to sell a call option on the object at the bidder’s strike price, the bidder
must commit that any time the value ends up strictly above this strike price (if the
option is “in the money”) she will allow the option holder to exercise her option at
2In particular,Weitzman allows for investigation to take place over time in an explicitly dynamic
model with discounting, while we assume investigation is instantaneous and thus have no explicit
dynamics beyond the sequencing of actions.
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the strike price. Only then will the purchaser be willing to pay the full inspection
cost and thus the bidder will be able to avoid all risk from inspection, instead
simply earning the covered call value. The following lemma proves that pursuing
such a commitment can only benefit the bidder; any other policy will cause her to
earn weakly less than the covered call value in expectation and strictly less if she
has positive probability of failing to exercise in the money.
Lemma 1. Given any {θi}, for any procedure and any i, E [Aivi − Iici] ≤ EAiκi. Fur-
thermore, this holds with equality if and only if bidder i always “exercises in the money”,
viz. takes the item if she inspects and vi > σi.
Proof. Fix all {θi}. Using the definition of the option strike price, substitute for ci
and use the independence of vi and Ii:
E [Aivi − Iici] = E
[
Aivi − Ii(vi − σi)
+
]
≤ E
[
Ai
(
vi − (vi − σi)
+
)]
= E [Aiκi] . (1)
The inequality follows because Ai ≤ Ii (one must inspect in order to be allo-
cated). Furthermore, by subtracting the left and right sides of the inequality oc-
curring in the middle of line (1), we see that the two sides are equal if and only
if E [(Ii − Ai)(vi − σi)+] = 0, which happens if and only if there is zero probabil-
ity that Ii = 1,Ai = 0, and vi > σi. This is precisely what it means to say that a
procedure always exercises in the money.
Thus any deviation from selling the option and committing to exercise in the
money whenever strictly profitable will cause strict losses in utility relative to the
covered call value. On the other hand the best welfare that any central planner can
possibly hope to achieve, even if that planner has access to all ex-ante (non-costly)
information and can force obedience by bidders, is the highest covered call value
among bidders.
Corollary 1. The welfare of the optimal centralized procedure is at most E [maxi κi].
Proof. The welfare generated by bidder i is exactly Aivi − Iici, so total welfare is
E
[∑
i
Aivi − Iici
]
≤ E
[∑
i
Aiκi
]
≤ E
[
max
i
κi
]
.
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In fact, this welfare is achievable by a simple procedure, due to Weitzman.
Theorem 1. The first-best procedure for a planner who knows all {θi}s causes bidders to
inspect in order of decreasing σi, stopping when the largest observed value vi exceeds all
remaining σ−i and assigning the item to i.
Proof of Theorem 1. The descending-inspection procedure always exercises in the
money, implying by Lemma 1 that its welfare is equal to E [
∑
iAiκi]. But it also
always allocates to the bidder with the highest covered call value, meaning its
welfare is E [maxi κi]. This is optimal by Corollary 1.
In the next section we will use the fact that other procedures will tend to make
consistently exercising in the money impossible to produce examples where these
procedures destroy all gains from trade.
3 Standard Auctions May Hopelessly Confuse Search
In this section we use show that standard simple auctions may be unboundedly
inefficient in this context and discuss why more elaborate efficient procedures are
unlikely to be practically relevant.
3.1 Failure of standard procedures
The most widely studied auction formats in models with information acquisition
(Bergemann and Välimäki, 2002) are simultaneous in the sense that all individ-
uals must decide simultaneously and prior to communication with one another
whether to inspect. However simultaneous procedures make exercising in the
money impossible because individuals decide whether to inspect the object prior
to any assurances about price. The following example shows a case when this
eliminates all gains from trade in the sense of Mailath and Postelwaite (1990): the
best possible simultaneous mechanism achieves an unboundedly small fraction of
the first-best welfare.
Example 1 (Sequencing and the inefficiency of simultaneous procedures). Every
individual value is drawn iid as eitherM > 1 with probability 1
M
or 0 with prob-
ability 1 − 1
M
and for all i, ci = c for a constant 0 < c < 1 to be determined. When
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M is large, a success is a “black swan” (Taleb, 2007). Consider the limit asM →∞
and n
M
→∞ so the value of a black swan is large but rare, and yet there are enough
opportunities to find one that the probability of it existing in the entire population
approaches unity.
The optimal policy then involves ordering individuals in any manner and hav-
ing them sequentially query their values until a black swan is discovered and then
the assignment made. In this limit, the gross utility achieved approaches M (a
black swan is always found) while the expected number of inspections is M (the
mean of the geometric distribution with probability 1/M), so the net welfare ap-
proachesM(1− c).
Bergemann and Välimäki prove that, among all simultaneous mechanisms, a
simple second-price auction leads to greatest efficiency in this setting. Each bidder
has only two strategies that weakly dominate over all others: either bidding ex-
pected value less inspection cost without inspecting; or paying the inspection cost
and entering a bid equal to value. There is a fatal tradeoff: If too many inspect,
then the large total inspection cost swamps all gains from efficient allocation. But
if too few do, then welfare suffers because there is a small chance that any bidder
will find a black swan. We need to offer bidders the opportunity to inspect only if
no black swan has yet been found, but simultaneity makes this impossible.
Intuitively bidders face a high risk they will not be able to exercise in the money
and thus their greatest possible payoff is greatly reduced. We formalize this in
Proposition 1. In the interests of space, all proofs in this subsection have been
moved to Appendix A.
Proposition 1. In the example above for c appropriately close to 1, the welfare of any set
of bidder strategies is an unboundedly small fraction of the optimal welfare.
While we believe this example is the first of unbounded inefficiency of simulta-
neous search, its weaknesses in a search context are well-appreciated. In particular,
Compte and Jehiel (2007) show that in a model that is a special case of ours that
(trembling-hand perfect equilibria of) English auctions always perform weakly
better than simultaneous second-price auctions and sometimes strictly better. In-
deed, our black-swan example has an equilibrium with optimal welfare where at
the beginning of the auction, bidders sequentially inspect in an arbitrary (but fixed,
common-knowledge) order; if a bidder finds the high value, they stay in and all
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others drop. Unfortunately, such auctions still make it impossible to ensure exer-
cise in the money in equilibrium, because at the point when a bidder may have to
inspect she still has no way to place an upper bound on the price for which she
may be able to acquire the object.
Example 2 (English auctions do not allow exercise in themoney). Consider a slight
modification of the previous example. With a medium chance (say, 50%), the bid-
der’s value is neither 0 nor extremely high, but is instead some small yet significant
value L. For good welfare, it is still necessary that a black swan is almost always
found. But now, bidders cannot credibly signal that they have found the black
swan until the price is already too large (higher than L). If a bidder inspects at an
early time and decides not to drop out, this most likely only indicates that their
value is L. Therefore, it is not until the price ascends above L that a sequential,
high-welfare strategy set has a hope of succeeding. However, any bidder who
is left to inspect last (or subset of bidders who simultaneously inspect last) has a
negative expected utility, as the price now exceeds their expected gain.
Proposition 2. There are instances where any equilibrium of the English auction has
arbitrarily low welfare as a fraction of the first-best.
Again, to our knowledge, this is the first example in the literature of unbounded
inefficiency of an English auction based on information acquisition. However,
again the flaws of such procedures in related settings were pointed out by Bulow and Klemperer
(2009). They, and Roberts and Sweeting (2013), argue with numerical examples
that an explicitly sequential bargaining procedure may produce higher welfare.
In the Bulow-Klemperer-Roberts-Sweeting (BKRS henceforth) procedure, poten-
tial buyers are approached sequentially. There is (potentially) a reserve price and
a buyer may become an incumbent by placing any bid above this reserve. If the
buyer chooses not to become the incumbent, the next buyer is offered that chance.
Once a buyer becomes the incumbent, the next buyer is approached and may be-
come the incumbent if she beats the incumbent in a “knockout” round in which
either active buyer can submit any bid higher than the current high bid. This pro-
ceeds until one buyer drops out and a new incumbent is thus established; the drop-
ping out buyer can never re-enter. An incumbent can, after becoming such, raise
her bid if she wishes.
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This procedure always leads to efficiency in the examples we considered above,
as they allow for appropriate sequencing. However this is only the case because
all individuals are symmetric in these examples prior to inspection. If individuals
have private information, because this bargaining procedure does not allow for
the private information to be revealed, again sequencing may fail. In particular,
the threat of an individual who has already entered then bidding the price up
undermines the ability of a future bidder to exercise in the money in the same way
this may occur in a standard English auction.
Example 3 (Random sequencing may be devastating). Suppose that potential buy-
ers are, unobservably, either risky (R) or safe (S). Any individual is risky with
probability π ≪ 1 and safe with probability 1 − π. Safe individuals have value
vS with probability 1 − pS and value −∞ with probability pS ≪ 1.3 The cost of
determining her value is cS = vs − ǫ, where ǫ > r, the reserve price set by the
seller. Risky individual have probability pR ≪ 1 of having value vR and probabil-
ity 1 − pR of having value 0. The cost of learning her value is cR = vRpR2 > 0. We
assume ǫ≪ vR
2
< vS .
In this example, unbounded inefficiency occurs because it is necessary formany
risky individuals to investigate their values to achieve the optimum. However it
is more likely that at least one S individual first is offered a chance and enters
the auction. This is enough to deter the R types from investigating, as they fear a
bidding war with an already-entered S type will block their ability to make their
investigation profitable ex-ante.
Proposition 3. There are instances where any equilibrium of the BKRS mechanism has
unboundedly low welfare as a fraction of the first-best.
Interestingly in this case the simultaneous or English auction performs well.4
Thus while BKRS’s argument that the sequential procedure is more efficient than
the simultaneous one is true in some examples, the reverse holds in others.
3If our assumption that the individual must query her value in order to take the object is en-
forced, then it is equivalent for safe to have value vS with probability one. We introduce the extra
punishment for a bad match just to make the example more plausible.
4In both of those mechanisms there is a mixed-strategy symmetric equilibrium where (for large
n) the total probability of a black swan being found is roughly 1
2
. In such an equilibrium only R
types investigate their values. Because the expected surplus of an R type from investigating and
winning with probability one is vR
2
− r, R types are still willing to investigate for probabilities of
facing competition close to 1
2
.
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3.2 Impracticality of optimal mechanism
We must therefore wonder if more sophisticated auctions may outperform these
simple formats. If bidder types (costs and value distributions) are known to the
auctioneer and information acquisition is contractible, Crémer et al. (2009) describe
a procedure where agents are, in sequence, called upon to inspect and then bid in
a second-price auction against a reservation price equal to the highest remaining
strike price. Obviously this relies heavily on the informational and observabil-
ity assumptions, which are violated in most cases we are interested in. The only
mechanisms that are known to achieve efficiency more broadly are dynamic ver-
sions of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (henceforth VCG) mechanism described in a
special case of our environment by Cavallo and Parkes (2008) and more generally
by Bergemann and Välimäki (2010) and Athey and Segal (2013).
This mechanism has all individuals report their costs and value distributions
into a central mechanism designer who tells them to inspect in appropriate order
and asks them to report their values upon learning them. The planner implements
the Weitzman procedure and every individual pays the expected amount, condi-
tional on all information realized at the point of their report, by which their partic-
ipation in the mechanism reduced the aggregate expected utility of all other bid-
ders. While efficient in the weakly-dominant truth-telling equilibrium, this mech-
anism seems unlikely to us to be used in practice for two primary reasons that
motivate our interest in the simpler and (see below) approximately efficient Dutch
auction.
First, it requires participants to report the distribution of their value, an ob-
ject that is typically complicated and psychologically difficult to communicate re-
liably (Garthwaite et al., 2005) making such a protocol impractical.5 Second, as
Levin and Skrzypacz (2016) show, dynamic VCG mechanisms have many equilib-
ria, nearly all of which are inefficient, because reports made by bidders may affect
only the price paid by rivals and not their own allocation. This problem is par-
ticularly severe in our setting: Only the strike price and value reported impacts
a bidders’ own allocation, but the costs and distributions she reports have a rich
impact on others’ payments. Individuals have no incentive to correctly report this
5With multiple objects there is no known computationally efficient algorithm even for calculat-
ing an appropriate externality payment, and in the case of multiple inspection stages the cognitive
and communication complexity become extremely daunting.
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ancillary information and may manipulate it to raise or lower payments made by
their rivals depending on whether they are predating or colluding with their rivals.
It seems unlikely that such other-regarding motives will be entirely absent in any
context and thus this seems a setting where the use of a dynamic VCGmechanism
is particularly unpalatable.6
4 Dutch Auctions’ Performance is Invariant to Search
In this section, we show that the performance of the Dutch auction in our environ-
ment is “equivalent” to its performance in the “corresponding” environment with-
out information acquisition, namely one in which each bidder has a value equal to
her covered call value that she knows without paying any inspection costs. Given
that, by 1, no mechanism can achieve higher welfare than the expectation of the
highest covered call value, this equivalence connection preserves welfare and thus
implies that any desirable welfare property of the Dutch auction in the context
without information acquisition carries over to our setting.
Definition 3. For every type θi ∈ Θi we define the covered counterpart θ◦i to be a type
with zero inspection cost, whose value distribution is identical to the distribution
of κi when bidder i’s type is θi. More formally, we enlarge each bidder i’s type
space to Θi ∪ Θ◦i , where Θ
◦
i is a disjoint copy of Θi containing an element θ
◦
i for
6To highlight the centrality of this last point, we briefly now describe amechanismwith substan-
tially lower communication requirements that can implement the optimum, but which even more
clearly highlights the issues raised by Levin and Skrzypacz: Every bidder reports her strike price
and a single random sample from her value distribution. Bidders are sequentially approached in
descending order of strike price and asked to report their value until a value is reached that exceeds
all remaining strike prices. At this point the highest bidder with a value exceeding all remaining
strike prices is given the object. Individuals are then required to pay the utility that their partic-
ipation would have denied to all other individuals on net if they had not participated and every
bidder had, counter-factually, turned out to have a value given by the random sample reported in
stage 1.
This mechanism is efficient, all necessary information is reported and there is a weakly dom-
inant truthful equilibrium because the payments are computed based on a sample path through
the optimal mechanism. Thus expected payments are equal to the expected externalities that the
dynamic VCG mechanism computes. However, note that the random samples reported play no
role in determining any individual’s allocation; they determine only payments for others. There
is thus no incentive for individuals to report these truthfully; even a tiny incentive to collude or
predate will lead to extreme reports. While this illustrates the point sharply, the standard dynamic
VCG implementation generically asks individuals to report dimensions of the value distribution
that leave the strike price unchanged but may have a dramatic impact on other bidders’ payments.
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every θi ∈ Θi. The cost function ci is extended by setting ci(θ◦i ) = 0 for every
θ◦i ∈ Θ
◦
i . The family of value distributions {Fθ} is extended by setting
Fθ◦i (x) =

Fθi(x) if x ≤ σi1 if x > σi.
For any prior P define the induced prior over covered counterparts P◦ to be the joint
distribution of (θ◦1, . . . , θ
◦
n) when (θ1, . . . , θn) is distributed according to P.
Note that when bidders have covered counterpart types θ◦1, . . . , θ
◦
n, they know
their own values v1, . . . , vn without having to pay inspection costs. Therefore, an
auction whose bidders have types θ◦1, . . . , θ
◦
n is equivalent to a standard private-
value auction without inspection costs, where each bidder i in addition to know-
ing her value vi receives a signal θ◦i that is not payoff-relevant except to the extent
that it correlates with other bidders’ types and hence with their bids. In particular,
when θ1, . . . , θn are mutually independent under distribution P, then θ◦1, . . . , θ
◦
n are
mutually independent under distribution P◦ and the signal θ◦i becomes simply a
random signal containing no payoff-relevant information whatsoever. In this spe-
cial case, the equilibria of any auction with types distributed according to P◦ are
exactly equivalent to the equilibria of the same auction with independent private
values κ1, . . . , κn.
Lemma 2. The highest expected welfare achievable by any procedure when types are dis-
tributed according to P is equal to the highest expected welfare achievable when bidders
are replaced with their covered counterparts, who face no inspection costs and have types
distributed according to P◦.
Proof. Weitzman’s optimal procedure achieves the highest expected welfare of any
procedure, and as noted in Subsection 3.2 it can be implemented by the dynamic
VCG mechanism. We have seen in the proof of 1 that this expected welfare is ex-
actly equal to E [maxi κi], which is equal to the highest expected welfare achievable
in a model where agents’ types are jointly distributed according to P◦.
Definition 4. The Dutch auction is a sales procedure in which a clock begins at
∞ and continuously decreases. At any time, any bidder may claim the item by
paying the current clock value, ending the auction.
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To state the precise sense in which Dutch auction equilibria are “equivalent”
under a type distribution P and its covered counterpart distribution P◦ it will be
useful to define the following equivalence relation.
Definition 5. Two auction outcomes are said to be functionally equivalent if they
award the item to the same bidder at the same price, and the set of bidders who
pay a non-zero cost to inspect their value is the same. Two strategies for a bidder
are functionally equivalent (against a given profile of opponents’ strategies) if they
always result in functionally equivalent outcomes. Two equilibria are functionally
equivalent if they result in functionally equivalent outcomes for every profile of
types.
Theorem 2. There is a mapping from equilibria of the Dutch auction in our model with
types jointly distributed according to P to equilibria of the Dutch auction with the covered
counterpart distribution P◦ where bidders know their values without inspection. This
mapping preserves bidder expected utility and auctioneer expected revenue, and it induces
a bijection on functional equivalence classes of equilibria.
Informally the theorem states that equilibria of the Dutch auction in our model
are in bijective correspondence with Dutch auction equilibria when bidders are
replaced with their covered counterparts. To the extent that the formal theorem
statement differs from this informal summary, it is because the correspondence
may fail to preserve irrelevant details such as whether a losing bidder with zero
information acquisition cost chooses to inspect her value.
In a first price auction without information costs, individuals shade their bids
downward relative to their value. In our setting, individuals shade downward
both their inspection time and, contingent on learning their values, their claim
times according to exactly the same function, derived from the equivalent auction
without information acquisition costs. This implies that, at the time they inspect
their values the clock is always weakly below their strike price and thus they can
be sure they will always exercise in the money. This ensures that individuals can
fully offload the information cost onto the market and thus that the presence of
information costs is “irrelevant” except in that it changes the value distribution to
the covered call value distribution. To formalize this idea, our proof of 2 defines
procedures by which a bidder can “simulate” (in an expected-utility-preserving
manner) the best-response behavior of her covered counterpart and vice-versa. In
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this section we elaborate on this simulation procedure and sketch the central ideas
of the proof. The proofs of detailed claims appearing in the argument are deferred
to Appendix B.
Define a bidder’s strategy to be normalized if she always inspects her value at
the earliest possible moment, and if the price b(v, θ) at which she claims the item
given that her value is v and type is θ (if it is not yet claimed by another bidder)
is a monotically non-decreasing function of v. For a bidder who faces no inspec-
tion cost, it is without loss of generality to assume her strategy is normalized, in
the sense that any best-response in the Dutch auction is functionally equivalent
to a normalized strategy. (Appendix B, 1.) Accordingly, we will henceforth only
consider normalized strategies for bidders whose type belongs to Θk◦.
If b is a normalized strategy of a bidder with type space Θk◦, then a bidder with
type space Θk can simulate b using a strategy λ(b) defined as follows. From her
type θk, the bidder can compute the covered counterpart type θk◦ and the strike
price σk. She inspects her value vk when the price reaches b(σk, θk◦). If vk ≥ σk
she claims the item immediately, otherwise she waits until the price decreases to
b(vk, θk
◦) and claims the item at that price, if no other bidder has claimed it.
Note that, strategy λ(b) is non-exposed and, contingent on winning the item,
the price paid is the lesser of b(σk, θk◦) and b(vk, θk◦). Since b(v, θ) is monotonic in
v, this means the price paid is b(κk, θk◦), which is the same price paid by a bidder
with type θk◦ and value κk. Thus, the utility of a bidder with type θk and value
vk using strategy λ(b) duplicates the utility of a bidder with type θk◦ and value
κk using strategy b, and the auction outcomes achieved by these two strategies,
when facing the same profile of opponents’ bids, are functionally equivalent. (See
Appendix B, Claims 2-3.)
We next describe the reverse simulation—that is, the process that a bidder
of type θk◦ uses to simulate the strategy of a bidder of type θk. The bidder be-
gins by inspecting her own value, κk, at the earliest possible moment. Knowing
her own type θk◦, she also knows the corresponding type θk and strike price σk.
She next samples a simulated value vk by setting vk = κk if κk ≤ σk, and other-
wise sampling vk from the distribution whose cumulative distribution function is
F (x) = (Fθk(x)−Fθk(σk))/(1−Fθk(σk)).Note that this means the distribution of vk,
conditional on θk, matches Fθk , so we can couple two bidders with types θk and θk
◦
in such a way that the first bidder’s value is equal to the random vk sampled by the
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second one. Letting b denote the strategy to be simulated, the simulating strategy
µ(b) simply claims the item at the time when a bidder with type θk, value vk, and
strategy b would claim the item, if no other bidder has claimed it. This implies
that b and µ(b) produce functionally equivalent outcomes at every sample point.
Moreover, by 1, the utility that a bidder with type θk◦ achieves using µ(b) weakly
improves upon the utility a bidder with type θk achieves using b. (See Appendix B,
2 and 3.)
The above arguments imply that λ and µ define a pair of mutually inverse bi-
jections on functional equivalence classes of best responses for a bidder with type
space Θk and one with Θk◦. An easy induction—swapping one bidder at a time
with her covered counterpart, while holding the types and strategies of others bid-
ders fixed—then establishes the claimed bijection between functional equivalence
classes of equilibria, completing the proof of the theorem.
2 immediately implies that the desirable properties of the first-price auction
carry over to the Dutch auction with information costs.
Corollary 2. IfK (P) is symmetric across bidders and bidders’ types are independent, then
any symmetric equilibrium of the Dutch auction is efficient. Even if K (P) is asymmetric
or bidders’ types are correlated, any equilibrium achieves at least a fraction 1 − 1
e
of the
welfare of the optimal mechanism.
Proof. By 2 it suffices to consider the case when bidders face zero cost to inspect
their value, and hence can be presumed without loss of generality to do so at the
earliest possible moment. A strategy of such a bidder is characterized by a func-
tion mapping her type and value to her bid, i.e., the clock value at which she will
claim the item if no other bidder has yet done so. When types are independent,
this function can be assumed without loss of generality to depend on the bidder’s
value only, since the type contains no payoff-relevant information conditional on
the value. In equilibrium, the bid must be a monotonically increasing function of
the value (at least, on the interval of values that have a positive probability of be-
ing greater than everyone else’s bid) and in a symmetric equilibrium all bidders
apply the same such function, resulting in the highest bidder winning the item.
In asymmetric environments or when types may be correlated, if bidders face no
information acquisition costs, the fact that any Dutch auction equilibrium achieves
at least a fraction 1− 1
e
of the welfare of the optimal mechanism is a consequence of
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the “price-of-anarchy” analysis of first-price auctions, e.g. (Syrgkanis, 2012).7
More broadly, any welfare property of the first-price auction carries over to the
Dutch auction with information costs.8 For example, while we focus here on wel-
fare rather than revenue, the Dutch auction in our context will achieve the same
revenue as the corresponding first-price auction. With appropriate reserve prices
(bidder-specific end times for the auction, pre-anounced) (Hartline et al., 2014), or
with sufficiently many bidders (Bulow and Klemperer, 1996), these revenues ap-
proximate (in the constant factor sense discussed in point 2 of Corollary 2) the
greatest achievable revenue by any auction in this simpler context. An interesting
question we leave open to future research is whether there are ways to use the ex-
istence of information costs to extract a greater fraction of bidder surplus than is
possible in the corresponding setting without information costs.9
5 Calibrations
We have thus shown that the worst case performance of standard formats is far
worse than that of the Dutch auction when information acquisition is necessary. In
this section we show that, in a pair of reasonable calibrated examples, this ranking
is maintained but losses in both types of auctions settings are much smaller. In
essentially all cases the Dutch auction loses less than 1% of value from the inef-
ficiencies arising from asymmetries and typically they are an order of magnitude
7In the case of arbitrary correlation, Syrgkanis shows this bound is tight. However, in the case of
asymmetries without correlation (the one we study in our calibrations of the next section) it is not
known whether this bound can be reached and it is widely believed it cannot be. This may partly
account for our findings below.
8Another example is that folk wisdom, building off formal results in related contexts (Swinkels,
2001) suggests that in a “large market” first-price auctions are fully efficient; in addition to our
assumption of independence mentioned in the previous footnote, this may partly account for our
findings in the next section that in plausible calibrations the Dutch auction obtains nearly full effi-
ciency. We conjecture that under suitable restrictions on the tails of the value distribution to ensure
that the distribution of the highest covered call value concentrates as the number of bidders grows
large we would obtain full efficiency even with asymmetries or correlation. However we do not
pursue a formalization of this result here.
9In any case, so long as the bidder value distribution is not too convex (Anderson and Renualt,
2003) the revenue achievable in the corresponding auction approximates total welfare which, by
individual rationality, upper bounds the greatest revenue achievable. Thus in most reasonable
settings (those where manymoments of the value distribution exists) this question impacts only the
approximation factor and not whether an approximation exists. We state and prove these results
formally in Appendix E.
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smaller than this. Losses from standard formats are also small, typically a few per-
cent though occasionally they are an order of magnitude larger. The Dutch auction
outperforms by a larger margin in revenue.
5.1 Start-up acquisitions
Our first calibration is designed to match broad moments, described in press re-
ports, of the market for the acquisition of start-up companies by established firms,
a process that is well-known to require a lengthy process of “due diligence” infor-
mation acquisition.10 We also consider a wide range of robustness checks about
our baseline parameters.11 In the second calibration we build more directly off
empirical analysis of a particular market in previous literature.
5.1.1 Set-up
We consider a framework where all primitive variables are joint log-normally dis-
tributed independently and identically across bidders. Each bidder has a cost ci
and a value vi distributed as:
log (vi) = V
0
i + V
1
i + V
2
i
log (ci) = C
0
i + C
1
i .
All variables labeled 0 are known commonly ex-ante to all bidders prior to bidding.
As such, they are a source of asymmetries across bidders. For example, a bidder
with a high value of V 0i will be commonly known by her rivals to be likely to be
stronger than other bidders. Thus while all bidder values are drawn i.i.d. bidders
are not symmetric at the beginning of the auction. Variables labeled 1 are the cost-
less private information (or “type”) of the bidder ex-interim, but not known to her
rivals; thus in the language of our set-up from Subsection 2.1 above, θi = (V 1i , C
1
i ).
V 2i is learned only after value inspection, at a cost ci, which is mandatory due dili-
gence for the acquisition of the start-up.
10 Our approach is not to precisely match these figures or conduct an empirical analysis, but to
capture the key features of this setting: relatively large inspection costs, high variance in values,
and a small to moderate number of bidders.
11Our results are quite consistent across these values and it is this consistency, rather than the
particular values chosen in our baseline calibration, that gives us confidence in our conclusions.
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We make the following distributional assumptions, with all variables whose
correlation structure is not explicitly described being distributed independently:
(
V 0i
C0i
)
∼ N
(
0
µc
,
α0σ
2
v ρ
α0√
α0+α1
σvσc
ρ α0√
α0+α1
σvσc
α0
α0+α1
σ2c
)
(
V 1i
C1i
)
∼ N
(
0
0
,
α1σ
2
v ρ
α1√
α0+α1
σvσc
ρ α1√
α0+α1
σvσc
α1
α0+α1
σ2c
)
V 2i ∼ N
(
0, (1− α0 − α1) σ
2
v
)
Thus we allow only for correlations across variables at the same time step and
not across time steps. We now briefly describe the interpretation of each of these
parameters:
• µc determines the relative scale of cost compared to value; the scale of value
is normalized to 0 as in the log-normal distribution all properties of shape are
invariant to this scale.
• σ2v , σ
2
c > 0 control the total variance in the logarithm of values and costs,
which are in one-to-one correspondence with the associated Gini coefficient
of the distributions of these variables.
• ρ ∈ [−1, 1] is the correlation between log-costs and log-values (at the two
time steps where such correlation is still possible) and we assume it is equal
at the ex-ante and ex-interim stages.
• α0, α1 ∈ [0, 1] with α0 + α1 ∈ [0, 1] determine the share of the total variance,
in both cost and values, at stages 0 and 1. For instance, the variance of V 0i
is α0σ2v and that of V
1
i is α1σ
2
v . Because costs are fully determined by the
ex-interim stage, the fraction of variance at the ex-ante stage is α0
α0+α1
and
correspondingly for the ex-interim stage.
We compare the performance of the simultaneous second-price auction and the
Dutch auction to the first-best allocation. We do not consider the performance
of an ascending auction for reasons of computational tractability. With two bid-
ders it can easily be shown that the (trembling hand perfect) equilibrium of the
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ascending auction is equivalent to that of the simultaneous second-price auction.12
With more than two bidders, we were not able to determine, and to our knowl-
edge no one has ever proposed, a computationally tractable method of finding
approximate equilibrium. Given how well the Dutch auction performs with more
than two bidders, it seems unlikely that investigating the ascending auction in
greater detail would change our qualitative conclusions, though quantitatively
Compte and Jehiel (2007)’s results suggest it might somewhat mitigate loses from
search coordination relative to the simultaneous second-price auction. We defer
analysis of the BKRS sequential auction to the next calibration. We briefly describe
our computational methods in Appendix C and in greater detail in Appendix F.
5.1.2 Calibration
We chose baseline parameter values to correspond roughly to press accounts of
the market for start-up acquisition. We chose σ2c = .2, a relatively low value, as
costs of due diligence seem relatively homogeneous across potential purchasers,
and σ2v = 1, corresponding to a Gini coefficient of .52, as this degree of inequality
(similar to the degree of pre-tax inequality in many developed countries) seems
a reasonable spread in values in a financial context. We chose µc = −.62 as this
leads average costs to equal a third of average values, which is consistent with
press accounts of the industry and with the fraction of search costs in procurement
contracts found in a different context by Salz (2015). We chose ρ = .7 because
press accounts indicate that due diligence costs covary heavily with firm size, as
larger purchasers tend to hire more expensive investment bankers and firms with
high idiosyncratic value tend to do more due diligence. We had no particularly
12In a two bidder auction, each bidder will obtain the object if the other bidder drops out before
she does. As a result, each must choose a time at which she will take some action if that time
is reached without the other bidder dropping out and whether this action will be to drop out or
to inspect the object. If the bidder expects to drop out, it is weakly dominant for her to do so at
E
[
vi
∣∣V 1
i
+ v0
i
]
−c as this is her value for winning the object if she has not yet inspected. If the bidder
expects to inspect, it is weakly dominant for her to do so immediately at the start of the auction,
as she will have to inspect in any case if she wins and she can only gain by giving herself a more
informed option to drop out earlier if her value turns out to be low. Thus bidders either pursue a
policy of immediate inspection and bidding of value or of no inspection and bidding Eθi [vi] − c.
But both of these strategies are available in the simultaneous second-price auction and thus (as long
as we focus on weakly dominant strategy equilibrium) these two auctions are equivalent. Matters
are much more complicated with more than two bidders, as the drop out of one bidder may then
trigger others to inspect dynamically; this is the source of Compte and Jehiel (2007)’s results, but
also of the numerical intractability of the ascending auction in this context.
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principled way to choose the values of α, so we settled on α0 = .1 and α1 = .4 as a
baseline as these imply relatively modest levels of asymmetry, a fair bit of selective
entry, and significant variation revealed by inspection. We chose five bidders for
our baseline scenario as this seems a reasonable number of potential bidders for a
hot start-up.
We considered variations in each parameter above and below these baseline
parameters: σ2v = .5, 1.5; µc = −1.0,−.35; σ
2
c = 0, 1; ρ = −.5, 0, 1; (α0, α1) =
(.5, .25), (.5, 0.05), (.1, .1), (.1, .7). We also consider the case of two and ten bidders
not just for our baseline but also for the calibrations where we found the greatest
efficiency loss for the Dutch auction, as we expect a small number of bidders to
exacerbate these harms.
Finally we manipulated parameter values to find the worst case for each auc-
tion within our general structure. The worst case we could find for the Dutch
auction was our baseline but with two bidders. For the simultaneous second-price
auction the worst case we found had very high cost µc = −.2 and the vast major-
ity of uncertainty realizing only after costly inspection (α0 = α1 = .01).13 We ran
versions of this with our baseline of 5 and 20 bidders, as we found increasing the
number of bidders made the inefficiency worse.
5.1.3 Results
Table 1 represents our results for all the parameter settings we study. Results are
the percent welfare loss relative to the first best rounded to a single significant
digit. Because we only averaged over three ex-ante draws, this is the degree of our
numerical precision across these three draws.
In all but two cases the welfare losses from the simultaneous second-price auc-
tion are two orders of magnitude greater than those from the Dutch auction. Only
in the case with two bidders are the losses comparable; in this case the losses from
the two mechanisms were differently ranked in the three draws and thus within
our numerical error. In one other case there was only a single order of magnitude
difference in the loses; this was the case when α1 = .7 and thus there are very
strong ex-interim signals of eventual values so inspection is not critical.
13Given the very small ex-ante asymmetry in this case, we only drew a single bidder type and
ran a symmetric example.
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Parameter values Second Price Dutch
Baseline 3 .01
σ2v = .5 .4 0
σ2v = 1.5 2 .02
µc = −1.0 4 0
µc = −.35 3 .03
σ2c = 0 4 .01
σ2c = 1 4 0
ρ = −.5 3 .03
ρ = 0 3 .02
ρ = 1 3 .01
(α0, α1) = (.5, .25) 2 .01
(α0, α1) = (.5, 0.05) 4 0
(α0, α1) = (.1, .1) 7 .01
(α0, α1) = (.1, .7) 1 .04
N = 2 1 1
N = 10 5 0
Worst case N = 5 20 0
Worst case N = 20 50 0
Table 1: Welfare loss as a percentage of the first best in start-up acquisition calibration,
rounded to the first significant digit. Zero indicates that in all runs there was exact
agreement with the first best allocation.
In fact, as we show in Appendix F, very few inspections occur on average; typ-
ically about half as many inspections occur in the second-price auction as in the
Dutch auction. Thus the allocation ends up being very different in the two cases;
allocation is much less efficient under the second-price auction, but fewer inspec-
tions take place. Given that in our baseline setting there is a quite strong signal
of value available to bidders ex-ante, this still results in a quite high fraction of
social welfare, implying that the second-price auction only loses a few percent-
age points of welfare relative to the first best. However, this failure to invest in
inspection decimates revenue in the auction; in our baseline the second-price auc-
tion achieves 40% less revenue than the first-best and consistently gets 30% less
revenue, as we discuss in Appendix F in greater detail. Furthermore, in a worst
case scenario, when there are many bidders, very high inspection costs and a weak
signal of values at the interim stage, the second-price auction loses 50% of the total
value.
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This suggests to us that in almost any realistic case, the losses from poor search
coordination of the second-price auction will be dramatically larger than those
from the asymmetries in the Dutch auction. However, these losses will not be very
large in magnitude unless several key features conspire together: large inspection
costs, high variance in value from inspection, and many bidders. This was pre-
cisely the conspiracy underlying our worst case results. In most realistic settings
which lack one or more of these features, the Dutch auction seems likely to lead to
much higher revenue and orders of magnitude smaller welfare loss relative to the
optimum, but not to a dramatic quantitative rise in the absolute value of welfare.
5.2 Timber auctions
Our previous calibration was quite flexible and we considered a wide range of
scenarios, but was only very loosely calibrated to the start-up acquisition setting.
We now consider a second calibration that is somewhat less flexible and in an en-
vironment where information acquisition costs are relatively smaller, but which is
drawn from an actual empirical estimation. In particular we import the framework
of Roberts and Sweeting (2013) which is estimated based on US timber auctions.
We do not discuss the institutional context of these auctions at all and present the
set-up and calibration extremely briefly to avoid excessive duplication of material
in their article. We defer discussion of numerical methods entirely to appendices,
5.2.1 Set-up
Roberts and Sweeting’s model is similar to that in our previous calibration but
somewhat simpler. First, costs are assumed homogeneous across all bidders: σ2c =
0 and ρ is irrelevant. Second, V 0i , rather than being drawn normally, takes on two
values (one for “loggers” and one for “millers”). As a result, there is only a single
α parameter governing the fraction of the variance realized in V 1i v. V
2
i .
Roberts and Sweeting are interested in the comparison between the simulta-
neous second-price auction and the sequential BKRS mechanism we described in
Subsection 3.1 above. Roberts and Sweeting actually consider an altered version of
the second-price auction in which inspection is not only mandatory for receiving
the object, but even for placing a bid. This makes the second-price auction perform
strictly worse than the version we studied in the previous calibration by the main
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theorem of Bergemann and Välimäki (2002). In particular in the previous section
we found that the relatively good performance of the second-price auction arose
almost entirely from the fact that it allowed for bidding prior to inspection.14 As
a result it may be that the gains they find of the sequential over the second-price
auction would diminish or disappear if bidding prior to inspection were allowed,
but for consistency with their work we do not consider this quantitatively here.
5.2.2 Calibration
We simply import the parameter values estimated by Roberts and Sweeting and
the robustness variations about these that they consider. To parameterize ex-ante
asymmetries, they assume that the log-mean of logger values is µlogger = 3.582 and
of mills µdiff = .378 higher. They set σ2v = .332, α = .689 and the the homogeneous
inspection cost at K = 2.05. They assume Nloggers = 4 loggers and Nmill = 4 mills
bid in the auction. About these baseline parameters they consider the following
variations: lowering and raising theNmill to 1 and 7;Nlogger to 0 and 8; µlogger (while
holding µdiff constant) to 2.921 and 4.243; µdiff to .169 and .587; σ2v to .122 and .646;
α to .505 and .872 andK to .39 and 3.72.
In addition, we consider the variation where the inspection cost K = 16, about
one-third of expected value, to check our hypothesis that rising inspection costs
significantly impact relative performance.
5.2.3 Results
Table 2 represents our results for all the parameter settings we study as the percent
loss in welfare compared to the first-best allocation rounded to two significant dig-
its, consistent with our numerical error which is at this scale of resolution. For ev-
ery parameter setting the Dutch auction has substantially lower welfare loss than
the other two formats. In all but three cases, none including the baseline, the loss is
within a tenth of a percent of the optimum and except in a few cases it is at least an
order of magnitude smaller than the loss from either of the other formats. In many
cases it is more than two orders of magnitude smaller. Furthermore, as we show
in Appendix F, results on revenue are generally consistent with these conclusions.
14Roberts and Sweeting also consider a sealed-bid first price auction; we do not include this here
as by Bergemann and Välimäki’s theorem this must perform weakly worse than the simultaneous
second-price auction.
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Parameter values Second Price Sequential Dutch
Baseline 2.5 .79 .02
Nmill = 1 2.4 .58 .14
Nmill = 7 2.8 1.1 .79
Nlogger = 0 1.6 .70 0
Nlogger = 8 3.0 .91 .02
µlogger = 2.921 4.4 2.3 .02
µlogger = 4.243 3.8 1.3 .02
µdiff = .169 3.1 1.1 .01
µdiff = .587 2.1 .79 .07
σ2v = .122 2.9 .89 .01
σ2v = .646 5.6 4.5 .25
α = .505 2.6 .86 .02
α = .872 2.4 .52 .01
K = .39 .55 .17 .02
K = 3.72 4.2 1.3 .02
K = 16 17 3.8 .02
Table 2: Welfare loss as a percentage of the first best in timber auction calibration, rounded
to nearest two significant digits. Parameter values given are the ones that differ
from the baseline.
The Dutch auction obtains higher revenue than the second-price auction in all of
these cases and higher than the sequential BKRS sequential mechanism in all but
two cases.
However, both the second price and sequential auctions perform quite well
in these settings, implying that the gains from the Dutch (and from the sequential
over the second price) auction aremodest in absolute terms, though as Roberts and Sweeting
note they are fairly large by the standard of relative welfare and revenue gains
from other design changes usually considered in the empirical auctions litera-
ture. Inmost cases the sequential mechanism performs significantly better than the
second-price auction and this absolute gain is usually bigger than that of the Dutch
over the sequential mechanism. However, the relative decline in loss compared to
the first-best is almost always greater for the Dutch over sequential than sequential
over second price and it is possible that the gains of sequential over second price
primarily arise from the prohibition on pre-inspection bids in the second-price auc-
tion as simulated by Roberts and Sweeting
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One important reason these gains could be small is that the costs of informa-
tion acquisition at the baseline are only 2% of typical values; when we increase
this by an order of magnitude the losses grow, especially from the second-price
auction, but by much less than an order of magnitude. Losses from the sequential
mechanism are still under four percentage points, consistent with our findings in
our start-up calibration that even with costs that are about a third of typical values
losses from mechanisms that poorly coordinate search are only a few percentage
points.
Thus while the Dutch auction seems clearly to perform dramatically closer to
the full optimum than alternative mechanisms, in environments with very small
information costs the choice among mechanisms may not make much of a differ-
ence and even in cases with large costs the loses are often modest. In any case, any
losses from asymmetries in this context appear to be negligible in the vast majority
of cases and extremely small in all cases.
6 Extensions
While our theorem from Section 4 is fairly general, our results may still be extended
beyond it in a number of directions. Because it is cumbersome to incorporate these
together into a maximally general model, given the different extents to which the
full force of our analysis carries over in each case, we now consider a series of
disjoint extensions. In many cases similar results may be obtained when various
extensions are combined, but in the interests of space we do not discuss this further
here. Furthermore and for the same reasons, all set-off formal proofs in this section
have been moved to Appendix D, except for those in Section 6.1 which occupy
Appendix G.
6.1 Many stages of inspection
In our baseline model we assumed that inspection is a binary choice. However our
results all extend to a model with many stages of inspection, so long as complete
inspection is mandatory for obtaining the object. In this subsection we describe
such an environment.
Bidders may inspect the object in inspection stages, at each stage investing addi-
27
tional resources to acquire more information. Inspection stages are discrete, taking
values in N ∪ {∞}; the special value k =∞ denotes the completion of all stages of
inspection. At the beginning of the procedure, each bidder i is in inspection stage
0. Each stage of inspection is instantaneous and the bidder may choose to advance
the inspection stage at any time, including advancing any number of stages at the
same moment in time. When a bidder acquires the item, she immediately com-
pletes all (countably many) stages of inspection for it.15
The information that bidder i gains upon reaching the kth inspection stage is
represented by a signal ski . Each bidder i draws a private type θi ∈ Θi and bidders
know their own type at all times. The bidder’s valuation for the item is a random
variable vi whose value is completely determined by the information learnedwhile
inspecting. The cost of inspection is represented by a sequence of random variables
0 = c0 ≤ c1 ≤ c2 ≤ · · · ≤ c∞, where ck represents the cumulative cost of reaching
the kth inspection stage; we will assume that this cumulative cost is one of the
pieces of information incorporated into the signal ski . We will also assume that
E[v+] <∞ and E[c∞] <∞.
Proposition 4. Lemma 2, Theorem 2 and thus Corollary 2 hold in the model with many
inspection stages, with an appropriately defined generalized notion of strike price and cov-
ered call value.
Informally, the generalization of strike price is a (random) sequence of prices,
one for each stage of inspection, each representing the strike price of a call option
whose fair value would exactly cover the expected remaining inspection costs of
a decision maker, given that the decision maker has already reached the given
inspection stage and invested the attendant costs. The generalized covered call
value is then defined as the minimum of this sequence of strike prices. Intuitively
this is the value that remains to an individual who, at every stage of inspection
prior to inspecting sells the relevant call option to fund her future information
acquisition. We leave to the appendix the formal definition, as it is somewhat
complicated. But, as in Section 4, it preserves all relevant welfare quantities and
thus has the same substantive implications as in the case with a single stage of
inspection.
15To model only a finite number of stages, let all subsequent stages have no additional cost and
reveal no information.
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6.2 Many objects
Our baseline analysis focuses on the case of a single object16, but our basic insight
extends to a context with multiple items. This context requires an auction format,
with a uniform descending price across objects, that is novel to our knowledge.17
A set M of m heterogeneous items is for sale to a set N of n bidders. Bidders
have unit demand; each wants to acquire at most one item. As in our baseline
model we will denote a generic bidder by i. We will use the symbol j to denote
a generic item. Bidders are endowed, as in the baseline model, with a type θi de-
termining a vector of costs ci (θi) with typical element cij (from which we drop the
argument) denoting the cost of inspecting object j for bidder i. Type θi is drawn for
each bidder according to an arbitrary joint distribution. Given θi, bidder i’s value
vij for object j is drawn independently across i and j according to distribution Fθi,j .
Definition 6. The uniform descending auction is a sales procedure that proceeds as
follows. A clock begins at ∞ and continuously decreases and a set of items that
are available is maintained; both are displayed publicly. At any time, any bidder
may claim any available item at the clock price, at which point both the bidder and
item are removed instantly. The clock then continues to descend until it reaches 0.
The equilibrium of this mechanism has not been analyzed in previous liter-
ature to our knowledge even in a context without information acquisition and
when information acquisition is incorporated into the model, there is no known
computationally tractable procedure that is guaranteed to achieve more than half
of the welfare of an optimal allocation, making it difficult to imagine full effi-
ciency is tractably achievable. As a result, in this setting, an analog of Theorem
2 is less meaningful. We instead prove an analog of the second point of Corol-
lary 2, that any equilibrium will quite tightly approximate the welfare guarantee
16Actually, our baseline analysis also applies—with only minor modifications in the proofs—to
the case in which a fixed number of identical items are for sale or, even more generally, to the case
in which certain subsets of agents may be chosen as winners of the auction, the collection of these
feasible sets of winners constitutes a matroid, and vi represents agent i’s value for winning. The
Dutch auction is modified so that: (i) an agent may join the set of winners at any time, by paying the
current clock value, (ii) agents are eliminated from the auction whenever they do not belong to any
feasible superset of the current set of winners, (iii) the auction ends when every agent has either
been included in the set of winners or eliminated. Agents are informed when they are eliminated,
but they are not informed when other agents join the set of winners.
17A patent on this mechanism is pending with the United States Patent and Trademark Office
under the name “Descending Counter Value Matching with Information Sharing”.
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of the best tractable assignment protocol we are aware of under complete knowl-
edge of all ex ante known information, namely the greedy matching algorithm that
is guaranteed to achieve half of optimal welfare. Our argument in the appendix
draws heavily on the literature on smoothness in computational mechanism de-
sign (Lucier and Borodin, 2010; Roughgarden, 2012; Syrgkanis, 2012; Syrgkanis and Tardos,
2013; Chawla and Hartline, 2013) which is used to derive approximate efficiency
results of this form.
Theorem 3. In any Bayes-Nash Equilibrium of the uniform descending auction, expected
welfare is at least 1
2
(1− e−2) ≈ 0.43 of the first-best.
Thus the basic intuition behind our result in the single item case that guarantees
reasonable performance carries over to a setting with many objects for sale.
6.3 Approximate best response
Determining a best response may be difficult in our setting, especially in the exten-
sion of the previous subsection, because deciding both when to investigate which
object and what to bid upon investigation requires a rich set of strategic calcula-
tions about the likely behavior of other agents. Luckily, our results do not depend
sensitively on agents being able to play perfect best-responses. This is an attractive
property of the approximation arguments like those we use to establish Theorem 3
(Roughgarden, 2015). In particular, we will say that bidders α-best respond if they
obtain at least a fraction α ≤ 1 of the greatest utility they could achieve through
any strategy. Our bound declines continuously in α.
Proposition 5. In the Dutch auction with a single item, if all bidders α-best respond, then
expected welfare is at least a factor 1 − e−α of optimal. In the uniform descending auction
with multiple items, if all bidders α-best respond, then expected welfare is at least a factor
1
2
(1− e−2α) of optimal.
For reasonably large α this decay is quite gradual indeed. For example, when
α = 0.7 the expected welfare of the Dutch auction with a single item is at least half
of optimal, as compared with the approximation guarantee of 1 − 1
e
≈ 63% when
players exactly best-respond to one another. The expected welfare of the uniform
descending auction with multiple items is at least 37% of optimal when α = 0.7, as
compared with the approximation guarantee of 1− 1
e2
≈43% when players exactly
best-respond to one another.
6.4 Common values
Milgrom and Weber (1982) show, in a context without information acquisition costs,
that ascending price auctions quite generally lead to greater revenue than a de-
scending price auction if individuals have common values in the sense that the true
but unknown value of the object is common across all individuals who all have
a signal of the object’s value. This raises the question of whether, in a common
values version of our model, an ascending price mechanism might out-perform a
descending price mechanism. In this subsection we show that, to the contrary, the
bad potential performance of ascending price mechanisms and the good guaran-
teed performance of a descending price mechanism extend to a simple common
values context.
Consider our baseline environment with the followingmodification to the value
and information structure. Every individual has a common prior on the true value
of the object, v, and an individual-specific cost ci of determining this common value
that is private knowledge. Expenditure of this cost is required to obtain the item
as above.
Because the object is of equal value to all individuals, the only scope for effi-
ciency is in ensuring that the individual who investigates the object has the mini-
mumpossible cost for doing so. In an ascending or simultaneous second-price auc-
tion, there is always an equilibrium that implements this efficiency as proven by
Bergemann and Välimäki (2002). However, as Maskin and Tomoeda (2016) shows,
there are often very inefficient equilibria. In our case this is particularly easy to
illustrate.
Suppose all costs are known and that there are two bidders, Alice and Bob. Al-
ice has cost E[v] − ǫ and Bob has cost ǫ, where E[v] ≫ ǫ > 0. The best welfare
is E[v] − ǫ and is achieved in an equilibrium where Alice believes Bob will query
and claim the object at price 0 after submitting a bid of E[v] and facing no com-
petition. However suppose that Bob believes Alice will, with certainty, query and
then submit a bid of v. Bob then has no incentive to bid anything above 0 as there
is no way he can avoid taking losses if he queries. Alice makes positive profits of
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ǫ in this case and would lose these by not querying. Thus this state constitutes an
equilibrium. As ǫ → 0 it remains such and thus the price of anarchy is arbitrarily
large in this example.
Conversely, the following theorem shows that the descending procedure is ro-
bustly approximately efficient in this case.
Proposition 6. In the common values environment described in this section, the descend-
ing price, single-item auction achieves at least 1− 1
e
of the welfare of the social optimum.
This suggests that it may be possible to extend our results into richer common
values environments, for example where bidders have private signals of the valu-
ation or have both a common and private value component. This is an interesting
direction for future research.
6.5 Optional inspection
In our baseline model inspection is mandatory for an individual to consume an
object. In many cases this seems realistic: in acquiring a company it is often man-
dated by law that due diligence is complete, purchasing a house usually requires
inspection and assessments and hiring job market candidates in academia rarely is
possible without a campus interview. However, in some contexts, such as buying
a car, inspection may be optional prior to consumption.
This possibility raises interesting challenges for a descending price mechanism.
While knowing that the price of the object is not too high (bounding it from above)
may be critical for deciding between inspection and forgoing the object entirely
(deciding between “no” and “maybe”), it is when the price of the object is very
low that it will be optimal to consume it without bothering to inspect. For exam-
ple, suppose there are two bidders. Bidder A has a cost of inspection equal to 1
and a value equal to v with probability p > 1/v and to 0 with the remaining prob-
ability. Bidder B has no inspection cost and value w sampled from a distribution
will full support on [0,∞). Since it is cost-free to inspect B’s value, w, the first-best
procedure starts by doing so. If w is greater than bidder A’s strike price (namely,
v−1/p), then it is optimal to simply award the item toB. Ifw is sufficiently close to
0, then it is optimal to award the item to A without expending the cost of inspect-
ing A’s value. If w lies in a non-empty interval between these two extremes, it is
optimal to inspect A’s value and then award the item to the bidder with the higher
32
value. Thus, in order to implement the first-best procedure, before A decides to
inspect her value it is necessary to know both a lower and an upper bound on B’s
value. While we spare the reader an equilibrium construction, it should be clear
that a descending procedure will not be able to signal that B’s value is above the
threshold value necessary to spur inspection by A in the first-best procedure.
More generally, for a bidder to choose between inspection and immediate pur-
chase (deciding between “maybe” and “yes”) it may be crucial to know that the
price of the object will not be too low (bounding it from below). It thus seems plau-
sible that the greatest efficiency might be achieved by neither an ascending nor a
descending price mechanism, but rather a hybrid where potential prices converge
from both ends. On the other hand, there is no known computationally tractable
algorithm for achieving the first-best in this setting (Doval, 2014).
However, at least in the case where inspection occurs in a single stage and there
is a single object, the inefficiency due to inspecting when one might instead have
immediately claimed the object cannot “compound” in the way inefficiency due
to not considering the object at all can. Intuitively the reason is that once an indi-
vidual has claimed the object, no other efficiency loss is possible from any other
individual. Any given individual can never lose more than half of the welfare
achievable by the optimal policy by simply choosing to ignore one of her two op-
tions. More formally consider our baseline model with the lone modification that
bidders now have the option to claim and receive Eθi [vi] without first inspecting.
Proposition 7. In the optional inspectionmodel, any Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the Dutch
auction achieves at least 1
2
− 1
2e
of the welfare of the first-best.
Thus the descending price procedure at least approximates optimality in this
context.
6.6 Posted pricing
The fundamental intuition behind our result is that, to perform well, a mechanism
must allow bidders to exercise in the money by guaranteeing them, at the point
they must decide on inspection, that they can acquire the object at a price with
an upper bound. A mechanism that is in some ways even simpler than ours and
allows this is to sequentially approach bidders and offer them a posted price. This
obviously requires the seller to know a reasonable price to post. When the bidders’
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types are independent and their distributions are known to the seller it is possible
to calculate such a price that can approximate optimal welfare.
Theorem 4 (“Prophet inequality”, Krengel and Sucheston (1978); Samuel-Cahn (1984)).
Let X1, . . . , Xn be independent nonnegative random variables. Assume that the distribu-
tion of the random variable X∗ = maxiXi has no point masses, and let π be the median
of this distribution. Let Z equal the lowest-index Xi that exceeds π, or 0 if none do. Then
EZ ≥ 1
2
EX∗.
Corollary 3. When bidders are fully independent, the sequential posted-price procedure,
with price π set to the median of the distribution of the maximum covered call value, obtains
half the optimal expected welfare.
Remark 1. A different procedure that arranges the bidders in random order and
sequentially offers bidder-specific posted prices can be shown to obtain at least 1−
1
e
fraction of the optimal expectedwelfare, using the “prophet secretary inequality”
of Esfandiari et al. (2015).
While escaping the extreme failures of standard procedures, the sequential
posted price mechanism sacrifices the price discovery benefits of auctions. Un-
like the descending procedure, it is not fully efficient even under symmetry and
without information acquisition. Any posted price will exclude some bidders who
may turn out to be the highest value ones in any given sample or will allocate the
item to some bidders who turn out not to have the highest value in a given sample.
The descending price auction maintains the price discovery features of an auction
while providing the guarantees necessary to assure exercise in the money.
7 Beyond Auctions
All of our formal results concern auctions, that is, transferable utility environments
where bidders value objects that are indifferent about which bidder obtains them.
However a large literature on “market design” in recent years has drawn links
from insights about auctions to mechanisms for matching pairs of agents with
preferences on both sides of the market, and also to allocation problems where
transfers are not available.
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For example, Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) show that the underlying structure
of ascending-price auctions is closely connected to that of the ascending match
value (lowest value matches made first) procedure for transferable utility match-
ing proposed by Crawford and Knoer (1981) and Kelso and Crawford (1982) and
the deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962). Quantitative wel-
fare guarantees in incomplete information environments are often not available in
these alternative settings because of bilateral monopoly problems (Myerson and Satterthwaite,
1981) and the lack of transfers. However the structural connections between auc-
tion and matching mechanisms have been used to suggest the attractiveness of
commonly-used matching procedures and vice versa. This suggests that some of
the insights about auctions in our results may have analogs in matching settings.
In this section we briefly and informally speculate about these settings. We hope
future research will more formally quantify the welfare properties of these propos-
als.
7.1 Two-sided matching and the Marshallian Match
Most of the centralizedmatching procedures advocated by economists (Roth, 2015)
involve participants simultaneously submitting preference lists. This may lead to
large welfare losses for reasons analogous to those we highlight in the auction con-
text. For example, medical students entering into the National Resident Matching
Program must submit preferences over all hospitals they might match with before
they have any clear sense of which hospitals are in their choice set. It may be
difficult for such students to know which hospitals are worth investigating more
deeply, leading to potentially large welfare losses. In fact two-sided matching in
many markets not organized by centralized matching appears to have features
reminiscent of a descending price auction; namelymatches clear sequentially, from
high value matches downward, and participants are given “guarantees” at various
points in time about their options prior to the process of information acquisition.
Two examples are illustrative.
First, in college admissions, it is common for students to “apply early” to a
favorite choice and to therefore receive a more thorough review of their applica-
tion. Then schools commit to accepting their top choices of students, prior to these
students flying out to the schools for “second visits”. Only after students have
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engaged in this information acquisition and made decisions do schools fill their
remaining slots from their wait lists. Second, in the economics job market, infor-
mation acquisition proceeds in stages, from application review to interviews to
fly-outs to offers to second visits to applicant choices and then to second round
offers. This process progressively narrows the pool of interest and increases the
degree of potential match commitment before more costly information acquisition
takes place. Even within rounds, especially on fly-outs and offers, top schools tend
to “go before” lower ranked schools to avoid lower ranked schools wasting a fly-
out or offer on an applicant who is likely to have better offers.
Inspired by these examples, we propose and have submitted a patent applica-
tion (see Footnote 17 above) on a two-sided mechanism with transferable utility.
There is a clock that descends from∞ to 0. Employers maintain bids on any sub-
set of employees they are interested in hiring. Employees maintain asks of any
employer they are willing to work for. When the clock descends to the value of
the bid-ask spread on any edge, the employer-employee pair along that edge are
matched and removed. The wages the employer pays the employee are the av-
erage of the bid and the ask. When the clock reaches 0 the match ends and all
unmatched participants leave unmatched.
We refer to this mechanism as the Marshallian Match following Plott et al.’s
(2013) discussion ofMarshall’s (1890) theory of equilibrium. In particular Plott et al.
argue that both in Marshall’s theory and in laboratory experiments, the highest
value potential trades tend to happen first. While they consider homogeneous
goodmarkets where transactions are just defined by a uniform-across-partner willingness-
to-pay or willingness-to-accept, the natural extension of this logic to matching
seems to be a mechanism like that we describe.18
18Our mechanism may also be applied to settings with homogeneous values across matches for
an given individual, like that studied by Plott et al.; then each employer and employee need report
only a single number. A natural application would be to two-sided spectrum auctions (though one
where homogeneity is only on the sellers’ side and partially on the buyers’ side) such as the on-
going incentive auctions in the United States (Milgrom and Segal, 2015). In this setting sufficient
competition may overcome the Myerson and Satterthwaite (1981) results and allow amore positive
result.
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7.2 Non-transferable utility
In some settings where information acquisition costs are significant, social factors
prohibit the use of monetary transfers and make the combination of envy-freeness
and Pareto efficiency a more attractive standard to judge a mechanism than its
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. For example, in the allocation of dormitory rooms among
college students, determining preferences may require costly visits to the relevant
dormitories, but most schools allocate rooms by lotteries for purposes of fairness
rather than by auction.
The most canonical form of such allocation is (random) serial dictatorship. In-
dividuals are ordered (uniformly randomly in the common envy-free form) and
each individual has the pick of all items that remain upon that individual being
reached. In an environment without information acquisition a simple implemen-
tation is for individuals to order all items and the randomization to occur, and
matches be made, through a centralized computer algorithm. However, with in-
formation acquisition the sequencing seems likely to be more important, so indi-
viduals do not waste resources investigating objects that will not turn out to be
in their choice sets. It seems plausible that a mechanism that introduced actual
sequencing and thus clarified students’ effective choice sets prior to their investi-
gating their rooms could improve all students’ utilities by an unbounded factor.19
In practice full sequencing may be too slow, but many schools do batch students
into dormitory assignment rounds with equal priority, allowing them a reasonably
clear sense of their choice set.
Despite these benefits of sequencing, it is well-known that random serial dic-
tatorship may be very inefficient (Agarwal and Somaini, 2015) from an ex-ante
perspective when compared with a market in probability shares in different ob-
jects such as that proposed by Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979). To our knowledge
the only implementation of the Hylland and Zeckhauser mechanism thus far pro-
posed involves the static reporting of preferences to a centralized algorithm. Our
analysis suggests that developing implementations based on a descending price
process, with irrevocable purchases of probability shares, may have advantages if
19The implications in a two-sided setting may be even richer, as it may be desirable for students
to “accumulate offers” before investigating any of them rather than to hold on to only a single offer
as in Gale and Shapley (1962)’s celebrated deferred acceptance algorithm.
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information acquisition is costly.20 Again this is an interesting direction for future
research.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we argue that traditional market designs do a poor job coordinating
sequential information acquisition while a simple uniform descending price de-
sign does better. This conclusion runs largely contrary to existing literature which
has focused on ascending price or simultaneousmechanisms (Crawford and Knoer,
1981; Ausubel and Milgrom, 2002; Ausubel, 2004). While our calibrations suggest
that in many realistic cases the benefits of descending price mechanisms outweigh
their disadvantages, our formalism neglects many important aspects of the infor-
mation acquisition process that could modify our conclusions.
Most importantly we assumed that information acquisition, while costly, oc-
curs instantaneously, and thus that the process is not costly to other participants.
In reality, an economics job market fly-out takes a day of real time, and the meet-
ing where interviews are cheaper occurs only over the course of three days. As
a result, the rich and full sequencing from the highest-value matches downward
that we suggest is infeasible and/or undesirable in that setting. It still seems plau-
sible, and consistent with practice, that it would be optimal for some amount of
clearing to take place sequentially from the top down, perhaps in stages. However
good mechanisms would have to trade-off sequencing against speed and a reason-
able trade-off would be more complicated and parameter-dependent to strike. In
this context, therefore, our results offer more a qualitative insight and direction for
future research rather than direct guidance on a market design.
Relatedly, we assume that all information arrives only endogenously in response
to the expenditure of costs by bidders. In reality, over the course of the time assign-
ment takes place, information may arrive exogenously. Creating a market that al-
lows for sequencing of endogenous information may therefore (assuming a dead-
line) require that somematches aremade before all exogenous information arrived.
This is a leading concern raised by Roth and Xing (1994) and Niederle and Roth
20Kleinberg and Weyl have submitted a patent application on a “Descending Price Auction for
a Divisible Good” that could potentially be extended to many goods to form the basis of such an
implementation.
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(2003) and would tend to favor a market that was (nearly) simultaneous once the
maximum exogenous information was revealed. A model exploring trade-offs be-
tween the sequencing that promotes efficient endogenous information acquisition
and the simultaneity that maximizes the value of exogenous information would
therefore be important to determine an appropriate market design.
Finally, our work at present leaves a number of more technical ends loose. For
example, we have imposed a unit demand structure, which can be relaxed to a
matroid and potentially also to some other forms of substitutability, and perhaps
even to allow some complementarity at some corresponding cost to the quality of
our bounds.
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Appendix
In Appendix A, we give proofs of negative results from Section 3. In Ap-
pendix B, we give the formal proof of 2 from Section 4. In Appendix C, we give
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a high-level overview of the numerical methods used in our calibrations. In Ap-
pendix D, we give proofs of our results on extensions in Section 6. In Appendix E,
we give some revenue guarantees for the Dutch auction. In Appendix F, we give
a detailed description of the numerical methods used in our calibrations. In Ap-
pendix G, we give full proofs of our results for multistage inspection.
A Negative Result Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. We show its welfare on any strategy profile can be arbitrarily
small relative to the optimal. Let pi denote the probability assigned by i’s strategy
to inspecting and entering. The probability that i inspects and discovers vi = M
is pi
M
, and is independent of all other bidders. Total welfare is the sum of welfare
from bidders who inspect before bidding and those who don’t. The welfare from
the latter is at most the expected value minus cost of one of these bidders, which is
1− c. The welfare from inspecting bidders is at most
welfare ≤M Pr[some i inspects and has vi = M ]− c
∑
i
pi
= M
(
1−
∏
i
(
1−
pi
M
))
− c
∑
i
pi
≤M
(
1− e−
∑
i pi/(M−pi)
)
− c
∑
i
pi ≤ M
(
1− e−
∑
i pi/(M−1)
)
− c
∑
i
pi.
We used the inequality 1 − y ≥ e−y/(1−y) for y < 1, with y = pi
M
. Now let x =∑
i pi, the expected number of bidders to inspect. We observe that this welfare is
maximized by choosing x such that c = M
M−1e
−x/(M−1). As we will take M → ∞,
we simplify the exposition by supposing the maximizer be the xwhere c = e−x/M ;
this is x = M ln 1
c
. Then
welfare ≤M (1− c)− c ·M ln
1
c
= M
(
1− c− c ln
1
c
)
.
This gives a total welfare of at mostM
(
1− c− c ln 1
c
)
+1−c, and we are interested
in its ratio to the optimal welfare, which approaches M(1 − c) as n,M → ∞ as
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discussed. This ratio approaches
second-price
optimal
→
M
(
1− c− c ln 1
c
)
M(1 − c)
=
1− c− c ln 1
c
1− c
.
This can be made arbitrarily small as c is chosen arbitrarily close to 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. The ascending auction is formally specified as follows. A
global price t is initially set to some value t0 and increases continuously. A bidder
may instantaneously inspect at any time. A bidder may choose to drop out at any
time t, including the time of inspection after the inspection has occurred. Other
bidders observe this decision at all times t′ > t. After the second-to-last bidder
drops out at time t, the last remaining bidder obtains the item and pays a price of
t. If the winning bidder has not yet inspected, she must pay the inspection cost (as
with all mechanisms in this paper). If multiple bidders simultaneously choose to
drop out at the same time t leaving no one remaining, the item is awarded to one
of those who dropped out at t, chosen uniformly at random, who pays price t. We
restrict to equilibria where, once a bidder inspects, they drop immediately if the
current price exceeds their realized value, else they drop when the price reaches
their realized value. (This is achieved by a trembling-hand or dominant-strategies
refinement.)
All bidders are symmetric and have the following value distribution:
v =


M with probability p
L with probability 0.5
0 otherwise.
The cost c of all bidders is equal to E v − L = pM − L
2
. The strike price may be
calculated by p (M − σ) = c, hence σ = L
2p
. (Observe that this calculation is correct
as long as σ > L, which is true because p < 0.5.) In particular, it will suffice for
our purposes to set M = 1
p2
and L = p, and take p → 0. However, a variety of
parameter ranges also would give the result.
The proof proceeds in two parts. First, we show that, in equilibrium, no bid-
ders wait until after time L before inspecting. Intuitively, this will follow because
whichever bidders inspect last are getting negative expected value (the price ex-
45
ceeds their expected gain), causing an unraveling. Second, we show that if all
bidders inspect and/or drop before time L, welfare cannot be high. Intuitively,
this is almost identical to the simultaneous second price case, as bidders have no
information about who has found or failed to find a black swan.
For the first part of the proof, assume for contradiction that we are in an equi-
librium and there is a realization of the game where the price reaches some t > L
with k ≥ 1 bidders having not yet inspected. We prove by induction on the num-
ber of remaining bidders that all have negative expected utility for this outcome,
giving the contradiction. A key claim we will use, to be proven later, is: (∗) For any
k ≥ 1, if the last k bidders inspect simultaneously, then they all have negative expected
utility. In particular, if i is the sole remaining bidder; then her expected utility is
E v − c− t < E v − c− L ≤ 0, so it is negative.
Now suppose there are k ≥ 2 remaining bidders and there is a nonzero chance
that some bidder j is inspecting. We claim that waiting until any later time t′ > t
to act is strictly dominated for all other i 6= j. If j drops before t′, then there are
k − 1 remaining bidders and by inductive hypothesis all have negative expected
utility. If no bidders drop before t′, i gets no higher utility for dropping at t′ than
at t, and no higher utility for inspecting at t′ than at t. Hence the only possible case
where all bidders are best-responding is when they always inspect simultaneously
at time t; in this case, claim (∗) says that all have negative expected utility.
Therefore, in equilibrium, no inspections occur at any time t > L: Thus con-
ditioned on the time equalling L, it is strictly dominated to wait longer before
deciding to inspect or to drop.
We now prove claim (∗), which relies on our choice of M , L, and p (although
many choices would suffice). The case k = 1 is covered above, so let k ≥ 2. The
expected utility for any one bidder i is upper-bounded as follows. Bidder i always
pays the inspection cost c. If any other bidder j 6= i finds a black swan (vj = M),
then i’s net gain is zero. Otherwise, if i finds the black swan, i gets M − t (where
t is the current time, hence the price the winner will pay). Otherwise (so nobody,
including i, finds a black swan), i has a 1/k chance of dropping out last, hence will
pay price t and gain her value. We will lower-bound t by L, as this only decreases
the price i pays when she wins and hence only increases her utility. This allows us
to drop the case where iwins with value vi = L, as the value cancels with the price
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paid. Putting these observations together,
utility < (1− p)k−1
(
p(M − L) +
1
k
(
1
2
− p
)
(−L)
)
− c
= (1− p)k−1
(
p(M − L)−
L
k
(
1
2
− p
))
− pM +
L
2
.
Note the strict inequality results from t < L. In particular, plugging in k = 1 gives
that utility is strictly negative for a single bidder winning the item at time t > L
having not yet inspected. Next, by taking the derivative of this bound on utility
with respect to k, we get
= (1− p)k−1 ln(1− p)
(
p(M − L)−
L
k
(
1
2
− p
))
+ (1− p)k−1
L
k2
(
1
2
− p
)
= (1− p)k−1
[
L
(
1
2
− p
)(
1
k2
+
1
k
ln
1
1− p
)
− p(M − L) ln
1
1− p
]
≤ L
(
1
2
− p
)(
1 + ln
1
1− p
)
− p(M − L) ln
1
1− p
using that this expression is decreasing in k and k ≥ 1. We can now use some
rough bounds, particularly p < 1
2
and ln 1
1−p ≥ p, to say that the derivative of our
bound on utility is at most
≤ L− p2(M − L) ≤ 0
if we take, for example,M = 1
p2
and L = p. This ensures that the derivative of the
bound is always negative, hence the bound is decreasing in k. But the bound on
utility was already 0 for k = 1, hence utility is negative for all k. This completes
the proof of claim (∗).
For the second part of the proof, we now know that in equilibrium all inspec-
tions occur at or before time L. We can use a similar strategy to the second price
case. Let x be the expected number of bidders who inspect in equilibrium. Because
each bidder who inspects has a 1
2
+ p chance of vi 6= 0, the expected number of bid-
ders with vi 6= 0 is exactly x
(
1
2
+ p
)
. We claim that conditioned on i inspecting
and discovering vi 6= 0, in equilibrium at time ≤ L, the probability that vi = M is
exactly p/
(
1
2
+ p
)
independent of everything else. This follows because the cases
vi = M and vi = L are indistinguishable up to time L (i always stays in). Hence,
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given that k bidders inspect and find vi 6= 0, the probability that none of them has
vi = M is exactly
(
1− p1
2
+p
)k
. Therefore, in a realization of the game where exactly
xˆ bidders inspect and k of them find vi 6= 0, expected welfare is at most
M
(
1−
(
1−
p
1
2
+ p
)k)
+ L− xˆ · c.
Now, use that 1− y ≥ e−y/(1−y) for y < 1, letting y = p1
2
+p
. (Here, y/(1− y) = 2p.)
≤ M
(
1− e−2pk
)
+ L− xˆ · c.
Now, we are using x to denote the expected number of inspections, so x = E xˆ.
Meanwhile, using that 1 − e−x is a convex function and the constraint that E k =
x
(
1
2
+ p
)
, we get that expected welfare is at most
EM
(
1− e−2pk
)
+L−x·c ≤M
(
1− e−2pE k
)
+L−x·c = M
(
1− e−x(p+2p
2)
)
+L−x·c.
It will simplify exposition of this proof to write this bound more roughly as
M
(
1− e−xp
)
− x · c+ o(σ).
This will not change the conclusion because the optimal welfare approaches σ.21
This simplification holds because, first, p→ 0 in our example and the 2p2 term has
a negligible effect; and second, the optimal welfare is σ and L = 2pσ = o(σ), so the
additive L does not change the welfare ratio.
As in the simultaneous second price case, we canmaximize this expression over
all x. Recall that c = p(M − σ); the maximum occurs when σ = M (1− e−px), or
x = 1
p
ln 1
1− σ
M
. So
welfare ≤ σ − (M − σ) ln
1
1− σ
M
+ o(σ),
whereas the optimal welfare approaches σ as the number of bidders diverges. Thus
21To see this, note that optimal welfare is the maximimum covered call value κi = min{vi, σ};
with enough bidders, almost certainly some bidder has κi = σ.
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the ratio approaches
welfare
optimal
≤ 1−
(
M
σ
− 1
)
ln
1
1− σ
M
+ o(1) = 1−
M
σ
ln
1
1− σ
M
+ o(1)→ 0 as
M
σ
→∞.
Recall that in particular we chose M = 1
p2
and L = p, which gave σ = 1
2
. This
satisfies the requirements we needed of L
σ
→ 0 and σ
M
→ 0 as p→ 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. The optimal policy is for the R types in the population to
sequentially try to find a black swan and only allow an S type to take the object
once all of the option value of the R types has been exhausted, or one has found
a black swan. As n grows large enough that nπpR is large, this policy achieves
welfare of approximately vR
2
, as the cost cR must be paid roughly 1pR times before a
black swan of value vR is found. On the other hand any policy in which a type S
investigates prior to any investigation by R types cannot achieve welfare of more
than (1− pS) ǫ + pS vR2 ≈ ǫ because vS >
vR
2
, so that once a safe option has been
successfully investigated the cost of this investigation is already sunk and thus it
is not worth investigating the risky option.
However, it is easy to see that in any sequential equilibrium of the BKRS pro-
cedure this is exactly what happens with probability 1− π. In particular the seller
cannot distinguish between R and S types and thus will draw an S type first with
probability 1−π. Such a type will earn surplus (1− pS) ǫ−r from investigating her
value and bidding r to become the incumbent, assuming that this leads her to win
with probability 1. But it will do so, because any future buyer will know that if she
enters bidding will proceed, in the knockout auction, at least up to vS > vR2 , ǫ, wip-
ing out any gains that either type R or S could gain from investigating their values
in a later round. Thus the social welfare of the BKRS procedure can be arbitrarily
close to a fraction 0 of the first-best social welfare.
B Equivalence Theorem
This section fleshes out the proof sketch of 2 provided in Section 4. It will be
helpful to express the proof in terms of a sample space with 2n bidders, whose
types and values are jointly distributed as follows. Bidders 1, . . . , n have types
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{θi}
n
i=1 distributed according to P, and bidder i for i = n+1, . . . , 2n has the covered
counterpart type θ◦i−n. The values v1, . . . , v2n are coupled so that vi+n = κi for i =
1, . . . , n (such a coupling is possible because θi+n = θ◦i ) and the pairs {(vi, vi+n)}
n
i=1
are mutually independent.
Claim 1. Against any profile of strategies for bidders k + 1, . . . , k + n− 1, any best
response of bidder k + n is functionally equivalent to a normalized strategy.
Proof. Since bidder k + n can inspect her value without cost, each of her strategies
is functionally equivalent to one in which she inspects her value at the earliest pos-
sible moment. Thus, up to functional equivalence, a strategy for bidder k + n is
completely described by a function b(vk+n, θk+n) indicating the price at which she
will claim the item, given that her value is vk+n, her type is θk+n, and no other bid-
der has yet claimed the item. Furthermore, if v < v′ but b(v, θk+n) > b(v′, θk+n), then
b cannot be a best response to a strategy profile of bidders k + 1, . . . , k + n− 1, un-
less both of the bids b(v, θk+n), b(v′, θk+n) have zero probability of winning against
that strategy profile. In that case b is functionally equivalent to a strategy that al-
ways bids zero when the probability of winning is zero, and the latter strategy is
represented by a monotonically non-decreasing bid function.
In the next claim and the following one, we say a strategy of bidder k “almost
surely exercises in the money” if the event that bidder k inspects her value, finds
that vk > σk, yet does not claim the item, has probability zero.
Claim 2. Fix any strategy profile b−k for bidders k + 1, . . . , k + n − 1. If bk is any
strategy for bidder k that almost surely exercises in the money, then bk and λ(µ(bk))
are functionally equivalent. If bk+n is a normalized strategy for bidder k + n then
bk+n and µ(λ(bk+n)) are functionally equivalent.
Proof. From the definitions of λ and µ it is clear that, if bidder k obtains the item at
price twhen using strategy bk, then k+n also obtains the item at price twhen using
µ(bk) to simulate bk, and that k obtains the item at price t when using λ(µ(bk)) to
simulate µ(bk).
To complete the proof that bk and λ(µ(bk)) yield functionally equivalent out-
comes, we must prove that bidder k inspects the item under strategy bk if and only
if she inspects the item under strategy λ(µ(bk)). Let b
insp
k (θk) denote the clock value
at which bidder k inspects the itemwhen using strategy bk; by our assumption that
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bk almost surely exercises in the money, we know that it always claims the item at
price binspk (θk) if vk > σk. Therefore, when bidder k + n uses strategy b = µ(bk) to
simulate bk, she must always claim the item at price b
insp
k (θk) if vk > σk.
Now, recall that the mapping λ is defined in terms of the function b(v) that
specifies the price at which bidder k + n claims the item if vk+n = v. When vk > σk
we have vk+n = σk, so according to the reasoning in the previous paragraph it must
be the case that b(σk) = b
insp
k (θk). By the definition of λ, then, it follows that strategy
λ(b) = λ(µ(bk)) inspects the itemwhen the clock value is b
insp
k (θk), exactly as bk does.
This completes the proof that bk and λ(µ(bk)) are functionally equivalent.
Since bidder k + n has zero inspection cost, this immediately implies that bk+n
and µ(λ(bk+n)) are functionally equivalent.
Claim 3. Fix any strategy profile b−k for bidders k + 1, . . . , k + n − 1. Let bk be
any strategy of bidder k and let bk+n be any normalized strategy of bidder k + n.
Denoting by uk, uk+n the expected utilities of bidders k and k + n, we have
uk(λ(bk+n), b−k) = uk+n(bk+n, b−k) (2)
uk(bk, b−k) ≤ uk+n(µ(bk), b−k). (3)
Furthermore, equality is attained in Equation (3) if and only if bk almost surely
exercises in the money. Best responses of bidder k to b−k almost surely exercise in
the money.
Proof. For i ∈ {k, k + n} let Ai and Ii denote the indicator random variables of
the events that bidder i inspects her value in a Dutch auction against bidders k +
1, . . . , k+n−1 playing strategy profile b−k, and let ti denote the amount that i pays.
We have
uk = Akvk − Ikck − tk
uk+n = Ak+nvk+n − Ik+nck+n − tk+n = Akκk − tk
where we have used the facts that Ak+n = Ak and tk+n = tk, along with vk+n = κk
(by our construction of the coupling) and ck+n = 0 (by the definition of the cov-
ered counterpart). 1 now implies all of the conclusions stated in the claim, except
for the statement that best responses of bidder k to b−k almost surely exercise in
the money. To prove that statement, we reason as follows. Let u∗k and u
∗
k+n de-
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note the maximum expected utility attainable by bidders k and k+ n, respectively,
when bidding against strategy profile b−k. Equation (2) implies u∗k ≥ u
∗
k+n, while
Equation (3) implies u∗k ≤ u
∗
k+n, therefore the two must be equal to one another.
Furthermore, any strategy of bidder k that does not almost surely exercise in the
money fails to attain equality in Equation (3) and therefore must fail to be a best
response. Contrapositively, every best response of bidder k must almost surely
exercise in the money.
Claim 4. The functions λ and µ induce mutually inverse bijections on functional
equivalence classes of best responses for bidders k and k + n.
Proof. First we must show that λ and µ preserve the relation of functional equiva-
lence. If bk+n and b′k+n are functionally equivalent normalized strategies of bidder
k+n then λ(bk+n) and λ(b′k+n) are functionally equivalent because this transforma-
tion leaves other bidders’ behavior unchanged and bidder k inspects at the same
clock value no matter whether she is using λ(bk+n) or λ(b′k+n); in fact this clock
value is equal to the value at which bidder k + n claims the item if her value is
σk and she is using either bk+n or b′k+n. If bk and b
′
k are functionally equivalent
strategies of bidder k then µ(bk) and µ(b′k) are functionally equivalent as the trans-
formation leaves other bidders’ behavior unchanged.
Having established that λ and µ are well-definedmappings between functional
equivalence classes, we know from 2 that the composition λ ◦ µ is equal to the
identity on the set of functional equivalence classes of strategies that almost surely
exercise in the money, and that µ ◦ λ is equal to the identity on the set of functional
equivalence classes of normalized strategies. Those two sets contain, respectively,
the sets of best responses of bidders k and k+n, by an application of 1 (for bidder
k + n) and 3 (for bidder k).
To conclude the proof of 2, from 4 we know that for any fixed profile of strate-
gies b−k of bidders k+1, . . . , k+n−1, there is a bijection between functional equiva-
lence classes of best responses of bidders k and k+n; in particular this holds when
b−k represents the profile of strategies used by bidders k+1, . . . , k+n−1 in an equi-
librium of the Dutch auction with either of the bidder sets {k, k+1, . . . , k+n−1} or
{k+1, k+2, . . . , k+n}. The functional equivalence classes of equilibria of the Dutch
auction with these two bidder sets are therefore in bijective correspondence. Fur-
thermore, this correspondence preserves the auctioneer’s revenue and the utility
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of each bidder except possibly bidders k and k + n. 3 ensures that those bidders’
expected utility is also preserved. Composing together these equilibrium corre-
spondences for k = 1, . . . , n, we finally obtain the mapping from equilibria of the
Dutch auction with bidders 1, . . . , n (whose types are jointly distributed according
to P) to equilibria of the Dutch auction with bidders n+1, . . . , 2n (whose types are
jointly distributed according to P◦) as asserted in the theorem statement.
C Numerical Methods
Here we give a high-level overview of our numerical methods, with more details
given in Appendix F.
In the start-up calibration of Subsection 5.1 we must solve, in each scenario
we study, for the expected welfare of three mechanisms: the first-best, the Dutch
auction and the simultaneous second-price auction. To do so, for every parameter
setting, we repeatedly:
1. Draw a value of {(V 0i , C
0
i )}
N
i=1.
2. Construct a distribution of covered call values for each bidder based on these.
3. Solve for the equilibrium of the Dutch auction using Richard Katzwer’s “Auc-
tionSolver” software package (Katzwer, 2009) to find the equilibrium of the
asymmetric first-price auction with bidder values distributed according to
covered call values. By 2 we know the equilibrium welfare in this environ-
ment is equal to that of the Dutch auction in our environment.
4. Solve for the equilibrium of the second-price auction using smoothed best
response iteration and some analytical tricks through a program we wrote
that we describe in Appendix F.
5. Sample {(V 1i , C
1
i , V
2
i , C
2
i )}
N
i=1 repeatedly, calculate the corresponding covered
call values, and feed this information to the above-calculated equilibria to
obtain average welfare for each mechanism, as well as the first-best (which is
just the highest covered call value).
We then average values over all these samples to construct overall Monte Carlo
estimates of our three objects of interest, though the number of sampling iterations
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is small given that each iteration requires a full solution for equilibrium and thus
in practice we consider the average of only three auctions generated by draws of
{(V 0i , C
0
i )}
N
i=1 for each set of parameter values rather than a precise estimate of
average welfare. This allowed us only to get precision to a single significant digit
and thus we report estimates rounded to this accuracy. We provide further details
of our numerical methods in Appendix F.
Solving for the equilibrium of the BKRSmechanism is fairly complex, likely one
reason that Roberts and Sweeting consider a set-up simpler than ours in the previ-
ous calibration. Luckily, Roberts and Sweeting report the welfare of the simultane-
ous second-price auction and the BKRS mechanism, meaning that we only need to
compute the first-best welfare and that of the descending auction. Furthermore be-
cause there are only two types of bidders, the outer loop of our numerical method
above is unnecessary. We thus simply construct the distribution of covered call
values and the corresponding first-price auction equilibrium using AuctionSolver
and then sample from the covered call value distribution to construct both first-
best welfare and welfare under the Dutch auction.
D Extensions
D.1 Many objects
Our argument uses an approach from the literature on smoothness in computa-
tional mechanismdesign (Lucier and Borodin, 2010; Roughgarden, 2012; Syrgkanis,
2012; Syrgkanis and Tardos, 2013; Chawla and Hartline, 2013). This relies on show-
ing inequalities based on a particular, simple deviation that each bidder could
make relative to equilibrium play. For player i, the deviation strategy b′i:
1. Samples a random number r ∈ [e−2, 1] with density f(r) = 1
2r
. For an object
with strike price σ and value v, define the shaded strike price and shaded value
to be (1− r)σ and (1− r)v, respectively.
2. Takes no action at any time when the clock value t is strictly greater than
the highest remaining shaded strike price of an uninspected object and the
highest remaining shaded value of an inspected object.
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3. When t becomes weakly less than either of these, the deviation claims any
object that has been inspected and has shaded value of t and if no such ob-
ject exists it inspects, in random order, any object with shaded strike price
t, claiming that object if its shaded value is weakly above t and otherwise
continuing inspection until all objects of shaded strike price t have been in-
spected.
Lemma 3. The deviation strategy b′i always exercises in the money. It acquires item j at
price (1 − r)κij if the item is still available, has non-negative value, and bidder i has not
yet acquired another item; otherwise it does not acquire item j.
Proof. By construction, any object that is inspected and has a value above its strike
price is immediately claimed, i.e. b′i always exercises in the money. The price at
which an object is claimed is, by construction, equal to the lesser of its shaded strike
price and its shaded value, i.e. (1−r)κij . The only circumstance that prevents i from
claiming j at this price is the event that either i already claimed another object, or
that j was already sold to another bidder.
To state the key lemma that underpins our analysis of the equilibria of the
descending-clock auction, we introduce the following notation. If b is a profile of
strategies, pi(b) denotes the price paid by bidder i in the descending-clock auction,
and pj(b) denotes the price paid for item j. Finally, κi(b) denotes the covered call
value of the item i receives in the descending-clock auction, or κi(b) = 0 if there is
no such item; in other words, κi(b) =
∑
j∈MA
ij(b)κij . All of these quantities should
be interpreted as random variables on the sample space defined by the random
realization of costs, types, and values.
Lemma 4. For any i, j, any strategy profile b, and any realizations of all types and values,
E
[
κi (b−i, b′i)− pi (b−i, b
′
i) | {(θj , vj)}
n
j=1
]
+ 1
2
pi(b) +
1
2
pj(b) ≥ 1
2
(
1− e−2
)
κij.
(The conditional expectation on the left side integrates over the random choice of r in strat-
egy b′i.)
Proof. The structure of the deviation strategy b′i guarantees that κi(b−i, b
′
i)−pi(b−i, b
′
i) =
rκi(b−i, b′i) pointwise. When i does not receive an item this is because both sides
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are equal to zero; when i receives an item it is because strategy b′i dictates that i al-
ways pays 1 − r times the covered call value for the item it acquires. Accordingly,
the inequality asserted by the lemma is equivalent to
Er [rκi(b−i, b′i)] +
1
2
pi(b) +
1
2
pj(b) ≥ 1
2
(
1− e−2
)
κij , (4)
where we have introduced the notation Er[·] as shorthand for E[· | {(θj , vj)}nj=1].
Claim 5. Let p(b) = max{pi(b), pj(b)}. If the random number r sampled in the
initial step of deviation strategy b′i satisfies r < 1− p(b)/κij then κi(b−i, b
′
i) ≥ κij .
Proof. The proof is by contradiction: if κi(b−i, b′i) < κij then player i did not claim
item j when the clock value was at (1 − r)κij , which could only mean that some
other bidder i′ had already claimed item j at that time. However, the inequality
r < 1 − p(b)/κij implies (1 − r)κij > p(b) ≥ pi(b), meaning that the behavior of
bidder i in strategy profile (b−i, b′i) remains indistinguishable from her behavior
in the equilibrium profile b until after the clock value descends below (1 − r)κij .
Consequently, the bidder i′ 6= i who claims item j at a price greater than or equal
to (1− r)κij when the strategy profile is (b−i, b′i)must also do so when the strategy
profile is b. This implies pj(b) ≥ (1 − r)κij , contrary to our assumption that p(b) <
(1− r)κij .
Let ρ = p(b)/κij . 5 justifies the inequality
Er [rκi(b−i, b′i)] ≥
(ˆ 1−ρ
e−2
(rκij) f(r) dr
)+
=
(ˆ 1−ρ
e−2
κij
2
dr
)+
= 1
2
(
1− e−2 − ρ
)+
κij .
(5)
If ρ < 1− e−2 then 1− e−2 − ρ is positive, so we obtain
Er [rκi(b−i, b′i)] ≥
1
2
(
1− e−2
)
κij −
1
2
ρκij =
1
2
(
1− e−2
)
κij −
1
2
p(b). (6)
In light of the fact that p(b) = max{pi(b), pj(b)} ≤ pi(b) + pj(b), we conclude that
Inequality (4) holds in this case. On the other hand, if ρ ≥ 1 − e−2, then p(b) ≥
(1− e−2) κij , so at least one of the last two terms on the left side of Inequality (4)
is greater than or equal to the right side. Since all three terms on the left side are
non-negative, we see that (4) holds in this case as well.
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Proof of 3. Let cbij denote the inspection cost paid by bidder i for item j in strategy
profile b. Let ui(b) =
∑
j [A
ij(b)vij − c
b
ij − pij(b)] denote bidder i’s utility in the
outcome of strategy profile b. Then, in any equilibrium b,
E [welfare] = E
[∑
i
ui(b) + pi(b)
]
≥ E
[∑
i
ui(b−i, b′i) + pi(b)
]
(7)
because each i prefers the equilibrium strategy bi to the deviation b′i. Now, the
deviation strategy b′i always exercises in the money, so
E [ui(b−i, b′i)] = E
[∑
j
(
A
ij(b−i, b′i)vij − c
(b−i,b′i)
ij − pij(b−i, b
′
i)
)]
= E
[∑
j
A
ij(b−i, b
′
i)κij − pij(b−i, b
′
i)
]
= E [κi(b−i, b
′
i)− pi(b−i, b
′
i)] .
Substituting this into (7), we obtain
E [welfare] ≥ E
[∑
i
(κi(b−i, b′i)− pi(b−i, b
′
i)) +
∑
i
pi(b)
]
.
The sum of prices paid by bidders equals the sum of prices paid for items, so we
may rewrite
∑
i pi(b) as
1
2
∑
i pi(b) +
1
2
∑
j p
j(b), yielding
E [welfare] ≥ E
[∑
i
(κi(b−i, b′i)− pi(b−i, b
′
i)) +
1
2
∑
i
pi(b) +
1
2
∑
j
pj(b)
]
. (8)
At this point we may define random variables
αi = E
[
κi(b−i, b′i)− pi(b−i, b
′
i) | {(θj , vj)}
n
j=1
]
+ 1
2
pi(b)
βj =
1
2
pj(b)
and rewrite (8) as
E [welfare] ≥ E
[∑
i
αi +
∑
j
βj
]
. (9)
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4 ensures that for all bidders i and items j, the inequality
αi + βj ≥
1
2
(
1− e−2
)
κij (10)
holds pointwise. For the first-best policy, define A∗ij and I
∗
ij as before to be, respec-
tively, the indicators of of the events that bidder i receives item j and that i inspects
j. We know from Lemma 1 that
E [first-best] =
∑
ij
E
[
A
∗
ijvij − c
∗
ij
]
≤
∑
ij
EA
∗
ijκij . (11)
Using (10) and the fact that the first-best policy allocates at most one item to each
bidder and at most one bidder to each item, we have
1
2
(
1− e−2
)∑
ij
EA
∗
ijκij ≤ E
[∑
ij
A
∗
ij(αi + βj)
]
= E
[∑
i
αi
(∑
j
A
∗
ij
)]
+ E
[∑
j
βj
(∑
i
A
∗
ij
)]
≤ E
[∑
i
αi +
∑
j
βj
]
. (12)
The theorem follows immediately, by combining (9) with (12).
Intuitively there are two reasons why the approximation (often referred to as
the “price of anarchy” in the relevant literature) we obtain to optimal welfare is
worse in the general than in the single-item case (point 2 of Corollary 2). First, the
greedy assignment algorithm which a descending auction approximately coordi-
nates is not optimal, only approximately so. Second, with multiple items there are
more cases to be considered to “cover” the potential welfare impacts of a devia-
tion, as deviations may not only change whether an individual is assigned an object
but also which object she is assigned.22 When one combines these two sources of
inefficiency, they cause our price-of-anarchy bound to degrade from 1 − 1
e
≈ 0.63
22Rather than the two cases that arise in the smoothness proof of, for example,
Lucier and Borodin (either bidder i achieves a high expected utility when deviating, or some bid-
der pays a high price in equilibrium) there are now three cases to consider: either bidder i achieves
a high expected utility when deviating, or some bidder pays a high price for item j in equilibrium,
or bidder i pays a high price for some other item in equilibrium.
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in the single-item case to 1
2
(1− e−2) ≈ 0.43 in the general case with multiple items
being sold. Note, however, that in the multiple-item case the greedy procedure is
only guaranteed to attain at least half of the first-best welfare, so the fact that every
equilibrium of the uniform descending procedure attains at least 43% of the first-
best welfare can be interpreted as indicating that the efficiency loss due to strategic
behavior is quite mild.
D.2 Approximate best responses
Proof of Proposition 5. We present the proof of the single-item case, and we indicate
how to modify the proof to pertain to the multi-item case.
Let i∗ = argmaxi κi. For a strategy profile b, let p(b) be the price paid and let
ui(b) = Ai(b)[vi−p(b)]−Ii(b)ci be i’s utility. If b is a profile of α-best responses, then
welfare ≥ E
[
p(b) +
∑
i
ui(b)
]
≥ E
[
p(b) + α
∑
i
ui(b−i, b
′
i)
]
(13)
for any profile of deviation strategies, {b′i}. In particular, consider the mixed strat-
egy b′i that samples a random variable r ∈ [e
−α, 1]with density f(r) = 1
αr
(indepen-
dent of θi) and claims the item at price (1 − r)κi if it is available. This is achieved
by inspecting when the clock value is at (1 − r)σi and claiming at (1 − r)vi, or
immediately if vi ≥ σi. We have
ui(b
′
i) = Ai(b−i, b
′
i)(κi − p(b)) = Ai(b−i, b
′
i)(rκi) ≥ 0, (14)
where the first equation holds because b′i always exercises in the money, and the
second holds because strategy b′i is designed to always pay price (1 − r)κi upon
winning the item. Combining (13) and (14), and letting i∗ denote the identity of
the bidder with the highest covered call value, we have
welfare ≥ E
[
p(b) + αui∗(b−i∗ , b′i∗)
]
= E
[
p(b) + αAi∗(b−i∗ , b′i∗)(rκi∗)
]
. (15)
We claim that the following inequality holds for all type profiles θ and strategy
profiles b:
E
[
p(b) + αAi∗(b−i∗ , b′i∗)(rκi∗)
∣∣∣θ, b] ≥ (1− e−α)κi∗ . (16)
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Since we are conditioning on both θ and b, the only remaining randomness is due
to the random sampling of r by strategy b′i∗ , which in turn may influence the allo-
cation of the item and the price paid. Let p denote the price at which a bidder other
than i∗ will claim the item when i∗ is excluded from the auction and the other bid-
ders’ strategy profile is b−i∗ . If p > (1−e−α)κi∗ thenAi∗(b−i∗ , b′i∗) = 0 and p(b) = p so
the validity of Inequality (16) is obvious. Otherwise, setting κ = κi∗ for notational
convenience, observe that bidder i∗ wins the item if and only if (1 − r)κ > p, i.e.
r < 1− p/κ. Thus, we have
E
[
αAi∗(b−i∗ , b′i∗)(rκi∗)
∣∣∣θ, b] = α ˆ 1−p/κ
e−α
rκ f(r) dr =
ˆ 1−p/κ
e−α
κ dr
= κ
[
1− p/κ− e−α
]
=
(
1− e−α
)
κ− p.
Observing that p(b) ≥ p pointwise, we may add E[p(b)|θ, b] to the left side and p to
the right side, obtaining Inequality (16).
Finally, combining Inequalities (15) and (16) we find that the welfare attained
by any profile of α-best responses satisfies
welfare ≥
(
1− e−α
)
E[κi∗ ]. (17)
In light of Lemma 1 which says that E[κi∗ ] is an upper bound on the expected
welfare attained by any policy, this concludes the proof of the proposition.
The proof of the approximation factor 1
2
(1− e−2α) in the multi-item case is a
modification of the proof of Theorem 3. A key difference is that we are only as-
suming that b is a profile of α-best responses, so Inequality (7) must be relaxed
to
E [welfare] = E
[∑
i
ui(b) + pi(b)
]
≥ E
[
α
∑
i
ui(b−i, b′i) + pi(b)
]
. (18)
To analyze the quantity on the right side, one considers for each player i the devi-
ation strategy b′i that:
1. Samples a random number r ∈ [e−2α, 1]with density f(r) = 1
2αr
. For an object
with strike price σ and value v, define the shaded strike price and shaded value
to be (1− r)σ and (1− r)v, respectively.
2. Takes no action at any time when the clock value t is strictly greater than
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the highest remaining shaded strike price of an uninspected object and the
highest remaining shaded value of an inspected object.
3. When t becomes weakly less than either of these, the deviation claims any
object that has been inspected and has shaded value of t and if no such ob-
ject exists it inspects, in random order, any object with shaded strike price
t, claiming that object if its shaded value is weakly above t and otherwise
continuing inspection until all objects of shaded strike price t have been in-
spected.
The key inequality that underpins the analysis of welfare in an equilibrium strat-
egy profile b is
αE
[
κi (b−i, b′i)− pi (b−i, b
′
i) | {(θj, vj)}
n
j=1
]
+ 1
2
pi(b) +
1
2
pj(b) ≥ 1
2
(
1− e−2α
)
κij . (19)
The proof of this inequality is exactly parallel to the proof of Lemma 4, with ap-
propriate modifications due to the fact that the density of r is now f(r) = 1
2αr
rather than 1
2r
. Compared with the proof of Theorem 3, we have an additional
factor of α on the right side of (18) which matches the additional factor of α on
the left side of (19). This allows us to combine the two inequalities to derive the
claimed approximation guarantee, in a manner that exactly parallels the way that
Inequality (7) was combined with Lemma 4 to derive the approximation guarantee
in Theorem 3.
D.3 Common values
Proof of Proposition 6. Let i be the bidder who turns out to have the lowest cost.
Note that the first-best welfare is achieved when bidder i inspects the common
value, v, and acquires the item if and only if v ≥ 0. This implies that the first-best
welfare is equal to E[v+]− ci. Denote this quantity by w.
Now let b be any equilibrium profile of strategies and let b′i be the mixed strat-
egy for i that samples a random r ∈ [1
e
, 1] with density f(r) = 1/r and inspects
the item’s value, v, when the descending clock is at (1 − r)w, unless the item has
already been claimed. Upon inspecting the item and finding that v ≥ 0, strategy b′i
immediately claims the item at the current price of (1 − r)w. If v < 0 then b′i never
claims the item.
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All bidders have non-negative utility in equilibrium, and bidder i’s utility in
equilibrium is at least as great as her utility when playing b′i, so
E [welfare] = E
[
p(b) +
∑
j
uj(b)
]
≥ E [p(b) + ui(b−i, b′i)] . (20)
Condition on the profile of bidders’ costs, c, so that the only remaining random
variables are the item’s value, v, and the random choice of r in mixed strategy b′i.
We claim that
E [p(b) + ui(b−i, b′i) | c] ≥
(
1− 1
e
)
w (21)
Let p denote the price at which a bidder other than i will claim the item when
i is excluded from the auction and the other bidders’ strategy profile is b−i. If
p >
(
1− 1
e
)
w then bidder i does not inspect the item’s value, and another bidder
wins the item at price p. We thus have p(b) + ui(b−i, b′i) = p >
(
1− 1
e
)
w which
establishes (21). Otherwise, we have p ≤
(
1− 1
e
)
w and bidder i inspects the item
if and only if r < 1− p/w. Note that conditional on the value of r and on the event
that bidder i inspects the item, her utility is
E[v+]− ci − (1− r)w · Pr(v ≥ 0) = w − (1− r)w · Pr(v ≥ 0) ≥ rw.
Integrating over the random choice of r, we obtain
E [ui(b−i, b′i) | c] =
ˆ 1−p/w
1/e
rw f(r) dr =
(
1− p
w
− 1
e
)
w =
(
1− 1
e
)
w − p. (22)
Since p(b) ≥ p we may add E[p(b)|c] to the left side of (22) and p to the right side,
obtaining (21)
Finally, combining Inequalities (20) and (21) we obtain E[welfare] ≥
(
1− 1
e
)
w,
as claimed.
D.4 Optional inspection
Proof of Proposition 7. For bidder i, let v¯i = E[vi | θi] denote the expected value of
acquiring the item given i’s type, θi. For any procedure, let us represent its net
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welfare as the sum of two terms: wi, the inspected welfare, is the net contribution
from bidders who inspect their value, while wu, the uninspected welfare, is the net
contribution from bidders who do not inspect their value. More precisely,
wi =
∑
i
Ii · [Aivi − ci]
wu =
∑
i
(1− Ii) · v¯i.
Conditional on the profile of realized types, {θi}, the procedure that maximizes
E[wi] is Weitzman’s optimal search procedure, which achieves E[wi] = E[maxi κi].
The procedure that maximizes E[wu] simply allocates the item to the bidder iwith
maximum v¯i. Therefore, letting w∗i and w
∗
u denote the values of wi and wu for the
first-best procedure, we have
E[first-best] = E[w∗i + w
∗
u] ≤ E[max
i
κi] + E[max
i
v¯i]. (23)
We claim that any equilibrium of the Dutch auction achieves
E[welfare] ≥
(
1− 1
e
)
E[max
i
κi] (24)
E[welfare] ≥
(
1− 1
e
)
E[max
i
v¯i] (25)
The proposition will follow by summing these two inequalities and combining
with (23).
The proofs of Inequalities (24) and (25) use a “smoothness” argument very sim-
ilar to the arguments used in proving Theorem 3 and Propositions 5 and 6. Let b
be any equilibrium profile of strategies, and define deviation strategies b′i and b
′′
i
for bidder i to be the following mixed strategies: sample a random r ∈ [1
e
, 1] with
density f(r) = 1/r. In deviation b′i, bidder i inspects the item when the descending
clock is at (1 − r)σi and claims it either immediately (if vi ≥ σi) or when the de-
scending clock reaches (1−r)vi. In deviation b′′i , bidder i acquires the item without
inspection when the descending clock reaches (1 − r)v¯i. Note that, conditional on
any type profile {θj},
For any profile of types (θ1, . . . , θn) let i′ denote the bidder with maximum cov-
ered call value, and let i′′ denote the bidder with maximum conditional expected
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value. The equilibrium welfare satisfies
E[welfare] = E
[
p(b) +
∑
i
ui(b)
]
≥ E
[
p(b) +
∑
i
ui(b−i, b′i)
]
≥ E [p(b) + ui′(b−i′ , b′i′)]
(26)
E[welfare] = E
[
p(b) +
∑
i
ui(b)
]
≥ E
[
p(b) +
∑
i
ui(b−i, b
′′
i )
]
≥ E [p(b) + ui′(b−i′′ , b
′′
i′′)]
(27)
where the second inequality on each line follows because the expected utility of
bidder i using either of the deviations b′i, b
′′
i is non-negative. As in the proof of
Proposition 6, conditional on any profile of types {θi}, each of the inequalities
E [p(b) + ui′(b−i′ , b′i′) | {θi}] ≥
(
1− 1
e
)
κi (28)
E [p(b) + ui′′(b−i, b
′′
i′′) | {θi}] ≥
(
1− 1
e
)
v¯i (29)
holds pointwise. The justification of both inequalities recapitulates the justification
for Inequality (21) in the proof of Proposition 6, except for notational changes to ac-
count for the minor differences in the deviations being considered. Combining (26)
and (27) with (28) and (29) we obtain (24) and (25), from which the proposition fol-
lows.
D.5 Posted pricing
Proof of Corollary 3. Each bidder i’s best response, when offered π, is to inspect iff
π ≤ σi and subsequently claim the item iff π ≤ vi; in other words, i accepts the
posted-price offer if and only if π ≤ κi. These strategies exercise in the money,
so the welfare of the sequential posted-price procedure is equal to the expected
covered call value of the winner, while the optimal welfare is upper-bounded by
the expected maximum covered call value. Letting Xi be the covered call value of
bidder i, and noting that these random variables {Xi} are independent, Theorem
4 implies the result.
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E Revenue Guarantees
Herewe show that, under some common assumptions, the Dutch auctionwith per-
bidder reserves has approximately optimal revenue in the single-item setting with
inspection costs. We will rely on material from main text Section 4. We will first
show that the Dutch auction with per-bidder reserves is still invariant to search
costs, i.e. “functionally equivalent” to an auction without costs of inspection. We
may then apply known results on first-price auctions with reserves, under suitable
assumptions.
Definition 7. The Dutch auction with per-bidder reserve prices {ri}Ni=1 is a sales
procedure in which a clock begins at∞ and continuously decreases. Any bidder
i may stop the clock at any time weakly exceeding ri, ending the auction, paying
the current clock value, and obtaining the item.
Recall Definition 3: for a given type θi ∈ Θi, its covered counterpart θ◦i has zero in-
spection cost and value distributed according to the distribution of κi, the covered-
call value for θi. Given a prior P on bidders in our model, P◦ is the corresponding
prior on covered counterparts.
Recall Definition 5: two auction outcomes are termed functionally equivalent if
the same bidder gets the item and at the same price, and the set of inspection costs
paid is the same. This is extended to functional equivalence of strategies and of
equilibria.
Theorem 1. There is a mapping from equilibria of the Dutch auction with per-bidder
reserves in our model with types jointly distributed according to P to equilibria of the
Dutch auction with per-bidder reserves with the covered counterpart distribution P◦ where
bidders know their values without inspection. This mapping preserves bidder expected
utility and auctioneer expected revenue and induces a bijection on functional equivalence
classes of equilibria.
Proof. Fix a bidder i and any strategies of the other bidders. We will construct
a mapping between (A) best-responses of i in the Dutch auction with per-bidder
reserves and inspection and (B) best-responses of i’s covered counterpart in the
Dutch auction with per-bidder reserves and no inspection. This will be a bijection
of functional equivalence classes of best responses, preserving bidder utilities and
auctioneer revenue, proving the theorem.
First, we will construct a bijection between setting A above and (A’) the Dutch
auction without reserves and with inspection, where bidders other than i continue
to play their strategies from the auction with reserves and we have added a “re-
serve bidder” who always bids ri. We claim this is a bijection of best-responses
of bidder i between A and A′, for the following reason. Every strategy in A′ that
attempts to inspect or claim below ri is dominated by doing nothing, since the re-
serve bidder always bids ri. All other strategies in A’ are also available in A, and all
strategies in A are available in A’. Furthermore, every strategy has the same utility
for i in both cases, so the mapping of strategies in A to the same strategy in A’ in-
duces a bijection between functionally equivalent best-responses; it also preserves
all bidder utilities and auctioneer revenue.
Now, consider setting B’, obtained from B in the same way that A’ is obtained
from A: by removing the reserve prices and adding a “reserve bidder” who al-
ways bids ri. Because these both involve a Dutch auction without reserves, and B’
is the inspection-less covered counterpart of A’, Claim 4 asserts a bijection between
functional equivalence classes of best-responses of bidder i in A’ and i’s covered
counterpart in B’; this bijection preserves all bidders’ utilities and auctioneer rev-
enue.
Finally, we construct a bijection between i’s covered counterpart’s best responses
in B’ and in B. Again, any strategy of i in B’ that plans to inspect or claim at a time
below ri is dominated, as the reserve bidder always claims the item at this time; all
other strategies are equivalent to the same strategy played in B, and preserve all
bidder utilities and auctioneer revenue.
By composing these bijections, we obtain the desired bijection between A and
B.
E.1 Revenue guarantees for Dutch with reserves
We now develop some revenue guarantees for the Dutch auction with per-bidder
reserves in the standard independent private values setting (i.e. each bidder knows
her value without inspecting). These will show that the expected revenue obtained
by the auction is at least some constant fraction of the total welfare generated in
the auction, under some assumptions on value distributions. This implies that
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expected revenue is at least the same fraction of the optimal obtainable revenue.23
The bounds we prove for this independent private values setting will then im-
mediately transfer to the case with inspection costs via Theorem 1.
Preliminaries. The virtual value function associated with a distribution F having
density f is
φF (x) = v −
1− F (x)
f(x)
.
For bidder i, let Fi denote her distribution of covered call values and φi the associ-
ated virtual value function. (Recall that the covered call value is κi = min{vi, σi},
the minimum of value and strike price.)
A common assumption in proofs of approximate revenue maximization is that
each bidder’s value distribution be regular, meaning its corresponding virtual value
function has nonnegative derivative. Here we assume a somewhat stronger, pa-
rameterized condition on the distribution of covered calls, ρ-concavity.
Definition 8. F is ρ-concave for ρ ≥ −1 if dφ
dx
≥ 1 + ρ.
Regularity is equivalent to −1-concavity, while the common monotone hazard
rate assumption is 0-concavity. Wewill assume that there is a ρ > −1 such that each
bidder’s covered call distribution Fi is ρ-concave, obtaining bounds parameterized
by ρ.
Results. The following lemma is not an original idea here but represents a com-
mon use case of ρ-concave distributions, particularly in Anderson and Renualt
(2003).
Lemma 1. Let value distributions F1, . . . , Fn all be ρ-concave for ρ > −1. Let R be
the optimal expected revenue of any auction with private values drawn indpendently from
these distributions, andW the optimal expected welfare. Then
R ≥
(
2
e+ 4
)
ρ+ 1
ρ+ 2
W.
23Ideally, one could obtain a better bound by comparing to the revenue of the optimal auction.
Unfortunately, with inspection costs, we do not have a better upper-bound on the optimal revenue
than the total welfare.
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Proof. Note that the optimal achievable revenue, from Myerson’s auction, is the
expected maximum virtual value, i.e.
R = Emax
i
φi(κi)
+.
Meanwhile, welfare is the expected maximum value:
Emax
i
κi.
Pick a bidder i and fix any realizations of κ−i. Let s = φ−1i (maxj 6=i φj(κj)
+). Intu-
itively, s is the “reserve price” faced by bidder s induced by the opponents’ bids,
in Myerson’s auction. The revenue of the optimal auction is
revenue = E
κ−i
Ri(κ−i) (30)
where Ri(κ−i) =
ˆ ∞
k=s
fi(k)φi(k)dk.
We now apply two bounds of Anderson and Renualt (2003). First, in this single-
bidder environment, consumer surplus is upper-bounded by revenue divided by
ρ + 1. In our notation, let the welfare generated by i be Wi(κ−i) =
´∞
k=s
fi(k)kdk.
Then
Ri(κ−i) ≥ (ρ+ 1) (Wi(κ−i)−Ri(κ−i)) (Anderson and Renualt, 2003)
=⇒ Ri(κ−i) ≥
ρ+ 1
ρ+ 2
Wi(κ−i).
Second, the difference inwelfare generated by i between thewelfare-optimal mech-
anism and the revenue-optimal one (the “dead weight loss”) is bounded. Letting
W ∗i (κ−i) =
´∞
k=maxj 6=i κj
fi(k)kdk be the first term:
W ∗i (κ−i)−Wi(κ−i) ≤
(
(1 + ρ)1/ρ +
ρ+ 2
ρ+ 1
)
Ri(κ−i) (Anderson and Renualt, 2003)
=⇒ W ∗i ≤
(
(1 + ρ)1/ρ + 2
ρ+ 2
ρ+ 1
)
Ri(κ−i)
≤
e+ 4
2
ρ+ 2
ρ+ 1
Ri(κ−i). (31)
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Here, if ρ = 0, then (1 + ρ)1/ρ := e; and we use that (1 + ρ)1/ρ ≤ e
2
ρ+2
ρ+1
. Now the
result follows by plugging Inequality 31 to (30), obtaining
revenue ≥
2
e+ 4
ρ+ 1
ρ+ 2
E
κ−i
W ∗i (κ−i)
=
2
e+ 4
ρ+ 1
ρ+ 2
welfare.
Lemma 2 (Hartline et al. (2014)). When bidders’ value distributions are regular (includ-
ing any ρ-concave distribution for ρ ≥ −1), the first-price auction with per-bidder reserves
has expected revenue at least a fraction e−1
2e
of the optimal (Myerson’s) expected revenue.
The reserves are set to each bidder’s inverse virtual value of zero.
Theorem 2. In equilibrium of the first-price auction with per-bidder reserves of {φ−1i (0)}
N
i=1
and all value distributoins ρ-concave for ρ > −1, expected revenue is at least a fraction
0.09ρ+1
ρ+2
of total welfare.
Proof. We have
expected revenue ≥
e− 1
2e
optimal revenue Lemma 2
≥
e− 1
2e
(
2
e+ 4
)
ρ+ 1
ρ+ 2
welfare Lemma 1
=
e− 1
e(e+ 4)
ρ+ 1
ρ+ 2
welfare
≥ 0.09
ρ+ 1
ρ+ 2
welfare.
Corollary 4. In the setting with inspection costs, suppose that bidder covered-call value
distributions are ρ-concave for ρ > −1 and have virtual value functions {phii}
N
i=1. The
expected revenue of the Dutch auction with per-bidder reserves of {φ−1i (0)}
N
i=1 is at least
0.09ρ+1
ρ+2
fraction of the optimal expected revenue.
Proof. By Theorem 1, the revenue and welfare are equal to that of a first-price auc-
tion with values distributed as the covered-call values. By Theorem 2, revenue in
the first-price auction exceeds the given fraction of total welfare, so this is the case
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in the Dutch auction with the same reserves and inspection costs. Finally, total
welfare is at least the optimal expected revenue.
In calibrations, we tend to find a significant improvement in revenue for the
descending-pricemechanism over a simultaneous sealed-bid auctionwhen inspec-
tion costs are high, i.e. in the startup acquisition calibrations. See Subsection F.4
below for details. For timber sales, where inspection costs are much lower, im-
provement over the second-price or BKRS procedures is more modest.
F Calibrations - In Detail
In this appendix we discuss in detail our methods for solving for approximate
equilibria of the simultaneous second-price and Dutch auctions and provide ad-
ditional numerical results. All discussions below are thus formulated in terms of
the general model of Section 2.1 in the text, rather than the particular formulation
in Section 5, unless specifically stated. We begin by describing our procedure at
a relatively high level here, highlighting only elements of potential interest to a
general economic theorist. Then we describe some additional results from our cal-
ibrations. Finally we fill in additional details about our approach that can be used
to replicate our methods from scratch.
F.1 Simultaneous second-price auction
Our discussion here corresponds to step 4 of the pseudo-algorithm we describe in
Appendix C.
We focus on equilibria in which, at any decision point at which agents have a
weakly dominant truthful strategy they adopt this strategy, given that Bergemann and Välimäki
(2002) show this leads to the best possible outcome in a simultaneous setting. In
particular, any bidder who inspects her value chooses to bid this value and any
bidder who chooses not to inspect her value bids the value she would in expecta-
tion derive from being awarded the object, v˜i ≡ Eθi [vi]− ci.
Next note that a) because the probability of paying the cost is strictly higher
under inspection than not, it becomes strictly less attractive to inspect when ci is
higher holding fixed θi, b) for ci = 0 inspection is weakly dominant and c) for
ci = ∞ non-inspection is weakly dominant. Thus for any value of θi there is a
70
unique threshold value of ci (θi) such that those with ci ≤ ci (θi) will inspect and
those with ci > ci (θi) will not inspect.
A given strategy induces a distribution of bids made by i whose cumulative
distribution function we call Gi. A sufficient statistic in determining i’s best re-
sponse is the distribution of the highest competing bid, call it bmax−i made by all
other bidders, which is determined by {Gj}Nj=1. Let G−i be the cumulative distri-
bution function of this variable and let g−i be its density (which we now assume
exists). The payoff to inspecting is
ˆ ∞
vi=0
ˆ vi
bmax−i =0
(vi − b−i) f (vi) g−i (b−i) db−idvi − ci
and the payoff to not inspecting is
ˆ v˜i
bmax−i =0
(v˜i − b−i) g−i (b−i) db−i.
We can solve for ci by simply finding the value of ci that equates these two expres-
sions for any given value of θi.
Given these facts, we iteratively take the following steps, starting with a bid
distribution {Gi}Ni=1 where each bidder bids her value truthfully. We compute a
best response set of theshold costs ci (θi), on a grid of possible values of θi. We then
compute the induced best-response distribution Gbri on a grid of possible bids. We
update the bid distribution by Gi(x) = (1 − λ)Gi(x) + λGbri (x), where λ ∈ (0, 1) is
a smoothing parameter. We then repeat for bidder i + 1, wrapping around at N .
Once this reaches an approximate fixed point, we stop and return the approximate
equilibrium strategy {ci}Ni=1.
F.2 Dutch auction
Our discussion here corresponds to step 5 of the pseudo-algorithm we describe in
Appendix C.
AuctionSolver takes as inputs a number of bidders and a value distribution
function for each bidder, which may be described in terms of a number of com-
mon mathematical functions, and returns a set of approximate equilibrium bid
functions, one for each bidder. Thus, in order to take advantage of his code, we
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must approximate the distribution of covered call values using functions express-
ible in terms of the mathematical functions AuctionSolver allows. Log-normal dis-
tributions appear to offer a very close fit in our specifications except at very low
values, which are irrelevant as all equilibrium quantities are functions of first- and
second-order statistics. We thus use a least squares non-linear fit finder to fit a log-
normal cumulative distribution function to the empirical cumulative distribution
function of covered call values generated by taking a very large number of samples
from the (θi, ci) distribution for each bidder. We then feed these log-normal distri-
butions into AuctionSolver (which allows the necessary mathematical functions)
and return corresponding bid functions for each bidder.
F.3 Evaluating welfare
Our discussion here corresponds to step 6 of the pseudo-algorithm we describe in
Appendix C.
With these equilibria in hand, we draw a large number of samples of {(θi, ci)}
N
i=1.
For each of these samples:
1. To calculate the welfare of the simultaneous second-price auction we directly
run the sample through the equilibrium calculated in SubsectionF.1 above,
tally all the inspection costs and the value of the highest bidder and take the
net between these, calling this the welfare in that sample.
2. To calculate the welfare of the Dutch auction we calculate the covered call
value for each bidder from (θi, ci) by solving for the strike price using Defini-
tion 1, use the equilibrium functions, determine the highest bidder and then
call the welfare in that sample her covered call value.
3. To calculate first best welfare we follow the same procedure as in the Dutch
auction, but simply use the highest covered call value rather than determin-
ing the winner.
In the timber calibration, we determine the welfare of the simultaneous second-
price auction and the BKRS mechanism using their code.
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F.4 Additional Results
Revenue. In calibrations, we tend to find a significant improvement in revenue
for the Dutch auction in the startup acquisition calibrations. One explanation for
this arises from the fact that, as we discuss shortly, many more inspections in the
Dutch auction occur prior to bidding. Inspections prior to bidding are sunk costs
that do not discourage aggressive bids as a result. Under the Dutch auction, equi-
librium always has all inspections occurring prior to bids. On the other hand, in the
equilibrium of the second-price auction, most inspections occur only after bidding
has already occurred. Such inspection costs reduce the effective value a bidder
places on the item even in expectation and thus lower optimal bids. Furthermore
the lack of ex-ante expectations dampens the spread of bids and thus makes the
highest order statistics that determine revenue lower. Together these effects mean
that delayed inspections have a quite large impact on revenue, even when their
impact on efficiency is modest.
This account is further confirmed by the fact that the revenue gains of the Dutch
auction are much more modest, and sometimes even negative, compared to the
form of the second-price auction studied by Roberts and Sweeting, where inspec-
tions must occur prior to bids, and even more so relative to the BKRS mechanism.
Another possible explanation for the difference between these cases is that inspec-
tion costs are much higher in the start-up than the timber calibration. In fact, we
suspect these two differences are complementary in producing the observed dis-
crepancy.
The results are for the same parameter settings discussed in previously in the
paper. The startup calibrations results are given in Table 3 and timber in Table 4.
Features of the second-price auction. In our startup acquisition calibrations, we
observed some features that might help explain when second price performs well
versus poorly. For the numbers reported below, we report results from just one sce-
nario from each set of parameters, but we believe these to likely be typical results.
Recall that each scenario is solved with relatively high precision.
The first is to look at what would happen if bidders never inspected, but in-
stead always bid according to expected value minus cost, with only the winner
inspecting (Table 5). Perhaps surprisingly, in many of our scenarios this proce-
dure would achieve quite high welfare. This makes it less surprising that the si-
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Parameter values Second price revenue as % of Dutch
Baseline 50
σ2v = .5 50
σ2v = 1.5 60
µc = −1 50
µc = −.25 70
σ2c = 0 60
σ2c = 1 60
ρ = −.5 60
ρ = 0 60
ρ = 1 60
(α0, α1) = (.5, .25) 60
(α0, α1) = (.5, 0.05) 50
(α0, α1) = (.1, .1) 60
(α0, α1) = (.1, .7) 70
N = 2 70
N = 10 60
Table 3: Revenue of the second-price auction as a percentage of that obtained by the Dutch
auction in the startup acquisition calibration, to one significant figure. Parameter
values given are the ones that differ from the baseline.
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Parameter values Second Price (% of Dutch) Sequential (% of Dutch)
Baseline 98 99
Nmill = 1 96 99
Nmill = 7 100 101
Nlogger = 0 100 100
Nlogger = 8 97 99
µlogger = 2.921 95 99
µlogger = 4.243 99 99
µdiff = .169 98 99
µdiff = .587 98 100
σ2v = .122 96 99
σ2v = .646 99 100
α = .505 97 99
α = .872 98 100
K = .39 100 100
K = 3.72 95 99
K = 16 79 94
Table 4: Revenue of the second-price and sequential mechanisms in the timber auction
calibration, expressed as a percentage of that obtained by the Dutch auction, to
two significant figures. Standard error due to sampling is far smaller. Parameter
values given are the ones that differ from the baseline.
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Parameter values Welfare loss as % of first best
Baseline 7
σ2v = .5 0.4
σ2v = 1.5 10
µc = −1 9
µc = −.25 5
σ2c = 0 7
σ2c = 1 7
ρ = −.5 8
ρ = 0 7
ρ = 1 5
(α0, α1) = (.5, .25) 2
(α0, α1) = (.5, 05) 10
(α0, α1) = (.1, .1) 2
(α0, α1) = (.1, .7) 2
N = 2 2
N = 10 10
Table 5: Welfare loss of a hypothetical “first-best without inspection” procedure: Imagine
always assigning to the bidder with largest expected value minus cost; she is the
only one who inspects. Displays the difference compared to the first best as a
percent of first best, rounded to one significant figure.
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Parameter values Second price Descending First best
baseline (auction 1) 24 27 27
baseline (auction 2) 27 29 29
baseline (auction 3) 28 30 30
Table 6: Percentage of bidders who eventually inspect in equilibrium of the second-price
and Dutch auctions as well as in the first best procedure. Results shown are for the
equilibria of three different auctions drawn according to the baseline parameters.
There are 5 bidders. Rounded to two significant figures; errors due to sampling
are significantly lower.
multaneous second-price auction achieves good welfare as well. The welfare of
this hypothetical “never-inspect” procedure tends to match second price in terms
of trends (although its welfare is often significantly worse). When σ2v (the vari-
ance of the value) is increased to 1.5 or the heterogeneity of bidders is decreased
(α0 = α1 = .1), the welfare of this procedure drops dramatically. The welfare of
second price also drops in these cases, but not as much.
Another is to consider the fraction of bidders that inspect in equilibrium, on
average. For the Dutch auction, this fraction closely (almost exactly) follows that
of the optimal procedure. Perhaps surprisingly, this fraction is also quite similar
for the second-price auction (see Table 6).
However, the way in which these numbers are reached is significantly different.
In Dutch and first best, the winner has always inspected prior to deciding to claim
the item; this is not true in the second-price auction.
Because of this, another way to evaluate the second-price auction is to look
at the fraction of times in equilibrium that the winner had inspected her value
before bidding (see Table 7). This can be compared with, for instance, the fraction
of times that the winner was the same as the winner in the optimal procedure.
In general this confirms that in the startups calibration, second price is able to
find reasonably high welfare assignments even without always inducing the right
bidders to inspect. In the baseline scenario, despite a significantly low inspection
rate of the winner, the overall welfare loss is relatively small. This suggests that,
in our baseline scenario, good welfare can result even when often picking a bidder
with high expected value minus cost without their inspecting first.
It also suggests how problems can arise for second price. An ideal scenario for
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Parameter values Winner inspection rate Winner matches first best rate
baseline (auction 1) 52 85
baseline (auction 2) 58 83
baseline (auction 3) 59 82
σ2v = .5 (auction 1) 1 97
σ2v = .5 (auction 2) 2.6 97
σ2v = .5 (auction 3) 2.8 95
(α0, α1) = (0.1, 0.1) (auction 1) 73 78
(α0, α1) = (0.1, 0.1) (auction 2) 64 74
(α0, α1) = (0.1, 0.1) (auction 3) 77 79
Table 7: Percentage of winners, in equilibrium of the second-price auction, who inspected
prior to submitting a bid (first column) and who were the same as the winner
in the first best procedure (second column). The three auctions for each set of
parameters are drawn from those parameter sets (giving V 0i , C
0
i for each bidder
i), then solved. Rounded to two significant figures. The first column is relatively
low and the second relatively high, meaning that in our calibrations, second price
is able to achieve reasonably high welfare and often find the “right” winner even
from bidders who bid “blind” without inspecting.
second price arises with low variance (σ2v = 0.5), where the winner is often correct
despite not inspecting. This says that bidders are sufficiently informed of their
values so that they can correctly sort without inspecting. But in the case with low
heterogeneity (α0 = α1 = 0.1), even though the winner inspection rate goes up, the
rate of matching the first best winner goes down. This suggests a problem with
coordinating the right bidders to inspect.
F.5 Additional Numerical Details
Below, we fill in some further details on our methods. We hope that an outside
party can use the information in our paper and this appendix to independently
replicate our results writing code from scratch. Our code itself contains instruc-
tions on exactly how we ran the code and interfaced with outside tools in order to
produce the numbers reported in this paper.
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F.5.1 Startup Acquisition
In this case, for each parameter setting considered, we repeated the following
steps:
1. Randomly draw a “scenario” using these parameters. This corresponds to
drawing V 0i and C
0
i for each bidder i.
2. Compute an equilibrium of the Dutch auction using AuctionSolver, as de-
scribed (to avoid duplication) below in Subsection F.5.3.
3. Compute an equilibrium of the second-price auction, described next.
4. Simulate a large number (typically one million or ten million) of random re-
alizations of that scenario. For each realization, compute the outcome under
the first-best, Dutch equilibrium, and second price equilibrium.
Because interfacing with AuctionSolver is relatively time-intensive, we only drew
a small number of scenarios for each set of parameters. In that sense, we cannot
guarantee high accuracy on our results for a given set of parameters. However, for
each scenario we drew, we were able to compute the welfare and revenue to quite
high precision (sources of error are described below).
In a couple of cases, AuctionSolver was unable to accept or solve inputs from a
scenario. This typically occurred because the covered call value distributions were
too high or heavy-tailed, making the program freeze when attempting to process
them. In these cases (less than 10% of the total number of scenarios drawn), we re-
drew the scenario randomly and tried again. Other than that, the scenarios were
not filtered in any way. After finalizing the code and setting the parameters, we
used the first random scenarios we drew for the results reported. The particular
scenarios we drew are saved in the code so that they can be double-checked.
Solving second price. In Section 5, we described our high-level approach for
solving the second-price auction. Here we give some additional details. One point
to note is that in almost all of our simulations, there was exactly one bidder of each
“kind”; that is, bidders were all asymmetric. In a case where there are multiple
bidders of a certain kind, the code uses the fact that their best-responses are iden-
tical to only look for an equilibrium that is symmetric within a given kind. In the
rest of the exposition, wewill write as though there is only one bidder of each kind.
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We discretized the bid space into at least 1000 possible values. The range of
bids was placed between 0 and high on the highest value distribution’s CDF, at
least 0.9999. This large upper bound was chosen because bidders will bid their
true values when they choose to inspect, so we cannot only consider relatively low
bids. We also discretized each bidder’s space of possible V 1i ; recall that this is the
type they observe at the start of the auction, determining their value distribution.
Each bidder’s discretized bid space depended on her particular distribution of V 1i ,
in order to cover most of the probability space, but all had the same number of
points (at least 1000).
We also precomputed and stored some useful values that are re-used often,
which can take up significant memory storage for large grid sizes but greatly
speeds up the process. Code profiling suggested that recomputing these values
each loop was using up the majority of computation time. First, for each possible
discretized outcome of V 1i , we computed and stored i’s CDF, that is, the probability
that her realized V 1i is at most this value. Second, for each i, for each of the possi-
ble discretized V 1i , and for each discretized bid b, we precomputed i’s expected net
utility for bidding her true value when the highest bid of any opponent is b.
The outer loop. Each loop, we start with a bid distribution and strategy for each
bidder i. We compute a new best-response of bidder 1 along with the correspond-
ing bid distribution. Then, to avoid over-shooting, we set i’s updated bid distri-
bution to be a convex combination of the old one and the best response. We also
track the mean error between the old and new bid distributions. After repeating
this for each bidder i, we check if the overall mean error was small enough, and if
so, terminate the process.
Computing a best-response for bidder i. i’s opponents’ strategies may be sum-
marized as a distribution G−i of the “highest opposing bid”. We first compute G−i
given the current strategies of the opponents. We then compute i’s best-response
as follows. For each possible discretized outcome of V 1i , from lowest to highest, we
compute c∗, the cost threshold below which i inspects and above which she bids
her expected value minus cost.
We compute c∗ by defining f to be the function equal to (utility from just bid-
ding expected value minus cost) - (utility from inspecting and bidding value).
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Then we find the root of f .
This rootfinding is done in two steps: a discretized approximate search, then a
continuous rootfinding using a scientific library. To see why we use a discretized
search first, recall that we discretized the allowable bids. If the bidder does not
inspect, each of these discretized bids corresponds to an expected value minus
cost. Because the expected value is fixed for this choice of discretized V 1i , this
results in a list of discretized costs. Each corresponds to a threshold at which the
non-inspecting bidder would choose the next discretized bid. We can quickly find
the two such costs that sandwich c∗; then the scientific library only has to search
over the small range in between to find it exactly.
We attempt to speed up this search in a couple of ways. We observe that the
expected utility for inspecting is a constant positive utility that does not depend
on c, minus c. So, we precompute this constant positive amount rather than re-
computing it for every evaluation of f . Most importantly, we “seed” the search
with an initial guess for c∗ equal to the c∗ found for the previous discretized value
of V 1i . Because V
1
i has changed very little (if the discretization is good), c
∗ should
also not change much. This allows the discretized search to run very quickly just
by linearly searching up or down from the guess.
Updating the bid distribution of i. In tandem with computing c∗ for each dis-
cretized V 1i , we simultaneously update the distribution of i’s bids. This is useful
for computing G−j for other bidders j.
Computing this distribution is straightforward: For each discretized V 1i , let p1
be the probability that the bidder draws V 1i and let c
∗ be the corresponding com-
puted cost threshold. Let p2 be the probability that the bidder draws c ≤ c∗ condi-
tioned on this realization of V 1i . Thenwe know that the bidder inspects with proba-
bility p1p2, in which case, she bids her value. We can thus put a point mass on each
discretized bid equal to p1p2 times the discretized probability of value equalling
that bid conditioned on V 1i . Meanwhile, with probability 1−p2, the bidder chooses
not to inspect and bids expected value minus cost. Her expected value, given V 1i ,
is a fixed constant. Thus, for each discretized bid from 0 up to her expected value,
we can add a point mass equal to p1 times the probability that her cost c is in the
range such that E[vi]− c equals this bid.
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F.5.2 Timber Sales
For these calibrations, we were able to use the code of Roberts and Sweeting di-
rectly to obtain the revenue and welfare of the sequential and second-price mecha-
nisms. For the Dutch, we followed the same procedure as in the startups case; this
is described next.
One difference to the startups case is that here we only consider specific “sce-
narios” (i.e. V 0i and C
0
i are always 0 and do not play a role).
F.5.3 Using First-Price to Solve the Dutch Auction
These are the steps we took to calculate the welfare and revenue of the Dutch
auction for a given scenario. One of the main results of the paper is that equi-
librium strategies, welfare, and revenue of the Dutch auction can be completely
determined by solving a first-price auction in a setting without inspection costs.
Therefore, we always used the following procedure to compute welfare and rev-
enue of the Dutch auction:
1. For each kind of bidder k, fit a distribution Fk to the covered-call value dis-
tribution of k. For instance, in the timber sales setting, there are at most two
kinds of bidders in each auction, mills and loggers. All bidders of the “mills”
kind have the same distribution of covered call values; the same holds for the
“loggers” kind. We fit the distributions by drawing a large number of sam-
ples (typically 100,000) to approximate the true CDF, then finding the (µ, σ)
for which the lognormal distribution had the least squared error to this CDF.
We also visually inspected the difference between each fitted distribution and
true one to ensure it was a close fit, particularly at the higher quantiles where
the fit matters more for the outcome of the auction.
We chose to use lognormal distributions because they are simple (with only
two parameters) yet seem to fit the settings we checked very closely. They are
also one of the distributions built-in to the AuctionSolver tool (discussed be-
low). For other settings of parameters, for instance when there is a significant
chance of a negative covered-call value, some other class of distributions may
be a better choice. It is also worth pointing out that the closeness of fit mat-
ters more at higher values which are more likely to be involved in winning
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the auction. For instance, at the opposite extreme, fitting the covered-call dis-
tribution well below zero is completely unnecessary as such bidders do not
even enter a bid.
This step is a source of potential error if the fitted distributions Fk are not
very close to the true ones, as then we will be solving for equilibrium of a
different set of bidders than the true ones.
2. We used Richard Katzwer’s AuctionSolver tool to solve for the equilibrium of
a first-price auction. In this auction, each bidder of kind k has value distribu-
tion Fk. In order to use the tool, we needed to truncate the value distributions
entered for the auction. We usually attempted to truncate them quite high,
e.g. at a CDF of 0.9999 or higher. However, in some cases, this gave the tool
difficulty in solving the auction, so we truncated somewhat lower.
The tool also had some difficulty loading larger or heavier-tailed distribu-
tions, so we typically scaled down all value distributions Fk by a constant
before entering them into AuctionSolver. Luckily, this can be accomplished
for the lognormal distribution by subtracting a fixed amount from the µ pa-
rameter of each distribution.
After solving for an equilibrium in AuctionSolver24, we used it to print out a
discretized bid function fk for each kind of bidder k. The output of Auction-
Solver takes the form of a list of discretized values and the corresponding bid
for each value. We constructed fk by linearly interpolating these points; for
instance, if the equilibrium output says that the value 10.0 maps to bid 5.0
and value 10.2 maps to bid 5.1, then we mapped value 10.1 to bid 5.05 and
so on. Any values above the truncated upper bound are mapped to the up-
per bound’s bid. At this point, if we scaled down the value distributions, we
now scaled up the output of AuctionSolver by the same factor. For instance,
suppose we subtracted 1 from the µ parameter of every kind of bidder, then
ran AuctionSolver. This implies that each bidder’s value is a factor e smaller
in the AuctionSolver results, so those bids are also a factor e smaller. To con-
struct fk, we just multiply all values and bids by e, then linearly interpolate.
24We almost universally used the default settings except to try to increase grid size for more
precision; our code describes in detail the exact steps we took in using AuctionSolver.
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In using AuctionSolver, we introduce two potential sources of numerical er-
ror. First, AuctionSolver discretizes the equilibrium bid functions in order to
solve for equilibrium. We tried to use large grid sizes to avoid error here and
it does not seem likely that this could noticeably impact results. Second, it
upper-bounds the value distributions. One might be concerned because this
entails solving for equilibriumwith slightly different value distributions than
the true ones, which are unbounded. We tried to use large upper bounds to
mitigate this concern. One might also be concerned that this upper bound
could slightly disrupt welfare results, although the chances of two bidders
both exceeding the upper bound in the same auction is very small. We also
guarded against this by breaking any ties in bids so that the lower-covered-
call bidder won the tiebreak, so that we can only underestimate the welfare.
Meanwhile, the impact on revenue of the upper bound should only be to
decrease it.
3. We simulated a large number of auctions, typically one million or ten mil-
lion. For each, we calculated the eventual bid of each participant, which is fk
applied to their covered-call value (as shown in this paper), and computed
the welfare and revenue. The average welfare can be computed as the aver-
age covered call value of the winner. We then averaged the results of these
trials. By computing the sample variance of these trials, we were also able
to compute the standard error, which is significantly smaller than the preci-
sion to which we report the results. In that sense, the numerical error here is
extremely small. But again, there is some possibility of error if the original fit-
ted distributions Fk were not good fits to the true covered call distributions.
If that were the case, we would be simulating strategies that are not actually
an equilibrium. Again, we attempted to mitigate this concern by visually
inspecting the goodness of the lognormal fit.
G Multi-Stage Inspection
In this section we present full proofs of our results for the case of multistage inspec-
tion, culminating in Lemma 13, which generalizes our main “amortization lemma”
( 1) to the setting of multi-stage inspection.
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G.1 A more formal model
This subsection presents, in greater formality, the model of multi-stage inspection
presented in main text Section 6.1. In fact, the model we present here also general-
izes from the single-item auctions contemplated inmain text Section 6.1 to auctions
with any finite number of items.
We will equip our probability space (Ω,F, µ) with filtrations {Fk,τi,j }. The sub-
scripts i and j range over bidders and items, respectively. For the remainder of this
section we focus on the stopping problem that a single bidder faces when deciding
when to advance the stage of inspection for a single item and when to acquire it.
Thus we are treating i and j as fixed for the remainder of this section. Accordingly,
we will omit the double subscript i, j and denote σ-fields by Fk,τ . The superscripts
k and τ refer to the stage of inspection and the time, respectively. We think of
k ∈ N ∪ {∞} as a counter that increases when the bidder endogenously decides to
advance to the next stage of inspection; the special value k = ∞ denotes the com-
pletion of all stages of inspection, which is a prerequisite for acquiring an item.
We think of τ ∈ R+ as representing the “clock time” which advances exogenously;
as τ increases the bidder may receive decision-relevant information. For example,
the bidder may be notified that a competing bidder has acquired an item. In the
notation of main text Section 6.1, Fk,τi,j denotes the σ-field generated by the signals
s1i , . . . , s
k
i , along with any exogenous signals that arrive during the time interval
[0, τ).
The σ-fields Fk,τi,j satisfy the relation F
k,τ
i,j ⊆ F
k′,τ ′
i,j whenever k < k
′ and τ < τ ′.
We will assume that F∞,τ is the σ-field generated by
⋃
k∈N F
k,τ , and we will use
the analogous notation Fk,∞ to denote the σ-field generated by
⋃
τ∈R+ F
k,τ . The
information a bidder learns by inspecting an item’s value is conditionally inde-
pendent of the information learned by waiting as time passes; formally, for any
k ∈ N, τ ∈ R+ and any event E ∈ Fk,∞, we have
Pr [E ‖F∞,τ ] = Pr
[
E ‖Fk,τ
]
. (32)
The bidder’s valuation for the item is represented by a F∞,0-measurable func-
tion v. The cost of inspection is represented by a stochastic process (ck) adapted
to the filtration {Fk,0}∞k=0, and at every point of the sample space the sequence
0 = c0, c1, c2, . . . is non-decreasing and converges to a finite limit, c∞. The value of
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ck should be interpreted as the combined cost that the bidder must pay to reach
the kth inspection stage. Our assumption that v is F∞,0-measurable and that ck is
Fk,0-measurable means that the bidder’s uncertainty about the item’s value and
about future inspection costs may potentially diminish when she advances to a
higher inspection stage, but it does not diminish as clock time progresses. We will
assume that E[v+] <∞ and E[c∞] <∞.
An inspection policy is a rule for varying the inspection stage of an item over
time, and deciding when to acquire the item, based on information learned in the
past and present. More formally, it is an ordered pair (s,As), where s : Ω × R+ →
N∩{∞} denotes the rule for varying the inspection stage and As : Ω×R+ → {0, 1}
is the indicator of the (F-measurable) event that the policy decides to acquire the
item at time τ or earlier. With a slight abuse of notation, we will refer to such an
inspection policy simply as s rather than as (s,As). Inspection policies must satisfy
the following properties.
1. For each ω ∈ Ω, s(ω, τ) and As(ω, τ) are non-decreasing functions of τ .
2. For all τ ∈ R+, k ∈ N, we have {ω ∈ Ω | s(ω, τ) > k} ∈ Fk,τ .
3. For all (ω, τ) ∈ Ω× R+, if As(ω, τ) = 1 then s(ω, τ) =∞.
The second property means that if the inspection policy has decided to advance
beyond stage k at time τ or earlier, the decision must be based on information
obtained during the first k stages of inspection and the first τ units of clock time.
The third property means that if the inspection policy decides to acquire the item,
it must complete all stages of inspection. We will generally omit the argument ω
from s, interpreting s(τ) for any fixed τ as a random variable defined on (Ω,F)
and taking values in N ∪ {∞}. Since s(τ) is a non-decreasing function of τ , the
limit limτ→∞ s(τ) is a well-defined (N ∪ {∞})-valued random variable, which we
will denote by s(∞); it represents the final inspection stage reached by s. Similarly
limτ→∞As(τ) is a well-defined {0, 1}-valued random variable and we will denote
it simply by As; it is the indicator random variable of the event that the policy
acquires the item. The random variable cs = cs(∞) represents the cost of executing
the policy s.
We can combine two inspection policies q and r by forming their pointwise
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minimum, q ∧ r, or their pointwise maximum, q ∨ r. Formally these are defined by
(q ∨ r)(ω, τ) = q(ω, τ) ∨ r(ω, τ) and Aq∨r(ω, τ) = Aq(ω, τ) ∨ Ar(ω, τ)
(q ∧ r)(ω, τ) = q(ω, τ) ∧ r(ω, τ) and Aq∧r(ω, τ) = Aq(ω, τ) ∧ Ar(ω, τ).
The verification that q ∨ r and q ∧ r satisfy the definition of an inspection policy is
left to the reader.
G.2 Generalized strike price
This subsection generalizes the notion of strike price to the setting of multi-stage
inspection. For each inspection stage k <∞ we will define a strike price σk which
will be a Fk,0-measurable random variable. Informally σk represents the value of
an outside option such that a bidder who has already sunk the cost of reaching
stage k is indifferent between stopping immediately and accepting a payoff of σk,
versus continuing to apply the optimal policy that undertakes at least one more
stage of inspection, given that the policy can stop at any future time and obtain the
outside-option payoff of σk.
Proving the existence and uniqueness of a Fk,0-measurable function σk that
achieves this indifference property turns out to be a bit subtle. We begin with
the following definition.
Definition 9. A F-measurable function σ discourages inspection at stage k if for every
inspection policy s satisfying s(∞) > k pointwise, the relation
E
[
A
sv − cs ‖Fk,∞
]
≤ E
[
A
sσ − ck ‖Fk,∞
]
holds pointwise almost everywhere. The set of all F∞,0-measurable functions that
discourage inspection at stage k is denoted by DIk. The set of functions σ ∈ DIk
that satisfy σ ≤ v+ pointwise is denoted by DIk0 .
Informally, to say that a random variable σ discourages inspection at stage k
means a bidder who has an outside option worth σ and is currently at inspection
stage k must weakly prefer a policy that stops immediately and claims the payoff
of σ over one that may perform additional stages of inspection.
The following property of DIk will be useful in the sequel.
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Lemma 3. For any finite subset {σ1, . . . , σn} ⊂ DI
k the pointwise minimum σ(ω) =
min1≤i≤n{σi(ω)} also belongs to DI
k.
Proof. Let Ui = {ω ∈ Ω | σi(ω) = σ(ω)} and note that the sets U1, . . . , Un are Fk,∞-
measurable and that they cover Ω. The relation
E
[
A
sv − cs ‖Fk,∞
]
≤ E
[
A
sσj − c
k ‖Fk,∞
]
= E
[
A
sσ − ck ‖Fk,∞
]
holds pointwise a.e. on Uj . The lemma follows by patching together these relations,
since the sets Uj cover Ω.
Since the strike price is informally defined as the minimum value of an outside
option that discourages inspection at stage k, it is natural to try defining σk as
the pointwise infimum of the functions σ ∈ DIk. Unfortunately, except at sample
points that are point-masses of the probability measure µ, this pointwise infimum
will be equal to −∞ because we can modify the value of any σ ∈ DIk on any
measure-zero set without altering its membership in DIk. Therefore, we have to
define σk more indirectly using the following lemma.
Lemma 4. There exists a Fk,∞-measurable function σk, taking values in R∪{−∞}, such
that for all U ∈ Fk,∞,
ˆ
U
σk dµ = inf
{ˆ
U
σ dµ
∣∣∣∣ σ ∈ DIk
}
= inf
{ˆ
U
σ dµ
∣∣∣∣ σ ∈ DIk0
}
. (33)
The function σk is unique almost surely, meaning that any two such functions are equal
except on a set of measure zero.
Proof. First note that the set DIk0 is non-empty because, for example, the function
v+ belongs to DIk0: a bidder whose outside option is to obtain payoff v
+ at no cost
will always (at least weakly) prefer that option to paying the cost of additional
stages of inspection followed by attaining a reward which is at best equal to v+.
To prove the existence of σk we will consider the set function
νk(U) = inf
{ˆ
U
σ dµ
∣∣∣∣ σ ∈ DIk
}
= inf
{ˆ
U
σ dµ
∣∣∣∣ σ ∈ DIk0
}
.
Note that the infimum defining νk(U) is the same regardless of whether σ ranges
over the full setDIk or its subsetDIk0; this is because for every σ ∈ DI
k the pointwise
88
minimum σ′ = σ∧v+ belongs to DIk0 and satisfies
´
U
σ′ dµ ≤
´
U
σ dµ. We will prove
that νk(U) is a countably additivemeasure onFk,∞ and that it is satisfies νk(U) <∞
for all U . From the definition of νk it is clear that νk(U) = 0 whenever µ(U) = 0.
An application of the Radon-Nikodym Theorem then implies the existence of the
function σk asserted in the lemma statement.
We now argue that νk is countably additive. Suppose U1, U2, . . . are disjoint
sets in Fk,∞ and let U denote their union. Since v+ ∈ DIk we see that νk(Ui) ≤´
Ui
v+ dµ for all i. Hence the sum of the non-negative elements in the set {νk(Ui) |
i = 1, 2, . . .} is finite, being bounded above by
´
Ω
v+ dµ. It follows that the sum∑∞
i=1 ν
k(Ui) has a well-defined value in R ∪ {−∞} independent of the ordering of
the summands: either the sum of the negative elements in {νk(Ui) | i = 1, 2, . . .} is
finite, in which case
∑∞
i=1 ν
k(Ui) converges absolutely to a finite value, or else the
sum of the negative elements in {νk(Ui) | i = 1, 2, . . .} is −∞, in which case the
partial sums
∑n
i=1 ν
k(Ui) converge to −∞ as n → ∞, irrespective of the ordering
of summands.
We must prove that
∑∞
i=1 ν
k(Ui) = ν
k(U). For any ε > 0 we can choose σ ∈ DIk
such that
´
U
σ dµ < νk(U) + ε. Without loss of generality we may assume σ ≤ v+
pointwise, since Lemma 3 justifies replacing σ with the pointwise minimum σ∧v+
if necessary. Now, arguing as in the preceding paragraph, we may conclude that
the sum
∑∞
i=1
´
Ui
σ dµ is well-defined irrespective of the order of summands, and
that it is equal to
´
U
σ dµ. It follows that
∞∑
i=1
νk(Ui) ≤
∞∑
i=1
ˆ
Ui
σ dµ =
ˆ
U
σ dµ < νk(U) + ε.
As ε > 0was arbitrarily small, we may conclude that
∑
i ν
k(Ui) ≤ ν
k(U).
To prove the reverse inequality, for i = 1, 2, . . . choose σi ∈ DIk such that´
Ui
σi dµ < ν
k(Ui) + 2
−iε. For n = 1, 2, . . . let σ(n) be the pointwise minimum of
σ1, σ2, . . . , σn, v
+. Using the definition of νk,
νk(U) ≤
ˆ
U
σ(n) dµ ≤
n∑
i=1
ˆ
Ui
σi dµ+
∞∑
i=n+1
ˆ
Ui
v+ dµ
<
n∑
i=1
νk(Ui) + (1− 2
−n)ε+
∞∑
i=n+1
ˆ
Ui
v+ dµ.
We may choose n large enough that
∑∞
i=n+1
´
Ui
v+ dµ < ε and
∑∞
i=n+1 ν
k(Ui) < ε.
Then
νk(U) <
n∑
i=1
νk(Ui) + 2ε <
∞∑
i=1
νk(Ui) + 3ε.
As ε > 0 was arbitrarily small we conclude that νk(U) ≤
∑∞
i=1 ν
k(Ui). Having
already proved the reverse inequality, we may conclude that νk is a countably ad-
ditive measure. By the Radon-Nikodym Theorem, there exists a Fk,∞-measurable
function σk taking values in R ∪ {−∞} that satisfies (33).
Finally, the uniqueness statement in the lemma follows because if σk and σˆk
both satisfy (33) then
´
U
(σk − σˆk) dµ = 0 for all U ∈ Fk,∞, implying that {ω : σk 6=
σˆk} has measure zero.
Lemma 5. If φ is a Fk,∞-measurable function taking values in a bounded non-negative
interval [0,M ] then E
[
φσk
]
= inf
{
E [φσ] | σ ∈ DIk
}
= inf
{
E [φσ] | σ ∈ DIk0
}
.
Proof. As in Lemma 4, the infimum is the same regardless of whether σ ranges over
DIk or DIk0. We will henceforth work only with σ ∈ DI
k
0.
First suppose that φ is a simple function. Then we may represent it as φ =∑n
i=1wi1Vi for disjoint measurable sets Vi ∈ F
k,∞ and weights wi ∈ [0,M ]. In that
case Lemma 4 yields
E
[
wi1Viσ
k
]
= inf
{
E [wi1Viσ] | σ ∈ DI
k
0
}
for i = 1, . . . , n. Summing over iwe may conclude that
E
[
φσk
]
=
n∑
i=1
inf
{
E [wi1Viσ] | σ ∈ DI
k
0
}
≤ inf
{
E [φσ] | σ ∈ DIk0
}
.
To prove the reverse inequality, for any ε > 0 choose σ1, . . . , σn ∈ DIk0 such that for
i = 1, . . . , n,
E [wi1Viσ] > E [wi1Viσi]−
ε
n
.
The function σ = min{σ1, . . . , σn} belongs to DIk0 and satisfies E
[
φσk
]
> E [φσ]− ε.
As ε > 0 was arbitrarily small, we conclude that E
[
φσk
]
≥ inf
{
E [φσ] | σ ∈ DIk
}
which completes the proof of the lemma for the special case of simple functions.
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For the general case, we may use the equation
E [φσ] = E
[
φv+
]
− E
[
φ(v+ − σ)
]
to see that the lemma is equivalent to the assertion that
E
[
φ(v+ − σk)
]
= sup
{
E
[
φ(v+ − σ)
]
| σ ∈ DIk0
}
. (34)
It will be more convenient to work with this form of the lemma because the func-
tion v+ − σ is non-negative for σ ∈ DIk0 . In particular, the set function ν(U) =´
U
(v+ − σk) dµ is a non-negative measure on (Ω,F) and therefore
E
[
φ(v+ − σ)
]
=
ˆ
U
φ dν = sup
{ˆ
U
φ′ dν | 0 ≤ φ′ ≤ φ, φ′ a simple function
}
.
Letting S denote the set of simple functions φ′ that satisfy 0 ≤ φ′ ≤ φ, and recalling
that (34) was already shown to hold for simple functions, we now find that
E
[
φ(v+ − σk)
]
= sup
{
E
[
φ′(v+ − σk)
] ∣∣ φ′ ∈ S}
= sup
{
E
[
φ′(v+ − σ)
] ∣∣ φ′ ∈ S, σ ∈ DIk0}
= sup
{
E
[
φ(v+ − σ)
] ∣∣ σ ∈ DIk0} ,
which completes the proof of (34).
As a first application of Lemma 5, we will prove that σk is Fk,0-measurable; this
strengthens Lemma 4, which only asserts that σk is Fk,∞-measurable. The fact that
σk is Fk,0-measurable can be informally summarized as stating that the value of the
stage-k strike price only depends on information learned during the first k stages
of inspection, not on information learned during the passage of “clock time”. This
property is intuitive, since the information learned during the passage of clock
time is conditionally independent of the bidder’s value and inspection costs. It
wil also turn out to be an important property of σk when it comes to analyzing
equilibria of the descending-price auction.
Lemma 6. The function σk is Fk,0-measurable.
Proof. Let σˆk = E
[
σk ‖Fk,0
]
. By construction, σˆk is Fk,0-measurable. Let us prove
that it satisfies (33) for every U ∈ Fk,∞. We will make repeated use of the following
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identity: if f is Fk,0-measurable and g is F-measurable then
E [fg] = E
[
E
[
fg ‖Fk,0
]]
= E
[
f E
[
g ‖Fk,0
]]
. (35)
Given any U ∈ Fk,∞, let φ = E
[
1U ‖F
k,0
]
. Recalling that every function in DIk
is Fk,0-measurable, as is σˆk, we find that
ˆ
U
σˆk dµ = E
[
1U σˆ
k
]
= E
[
φσˆk
]
= E
[
φσk
]
= inf
{
E [φσ] | σ ∈ DIk0
}
= inf
{
E [1Uσ] | σ ∈ DI
k
0
}
= inf
{ˆ
U
σ dµ
∣∣∣∣ σ ∈ DIk0
}
,
where we have applied (35) twice on the first line and once on the second line.
Since σˆk satisfies (33), the uniqueness assertion in Lemma 4 implies that σk = σˆk
almost everywhere, and consequently (possibly after modifying the values of σk
on a measure-zero set) we may conclude that σk is Fk,0-measurable.
Related to the issue of Fk,0-measurability, we have the following definition and
lemma, which address the question of when it is possible to simulate an arbitrary
inspection policy with one that performs all of its inspection at time 0.
Definition 10. An inspection policy s is prompt if all of its inspection is performed
at time 0, i.e. s(ω, τ) = s(ω, 0) for all ω ∈ Ω, τ ∈ R+.
In the following “prompt simulation lemma”, the probability space Ω = Ω ×
[0, 1] is equipped with the product probability measure µ × m where m denotes
Lebesgue measure on [0, 1]. We think of a sample point (ω, x) ∈ Ω as consisting of
a sample point ω from the original probability space, along with an independent
“random seed” x ∈ [0, 1]which may be used for defining a randomized inspection
policy. For each k, τ there are two relevant σ-fields on Ω: F
k,τ
is the product of
Fk,τ with the Borel σ-field on [0, 1], whereas Fk,τ is the σ-field of all sets of the form
U × [0, 1] for U ∈ Fk,τ . Thus, a F
k,τ
-measurable function is allowed to depend
on the random seed x, whereas a Fk,τ -measurable function may only depend on
ω. Note that for every Fk,τ-measurable function f on Ω there is a corresponding
F
k,τ -measurable function f on Ω, defined by f(ω, x) = f(ω). In a slight abuse of
notation, we will ignore the distinction between f and f .
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Lemma 7 (Prompt Simulation Lemma). If s is any inspection policy, then there is a
prompt inspection policy r on
(
Ω,
(
F
k,τ
))
such that for all k ∈ N ∪ {∞},
Pr
[
s(∞) = k ‖F∞,0
]
= Pr
[
r(∞) = k ‖F∞,0
]
(36)
It follows that
E
[
A
sv − cs ‖F∞,0
]
= E
[
A
rv − cr ‖F∞,0
]
(37)
and, for any σ ∈ F∞,0,
E
[
A
sσ ‖F∞,0
]
= E
[
A
rσ ‖F∞,0
]
, (38)
Proof. The inspection policy r on Ω = Ω × [0, 1] is defined as follows. For any
sample point (ω, x) ∈ Ω and any τ ∈ R+ we define r((ω, x), τ) to be the greatest
k ∈ N ∪ {∞} such that
Pr
[
s(∞) ≥ k ‖F∞,0
]
≥ x.
Let us first verify that r satisfies the definition of a prompt inspection policy, and
then verify that (36) holds. Promptness of r is trivial, since the definition of r((ω, x), τ)
has no dependence on τ , sowe only need to check that for all k, {(ω, x) | r((ω, x), 0) >
k} is F
k,0
-measurable. From the definition of r we see that r((ω, x), 0) > k holds if
and only if the inequality Pr [s(∞) > k ‖F∞,0] ≥ x holds at ω. Let h(ω) denote the
conditional probability Pr [s(∞) > k ‖F∞,0]. By definition h is F∞,0-measurable;
we claim that it is, in fact, Fk,0-measurable. Indeed, the set E = {ω ∈ Ω | s(ω,∞) >
k} belongs to Fk,∞ by the definition of an inspection policy. Applying the condi-
tional independence relation (32), we find that
Pr
[
s(∞) > k ‖F∞,0
]
= Pr
[
s(∞) > k ‖Fk,0
]
,
so h(ω) can be equivalently defined as Pr
[
s(∞) > k ‖Fk,0
]
, from which it is clear
that h is Fk,0-measurable. Consequently the function h(ω) − x is F
k,0
-measurable,
and the set W = {(ω, x) | h(ω) − x ≥ 0} belongs to Fk,0. Recalling that W is also
the set of (ω, x) such that r((ω, x), 0) > k, we see from the relation W ∈ Fk,0 that r
satisfies the definition of an inspection policy.
To verify (36) recall that the event r(∞) > k holds at (ω, x) if and only if
h(ω) − x ≥ 0. As x is independent of ω and is uniformly distributed in [0, 1],
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the conditional probability of this event given ω is simply h(ω). Thus,
Pr
[
r(∞) > k ‖F∞,0
]
= E
[
Pr [r(∞) > k ‖ω] ‖ F∞,0
]
= E
[
h(ω) ‖F∞,0
]
= h(ω) = Pr
[
s(∞) > k ‖F∞,0
]
. (39)
To derive (36) we simply instantiate equation (39) at k − 1 and k, and subtract.
Finally, to verify equations (37)-(38) from the lemma statement, recall that v, σ,
and {ck}k∈N∪{∞} are F∞,0-measurable. We therefore have the equations
E
[
A
sv ‖F∞,0
]
= Pr
[
s(∞) =∞‖F∞,0
]
· v (40)
E
[
cs ‖F∞,0
]
=
∞∑
k=0
Pr
[
s(∞) = k ‖F∞,0
]
· ck (41)
E
[
A
sσ ‖F∞,0
]
= Pr
[
s(∞) =∞‖F∞,0
]
· σ, (42)
Viewing v, σ, {ck} as functions defined onΩ, they are F∞,0-measurable, so the same
reasoning justifies
E
[
A
rv ‖F∞,0
]
= Pr
[
r(∞) =∞‖F∞,0
]
· v (43)
E
[
cr ‖F∞,0
]
=
∞∑
k=0
Pr
[
r(∞) = k ‖F∞,0
]
· ck (44)
E
[
A
rσ ‖F∞,0
]
= Pr
[
r(∞) =∞‖F∞,0
]
· σ. (45)
Using (36) we find that the right sides of (40)-(42) are equal to the right sides of the
corresponding equations (43)-(45), which concludes the proof of (37)-(38).
Given that σk is informally defined as the value of an outside option that makes
the bidder indifferent between stopping and inspecting at stage k, it is intuitive
that σk discourages inspection at stage k. The following lemma substantiates this
intuition.
Lemma 8. The random variable σk discourages inspection at stage k.
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Proof. For all V ∈ Fk,∞,
E [1V (A
sv − cs)] ≤ inf
{
E
[
1V
(
A
sσ − ck
)] ∣∣ σ ∈ DIk}
= inf
{
E
[
1V
(
E
[
A
s ‖Fk,∞
]
σ − ck
)] ∣∣ σ ∈ DIk}
= E
[
1V
(
E
[
A
s ‖Fk,∞
]
σk − ck
)]
= E
[
1V
(
A
sσk − ck
)]
,
where the first line used the definition of DIk, the second and fourth lines are ap-
plications of the law of iterated conditional expectation, and the third line uses
Lemma 5. Since V was an arbitrary element of Fk,∞we conclude thatE
[
Asv − cs ‖Fk,∞
]
≤
E
[
Asσk − ck ‖Fk,∞
]
, i.e., σk discourages inspection at stage k.
Lemma 9. Suppose k is a natural number and r, s are any two inspection policies that
satisfy k ≤ r(∞) ≤ s(∞) pointwise, and suppose that Ar = As holds at every sample
point where r(∞) = s(∞). Let σr denote a random variable whose value is equal to σr(∞)
if r(∞) <∞ and equal to v otherwise. Then we have
E
[
A
sv − cs ‖Fk,∞
]
≤ E
[
A
rv − cr ‖Fk,∞
]
+ E
[
(As − Ar)σr ‖Fk,∞
]
. (46)
Note that the lemma generalizes Lemma 8 because in the case r(∞) ≡ k we
have Ar ≡ 0, so the right side of (46) equals E
[
Asσk − ck ‖Fk,∞
]
.
Proof. The set of sample points where s(∞) > r(∞) can be partitioned into sets
Vm ∈ F
m,∞ where s(∞) > r(∞) = m ≥ k. On each Vm we have
E
[
1Vm(A
sv − cs) ‖Fk,∞
]
≤ E
[
1Vm(A
sσm − cm) ‖Fk,∞
]
= E
[
1Vm (A
sσr − cr) ‖Fk,∞
]
(47)
where the first inequality is because σm discourages inspection at stage m. Now,
E
[
A
sv − cs ‖Fk,∞
]
= E
[
1Ω\V (A
sv − cs) ‖Fk,∞
]
+
∞∑
m=k
E
[
1Vm (A
sv − cs) ‖Fk,∞
]
= E
[
1Ω\V (A
rv − cr) ‖Fk,∞
]
+
∞∑
m=k
E
[
1Vm (A
sv − cs) ‖Fk,∞
]
= E
[
A
rv ‖Fk,∞
]
− E
[
1Ω\V cr ‖Fk,∞
]
−
∞∑
m=k
E
[
1Vmc
r ‖Fk,∞
]
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+
∞∑
m=k
E
[
1Vm (A
sv − cs + cr) ‖Fk,∞
]
= E
[
A
rv − cr ‖Fk,∞
]
+
∞∑
m=k
E
[
1Vm (A
sv − cs + cr) ‖Fk,∞
]
≤ E
[
A
rv − cr ‖Fk,∞
]
+
∞∑
m=k
E
[
1VmA
sσr ‖Fk,∞
]
by inequality (47)
= E
[
A
rv − cr ‖Fk,∞
]
+ E
[
(As − Ar)σr ‖Fk,∞
]
which completes the proof.
Informally, we defined σk as the value of an outside option that makes the bid-
der indifferent between undertaking at least one more stage of inspection, or ceas-
ing immediately at stage k. Thus far, in Lemma 8 we have shown that the bidder
does not strictly prefer to undertake at least one more stage of inspection. We now
turn to showing the opposite inequality: that the bidder does not strictly prefer to
cease inspection immediately. We prove this fact in two steps: Lemma 10 shows
that if the value of the outside option is decreased by any constant δ > 0 then
the bidder strictly prefers to continue advancing the inspection stage beyond k;
Lemma 11 shows that even if the outside option value is exactly σk then there is
an inspection policy that always advances beyond stage k and is no worse than
claiming the outside option after exactly k stages of inspection.
Lemma 10. For all k ≥ 0 and δ > 0, there exists a prompt inspection policy r such that
r(ω, τ) > k for all ω, τ and
E
[
A
rv − cr ‖Fk,∞
]
≥ E
[
A
r(σk − δ)− ck ‖Fk,∞
]
(48)
almost everywhere.
Proof. Let G denote the collection of all sets U ∈ Fk,0 such that there exists a prompt
inspection policy rwith r(ω, τ) > k that satisfies (48) pointwise on U . We claim that
1. G is closed under countable unions;
2. for any set V ∈ Fk,0 such that µ(V ) > 0 there exists W ∈ G such thatW ⊆ V
and µ(W ) > 0.
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Treating these two claims as given for the moment, let us see how they imply the
lemma. Let γ = sup{µ(U) | U ∈ G}. We may choose sets U1, U2, . . . ∈ G such
that µ(Un) > γ − 1n for all n ≥ 1. The set U =
⋃
n≥1 Un belongs to G and satisfies
µ(U) ≥ µ(Un) for all n, so it must be the case that µ(U) = γ. Let V denote the
complement of U . If µ(V ) > 0 then there exists W ∈ G such that W ⊆ V and
µ(W ) > 0; then U ∪ W ∈ G and µ(U ∪ W ) > γ, contradicting the definition of
γ. Therefore it must be the case that γ = 1. From the definition of G we know
that there is a prompt inspection policy r satisfying (48) pointwise on U . Since
µ(U) = γ = 1 it follows that r satisfies (48) almost everywhere.
It remains to prove the two claims about G enumerated above. Let U1, U2, . . .
be any countable collection of sets in G, and for each n ≥ 1 let rn be a prompt
inspection policy that satisfies (48) pointwise on Un and such that rn(ω, τ) > k for
all ω, τ . Let Vn = Un \
(⋃
m<n Um
)
, and define
r(ω, τ) =

rn(ω, τ) if ω ∈ Vn0 otherwise.
(Note that the sets {Vn}n≥1 are pairwise disjoint, so the cases in the definition of
r(ω, τ) are mutually exclusive.) It is easy to verify that r satisfies the definition of a
prompt inspection policy, and that it satisfies (48) pointwise on U . Thus, G is closed
under countable unions.
Now suppose V ∈ Fk,0 and µ(V ) > 0. The function σ = σk − δ1V satisfies´
V
σ dµ <
´
V
σk dµ, so by Lemma 4 it must be the case that σ 6∈ DIk: there exists an
inspection policy s satisfying s(∞) > k pointwise, such that
E
[
A
sv − cs ‖Fk,∞
]
> E
[
A
sσ − ck ‖Fk,∞
]
(49)
holds on a set U of positive measure. By Lemma 7 we may assume without loss
of generality that s is a prompt inspection policy, since σ is Fk,0-measurable. Then
all of the random variables appearing in (49) — namely As, cs, ck, v, σ— are F∞,0-
measurable. By the conditional independence property (32) we may conclude that
E
[
A
sv − cs ‖Fk,∞
]
= E
[
A
sv − cs ‖Fk,0
]
E
[
A
sσ − ck ‖Fk,∞
]
= E
[
A
sσ − ck ‖Fk,0
]
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and hence the set U of sample points that satisfy (49) is a Fk,0-measurable set. Ob-
serve that σ = σk on the complement of V , and Lemma 8 precludes the possibility
that (49) holds on any positive-measure set where σ = σk. Thus, U ⊆ V . At this
point, we have proven that U is a Fk,0-measurable subset of V with positive mea-
sure, and that inspection policy s satisfies (48) pointwise on U (since σ = σk − δ
pointwise on U). Thus, V contains a positive-measure subset that belongs to G, as
claimed.
Lemma 11. Let qk denote an inspection policy defined as follows: for all ω, τ , qk(ω, τ) is
the least ℓ > k such that σℓ ≤ σk. If no such ℓ exists then qk(ω, τ) = ∞. Furthermore
Aqk = 1 if and only if qk(∞) =∞ and v > σ
k. For the inspection policy thus defined, we
have
E
[
A
qkv − cqk ‖Fk,∞
]
= E
[
A
qkσk − ck ‖Fk,∞
]
. (50)
Proof. First observe that qk is a well-defined prompt inspection policy: for any
j ∈ N the event {qk(∞) > j} is equal to the intersection of the events {σk < σi}
for i = k + 1, k + 2, . . . , j, which belongs to Fj,0 because σk and σi are both Fj,0-
measurable. Next, observe that the left side of (50) is pointwise less than or equal
to the right side, by Lemma 8. To prove that the reverse inequality holds pointwise,
we fix any δ > 0 and aim to prove that
E
[
A
qkv − cqk ‖Fk,∞
]
> E
[
A
qkσk − ck ‖Fk,∞
]
− 2δ (51)
holds on a set of measure at least 1 − δ. If this is true for all δ > 0, then in fact (50)
must hold almost everywhere.
For ease of notation, let q = qk. We shall construct a sequence of prompt inspec-
tion policies (rℓ)∞ℓ=1 inductively, such that for all ℓ the inequalities
rℓ(∞) ≥ (k + ℓ) ∧ q(∞) (52)
E
[
A
rℓv − crℓ ‖Fk,∞
]
> E
[
A
rℓσk − ck ‖Fk,∞
]
− δ +
δ
2ℓ
(53)
hold pointwise. For ℓ = 1 the existence of such a policy rℓ is implied by Lemma 10.
Assume now that rℓ is already defined. Use Lemma 10 to obtain a prompt inspec-
tion policy r that satisfies r(∞) > k + ℓ and
E
[
A
rv − cr ‖Fk+ℓ,∞
]
≥ E
[
A
rσk+ℓ − ck+ℓ ‖Fk+ℓ,∞
]
−
δ
2ℓ+1
(54)
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pointwise. Letting V denote the set of sample points where rℓ(∞) = k + ℓ < q(∞),
we define rℓ+1 to be equal to r on V and equal to rℓ on the complement of V . First let
us verify that rℓ+1 is a prompt inspection policy. Promptness of rℓ+1 follows from
the fact that q, rℓ, r are all prompt. The first and third properties of an inspection
policy are trivial to verify. For the second property, fix τ, j and consider the set of
ω such that rℓ+1(ω, τ) > j. If j ≤ k + ℓ then this is equal to the set of ω such that
rℓ(ω, τ) > j or q(ω, τ) > j, hence it isFj,τ -measurable. If j > k+ℓ there are twoways
that rℓ+1(ω, τ) could be greater than j: either rℓ(ω, τ) > j or rℓ(ω, τ) = k+ℓ < q(ω, τ)
and r(ω, τ) > j. Both of these events are Fj,τ-measurable. This completes the
verification that rℓ+1 is a valid inspection policy.
To verify (52), note that V is precisely the set of sample points at which rℓ(∞) <
(k+ℓ+1)∧q(∞). Thus, on the complement of V we have rℓ+1(∞) = rℓ(∞) ≥ (k+ℓ+
1)∧q(∞). Meanwhile, on V , we have rℓ+1(∞) = r(∞) ≥ k+ℓ+1 ≥ (k+ℓ+1)∧q(∞).
To verify (53), first observe that on the complement of V we have Arℓ+1 = Arℓ and
crℓ+1 = crℓ , whereas on V we have Arℓ = 0, crℓ = ck+ℓ, Arℓ+1 = Ar, and crℓ+1 = cr.
Combining these observations with the fact that V ∈ Fk+ℓ,∞ we obtain
E
[
A
rℓ+1v − crℓ+1 ‖Fk+ℓ,∞
]
= E
[
A
rℓv − crℓ ‖Fk+ℓ,∞
]
+ 1V E
[
A
rv − cr + ck+ℓ ‖Fk+ℓ,∞
]
> E
[
A
rℓv − crℓ ‖Fk+ℓ,∞
]
+ 1V E
[
A
rσk+ℓ ‖Fk+ℓ,∞
]
−
δ
2ℓ+1
> E
[
A
rℓv − crℓ ‖Fk+ℓ,∞
]
+ 1V E
[
A
rσk ‖Fk+ℓ,∞
]
−
δ
2ℓ+1
.
(55)
In the last line, we have used the fact that σk+ℓ > σk pointwise on V , which is a
consequence of the definition of q = qk and of the fact that q(∞) > k + ℓ pointwise
on V . Now, taking the conditional expectation of both sides of (55) with respect to
Fk,∞ and using the fact that Arℓ+1 = Arℓ + 1VAr pointwise, we obtain
E
[
A
rℓ+1v − crℓ+1 ‖Fk,∞
]
≥ E
[
A
rℓσk − ck ‖Fk,∞
]
+ E
[
1VA
rσk ‖Fk,∞
]
−
δ
2ℓ+1
> E
[
(Arℓ + 1VA
r) σk − ck ‖Fk,∞
]
− δ +
δ
2ℓ
−
δ
2ℓ+1
(56)
= E
[
A
rℓ+1σk − ck ‖Fk,∞
]
− δ +
δ
2ℓ+1
, (57)
which completes the induction.
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Now, the monotone convergence theorem implies that E
[
ck+ℓ
]
→ E [c∞] as ℓ→
∞, and hence we may choose ℓ large enough that E
[
c∞ − ck+ℓ
]
< δ2. Then by
Markov’s Inequality, the relation E
[
c∞ − ck+ℓ ‖Fk,∞
]
< δ holds pointwise on a set
of measure at least 1− δ. For the inspection policy q ∨ rℓ we have
(Aq∨rℓ − Arℓ) v ≥ (Aq∨rℓ − Arℓ) σk (58)
because the construction of q ensures that v ≥ σk at any point where Aq = 1.
Combining (53) with (58) we obtain
E
[
A
q∨rℓv − cq∨rℓ ‖Fk,∞
]
= E
[
A
rℓv − crℓ + (Aq∨rℓ − Arℓ) v − (cq∨rℓ − crℓ) ‖Fk,∞
]
> E
[
A
rℓσk − ck + (Aq∨rℓ − Arℓ) σk −
(
c∞ − ck+ℓ
)
‖Fk,∞
]
− δ
= E
[
A
q∨rℓσk − ck ‖Fk,∞
]
− E
[
c∞ − ck+ℓ ‖Fk,∞
]
− δ
> E
[
A
q∨rℓσk − ck ‖Fk,∞
]
− 2δ, (59)
where all of the inequalities except the last one hold pointwise, and the last in-
equality holds pointwise on a set of measure at least 1 − δ, by our assumption
on ℓ. Modify q ∨ rℓ into an inspection policy s defined by s(ω, τ) = (q ∨ rℓ)(ω, τ)
and As = 1v>σk · Aq∨rℓ . In other words, s uses the same inspection rule as q ∨ rℓ
but a modified acquisition rule that only acquires the item if v > σk. Note that
(Aq∨rℓ − As) ·
(
v − σk
)
≤ 0 pointwise. Upon rearranging terms and taking condi-
tional expectations, this implies
E
[
(As − Aq∨rℓ) v ‖Fk,∞
]
≥ E
[
(As − Aq∨rℓ)σk ‖Fk,∞
]
. (60)
Summing (59) and (60) we find that
E
[
A
sv − cs ‖Fk,∞
]
> E
[
A
sσk − ck ‖Fk,∞
]
− 2δ (61)
on a set of measure at least 1− δ.
Nowwe shall apply Lemma 9 to the pair of inspection policies q and s. Observe
that k < q(∞) ≤ s(∞) pointwise, and that Aq = As holds at every sample point
where q(∞) = s(∞). (If q(∞) = s(∞) < ∞ then Aq = As = 0, and if q(∞) =
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s(∞) =∞ then Aq = As = 1v>σk .) Consequently, the lemma guarantees that
E
[
A
qv − cq ‖Fk,∞
]
+ E
[
(As − Aq)σq ‖Fk,∞
]
≥ E
[
A
sv − cs ‖Fk,∞
]
. (62)
On a set of measure at least 1− δ we have
E
[
A
sv − cs ‖Fk,∞
]
> E
[
A
sσk − ck ‖Fk,∞
]
− 2δ
= E
[
A
qσk − ck ‖Fk,∞
]
+ E
[
(As − Aq) σk ‖Fk,∞
]
− 2δ
≥ E
[
A
qσk − ck ‖Fk,∞
]
+ E
[
(As − Aq) σq ‖Fk,∞
]
− 2δ, (63)
where the last line was derived using the fact that σk ≥ σq whenever As−Aq > 0, a
consequence of the definition of the inspection policy q. Combining (62) with (63)
and canceling the common term on the left and right sides, we obtain (52) which
completes the proof.
G.3 Generalized covered call value
In this section we generalize the notion of covered call value to the setting of multi-
stage inspection, and we state and prove Lemma 13, which generalizes the amorti-
zation lemma (Lemma 1 frommain text Subsection 2.2) that underpins many of the
results in the paper. As before, the lemma asserts that the expected value of items
acquired by the bidder, minus the inspection cost invested in all items, is bounded
above by the expected covered call value of items acquired by the bidder, and it
provides a sufficient condition for this upper bound to be sharp.
Definition 11. For k ≥ 0 let κk = min{σ0, σ1, . . . , σk}. Let κ∞ = limk→∞{κk}.
(Note that the limit has a well-defined value in R ∪ {−∞} since κ0, κ1, . . . is a non-
increasing sequence.) The random variable κ = min{κ∞, v} is the generalized cov-
ered call value.
To illustrate these definitions consider the single-bidder, single-item, single-
inspection-stage case. Then c0, c1, . . . degenerates to a single random variable c =
c1. Since there is only one stage of inspection, it is clear that the optimal inspec-
tion policy pays a cost of c, learns the value v, and then claims the better of v or
σ0. Thus by its definition as the indifference point for implementing the optimal
policy, E [max{v, σ0} − c] = σ0, or equivalently, E [(v − σ0)+] = E[c]. Thus, σ0 is the
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same as the strike price in Definition 1. On the other hand, σ1 is defined by the fact
that a bidder who has already reached inspection stage 1 (viz. learned her value)
is indifferent between stopping immediately and claiming a reward of σ1 versus
applying the optimal policy that engages in at least one more stage of inspection.
Given there are no inspection stages past the first, this policy must simply claim
the item of value v, and hence the indifference point σ1 is equal to v. The same
logic applies to σ2, σ3, . . .; all of them are equal to v.25 Thus the generalized strike
price σ0 represents the strike price, σ, defined in main text Subsection 2.2 while the
generalized strike prices σ1, σ2, . . . are all equal to the item’s value, v. The gener-
alized covered call value κ is therefore equal to min{σ, v}, matching the definition
from main text Subsection 2.2.
To generalize the crucial amortization lemma (Lemma 1) to environments with
multiple stages of inspection, we will use a property that generalizes the idea of
“exercising in the money”.
Definition 12. An inspection policy is non-exposed if it never ceases inspection at
a stage when the strike price is strictly greater than the minimum strike price en-
countered along the inspection path, and it never fails to acquire an item of value
v > κ if it completes all stages of inspection. More formally, s is non-exposed if
1. Pr
(
s(∞) <∞ and σs(∞) > κs(∞)
)
= 0
2. Pr (s(∞) =∞ and (1− As) (v − κ) > 0) = 0.
For non-exposed policies we have the following strengthening of Lemma 9.
Lemma 12. Suppose r, q are any two inspection policies that satisfy r(∞) ≤ q(∞) and
Ar ≤ Aq pointwise. If r is non-exposed then we have
E [Aqv − cq] ≤ E [Arv − cr] + E [(Aq − Ar)κ] . (64)
Proof. First note that
E [Aqv − cq] = E [Arv − cr] + E [(Aq − Ar)v − (cq − cr)] ,
25 More generally, in environments with at most b stages of inspection, then σb = σb+1 = · · · = v.
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so (64) is equivalent to
E [(Aq − Ar)v − (cq − cr)] ≤ E [(Aq − Ar) κ] . (65)
A first observation is that the equation
(Aq − Ar)v − (cq − cr) = (Aq − Ar)κ (66)
holds at any sample point where q(∞) = r(∞). When q(∞) = r(∞) < ∞ this is
because both sides are equal to 0. When q(∞) = r(∞) = ∞ we have cq − cr = 0,
and the only case in which Aq − Ar 6= 0 is if Aq = 1,Ar = 0, but in that case v = κ
because r is non-exposed. (Recall that v ≥ κ by the definition of κ, and that the
possibility v > κ is precluded for a non-exposed policy r when r(∞) = ∞ and
Ar = 0.)
The set V of sample points where q(∞) > r(∞) can be partitioned into sets
Vm ∈ F
m,∞ where q(∞) > r(∞) = m. For m = 0, 1, 2, . . . let Em denote the operator
Em[f ] =
ˆ
Vm
f dµ,
and note that
´
V
f dµ =
∑∞
m=0 Em[f ] whenever both sides are well-defined, for
instance whenever
´
V
f+ dµ < ∞. We have already argued that the integrands
on the left and right sides of (65) are equal on the complement of V , so (65) is
equivalent to
∞∑
m=0
Em [(A
q − Ar)v − (cq − cr)] ≤
∞∑
m=0
Em [(A
q − Ar) κ] . (67)
We will prove (67) by comparing the sums term-by-term. Since Ar = 0 and cr = cm
on Vm, the proof reduces to showing that
Em [A
qv − cq] ≤ Em [A
qκ− cm] . (68)
For n ≥ 0, define an inspection policy sn by setting sn(ω, τ) to be the least k > n
such that σk ≤ κn if there is any such k; otherwise sn(ω, τ) = ∞ and Asn(ω) =
Aq(ω). Also define an inspection policy q′ by specifying that q′(ω, τ) = q(ω, τ) for
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all ω, τ and that
A
q′ =

A
q if v ≥ κ∞
0 if v < κ∞
.
Consider the inspection policy qn defined by the pointwise minimum q′ ∧ sn. We
claim that for 0 ≤ m ≤ n,
Em [A
qnv − cqn ] ≤ Em [A
qnκn − cm] . (69)
For each fixed m the proof is by induction on n. In the base case n = m, note
that κm = σm pointwise on Vm, because r(∞) = m and r is non-exposed. Thus,
when n = m the inequality (69) is equivalent to Em [Aqnv − cqn ] ≤ Em [Aqnσm − cm],
which is valid because σm discourages inspection at stage m and Vm ∈ Fm,∞. For
the induction step, let U denote the set of sample points where qn(∞) 6= qn+1(∞).
Note that U ∈ Fn+1,∞, and that on U the relations σn+1 = κn+1, qn(∞) = n + 1, and
Aqn = 0 hold pointwise, whereas on the complement of U the relations κn+1 = κn
and Aqn+1 = Aqn hold pointwise. These observations imply the following:
A
qn+1v = Aqnv + 1UA
qn+1v (70)
cqn+1 = cqn + 1U(c
qn+1 − cn+1) (71)
A
qn+1κn+1 = Aqnκn + 1UA
qn+1σn+1. (72)
We therefore have
Em [A
qn+1v − cqn+1 ] = Em [A
qnv − cqn ] + Em
[
1U
(
A
qn+1v − cqn+1 + cn+1
)]
≤ Em [A
qnκn − cm] + Em
[
1UA
qn+1σn+1
]
= Em
[
A
qn+1κn+1 − cm
]
,
where the second line follows from the induction hypothesis and the fact that σn+1
discourages inspection at stage n+ 1. This completes the inductive proof of (69).
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Now, applying Lemma 9 we find that
Em
[
A
q
′
v − cq
′
]
≤ Em [A
qnv − cqn ] + Em
[(
A
q
′
− Aqn
)
σqn
]
≤ Em [A
qnκn − cm] + Em
[(
A
q′ − Aqn
)
κn
]
= Em
[
A
q
′
κn − cm
]
. (73)
where the second line follows from (69) and the definition of qn: the relation σqn =
σsn ≤ κn holds whenever q′(∞) > qn(∞).
Themonotone convergence theorem implies that limn→∞ Em
[
A
q′κn
]
= Em
[
A
q′κ∞
]
,
so the inequality
Em
[
A
q′v − cq
′
]
≤ Em
[
A
q′κ∞ − cm
]
(74)
follows from (73) in the limit as n→∞. Now, recalling the definition of q′, we see
that Aq
′
= 0 whenever κ 6= κ∞ and that Aq − Aq
′
= 0 whenever κ 6= v. In addition,
q(∞) = q′(∞) and hence cq = cq′ . Therefore,
Em [A
qv − cq] = Em
[(
A
q − Aq
′
)
v
]
+ Em
[
A
q′v − cq
′
]
≤ Em
[(
A
q − Aq
′
)
v
]
+ Em
[
A
q
′
κ∞ − cq
′
]
= Em
[(
A
q − Aq
′
)
κ
]
+ Em
[
A
q′κ− cm
]
= Em [A
qκ− cm]
which establishes (68) and completes the proof of the lemma.
The following lemma generalizes Lemma 1 frommain text Subsection 2.2 to the
setting of multi-stage inspection.
Lemma 13. For any inspection policy s, we have
E [Asv − cs] ≤ E [Asκ] , (75)
with equality when s is non-exposed.
The formal proof of the lemma appears below. The intuition underlying the
proof can be summarized by appealing to the option-theoretic notions introduced
in main text Subsection 2.2. Suppose that a third party (the “insurer”) agrees to
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underwrite all of the bidder’s inspection costs in exchange for being granted a call
option with strike price σ along with the right to dictate the bidder’s inspection
policy. The defining property of σk is that if the bidder is at inspection stage k
and the insurer holds an option with strike price σk, she is indifferent between
telling the bidder to stop immediately or to engage in a policy that incorporates
at least one more stage of inspection. Since the value of exercising the option is a
decreasing function of its strike price, this implies the following two observations:
1. If σk < σ, the insurer must require the bidder to stop inspecting.
2. If σk > σ, the insurer must require the bidder to continue inspecting.
Now consider an option with a renegotiable strike price that evolves as follows.
Initially the strike price is set at σ = σ0, but whenever the bidder reaches an inspec-
tion stage k such that σk < σ, the strike price is reduced to σk. Now there are only
two types of states: those in which σ = σk (possibly because σ was just reduced
to σk) and those in which σ < σk. In the former type of state, the insurer is indif-
ferent between asking the bidder to continue inspecting or to stop immediately;
in the latter type of state, she strictly prefers for the bidder to continue inspect-
ing. In other words, the insurer is indifferent between all non-exposed policies,
and strictly prefers non-exposed policies to exposed ones. Since one example of
a non-exposed policy is the trivial policy which stops immediately at stage 0 and
yields zero net payoff for the insurer, it must be the case that every non-exposed
policy yields zero expected net payoff for the insurer, and all other policies yield
negative expected net payoff for the insurer. Given the way we have defined the
dynamics of the option’s renegotiable strike price, it is always the case that if the
bidder completes all stages of inspection and acquires the item, she pays v − κ to
the insurer. Thus the insurer’s net payoff is As(v−κ)− cs. We have argued that the
expected value of this quantity is never positive, and that it equals zero when s is
non-exposed, exactly as asserted in the lemma.
Having presented this intuition, we now present the formal proof.
Proof of Lemma 13. The inequality (75) is the special case of Lemma 12 in which
q = s and r is the trivial inspection policy given by r(ω, τ) = 0 for all (ω, τ). So,
we only need to prove that E [Asv − cs] = E [Asκ] when s is non-exposed. To do
so, it will be useful to first construct, for any given k ∈ N, a non-exposed prompt
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inspection policy q such that q(∞) > k pointwise, and
E [Aqv − cq] ≥ E [Aqκ] . (76)
The construction will proceed by induction on k. For k = 0, observe that the policy
q0 defined in Lemma 11 is non-exposed and prompt. Setting q = q0 and applying
Lemma 11 we obtain
E [Aqv − cq] ≥ E
[
A
qσ0 − c0
]
≥ E [Aqκ]
since σ0 ≥ κ and c0 = 0. This completes the base case of the induction.
For k > 0 assume that we already have a non-exposed prompt inspection policy
q
′ such that q′(∞) > k − 1 pointwise, and
E
[
A
q′v − cq
′
]
≥ E
[
A
q′κ
]
. (77)
Let V be the set of all sample points where q′(∞) = k and note that V ∈ Fk,∞.
Recalling the policy qk defined in Lemma 11, we define q to be equal to qk on V
and to q′ on Ω \ V . By construction q is prompt and q(∞) > k pointwise. For any
ℓ > k we have
q(∞) > ℓ⇐⇒ (q′(∞) = k and qk(∞) > ℓ) or q′(∞) > ℓ,
which shows that the event q(∞) > ℓ belongs to Fℓ,0, confirming that q is a valid
inspection policy. Our induction hypothesis that q′ is non-exposed implies that at
all sample points in the complement of V , q satisfies the properties that define a
non-exposed policy. At sample points that belong to V , the facts that q′ is non-
exposed and that q′(∞) = k together imply σk = κk. This means that q (which
mimics the policy qk on V ) stops at the first ℓ > k such that σℓ ≤ σk if such an ℓ
exists, and otherwise it completes all inspection stages and acquires the item if and
only if v > σk. Recalling that σk = κk, we see that the former case implies that q
stops at a stage ℓ <∞ such that σℓ = κℓ, and the latter case implies that q(∞) =∞
and that Aq = 1 if and only if v > σk = κ. This completes the verification that q is
non-exposed.
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Applying Lemma 11 we find that
E [1V (A
qv − cq)] = E
[
1V
(
A
qσk − ck
)]
= E
[
1V
(
A
qκ− ck
)]
, (78)
where the second equation uses the fact that at every sample point in V where
Aq = 1, the relation σk = κ holds. Summing (77) and (78), and rearranging terms,
we obtain
E
[(
A
q′ + 1VA
q
)
v − cq
′
− 1V c
q + 1V c
k
]
≥ E
[(
A
q′ + 1VA
q
)
κ
]
. (79)
Recall that on the set V , we have q′(∞) = k, hence the relations cq′ = ck and Aq′ = 0
hold pointwise on V . These observations, together with the fact that q = q′ on
Ω \ V , imply the relations
A
q = 1Ω\VA
q′ + 1VA
q = Aq
′
+ 1VA
q
cq = 1Ω\V c
q′ + 1V c
q = cq
′
− 1V c
k + 1V c
q
hence (79) simplifies to E [Aqv − cq] ≥ E [Aqκ] , as desired. This completes the in-
duction step, and establishes the existence of the claimed inspection policy q for
every k ∈ N.
The monotone convergence theorem implies that E
[
c∞ − ck
]
→ 0 as k → ∞,
so for any given ε > 0 we may choose k large enough that E
[
c∞ − ck
]
< ε. Then
we may choose a non-exposed prompt inspection policy q such that q(∞) > k
pointwise, and E [Aqv − cq] ≥ E [Aqκ] . For the inspection policy defined by the
pointwise maximum q ∨ s, we have
E [Aq∨sv − cq∨s] = E [Aqv − cq] + E [(Aq∨s − Aq) v]− E [cq∨s − cq]
> E [Aqκ] + E [(Aq∨s − Aq) κ]− ε. (80)
In deriving the last line, we made use of (76) together with fact that k < q(∞) ≤
(q ∨ s)(∞) ≤ ∞, so E [cq∨s − cq] ≤ E
[
c∞ − ck
]
< ε.
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Now, applying Lemma 12 to the inspection policies s and q ∨ s, we obtain
E [Asv − cs] ≥ E [Aq∨sv − cq∨s]− E [(Aq∨s − As)κ]
> E [Aq∨sκ]− ε− E [(Aq∨s − As) κ]
= E [Asκ]− ε.
As ε > 0was arbitrarily small, we conclude that E [Asv − cs] ≥ E [Asκ]. The reverse
inequality was already established in the first paragraph of this proof, so the proof
is complete.
We conclude this section with a technical lemma about the generalized cov-
ered call value which will be useful in the sequel, when we analyze the first-best
procedure and the equilibria of Dutch auctions.
Lemma 14. At every sample point where v > κ ≥ 0, except possibly a measure-zero set of
exceptions, there exists some k <∞ such that κ = σk < infℓ>k{σ
ℓ}.
Proof. For any k < ∞ and ε > 0 let Uk,ε denote the set of sample points where
E[v+ ‖Fk,∞] > σk + ε ≥ ε and E[c∞ ‖Fk,∞] < ck + ε. We claim that Uk,ε has measure
zero. Indeed, let s denote the inspection policy that always completes all stages of
inspection, and then acquires the item if v ≥ 0. The strict inequality
E[v+ − c∞ ‖Fk,∞] > σk − ck (81)
holds pointwise on Uk,ε. Since As = 1 if and only if v ≥ 0, the equation Asv = v+
holds pointwise. Since σk ≥ 0 at every point of Uk,ε, the inequality Asσk ≤ σk holds
pointwise on Uk,ε. Combining these relations with (81) we find that
E[Asv − cs ‖Fk,∞] > Asσk − ck (82)
holds at every point of Uk,ε. On the other hand, since σk discourages inspection,
the opposite inequality E[Asv − cs ‖Fk,∞] ≤ Asσk − ck holds pointwise almost ev-
erywhere. The only way to reconcile these two statements is to conclude that Uk,ε
has measure zero.
Let V denote the set of all sample points at which the relations
E[v+ ‖Fk,∞] > v+ − ε and E[c∞ ‖Fk,∞] < ck + ε (83)
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are violated for only finitelymany values of k. By themartingale convergence theo-
rem, we have limk→∞E[v+ ‖Fk,∞] = v+ and limk→∞E[c∞ ‖Fk,∞] = c∞ = limk→∞ ck
almost everywhere, and this implies that Vε has measure 1.
Now consider the set
Wε = Vε \
( ∞⋃
k=0
Uk,ε
)
,
which also has measure 1. At any point in Wε there is some k0 < ∞ such that for
all k ≥ k0, both of the relations in line (83) hold. However, since the point does
not belong to Uk,ε, it must be the case that E[v+ ‖Fk,∞] > σk + ε ≥ ε does not hold.
In other words, either σk < 0 or E[v+ ‖Fk,∞] ≤ σk + ε. If there is any k such that
σk < 0, then κ < 0. Otherwise, for all k ≥ k0, E[v+ ‖Fk,∞] ≤ σk + ε. Combining this
with (83), we have that at any point ofWε where κ ≥ 0,
∀k ≥ k0 v
+ < E[v+ ‖Fk,∞] + ε ≤ σk + 2ε (84)
and therefore
v+ <
(
lim inf
k→∞
σk
)
+ 2ε. (85)
Since each of the sets Wε has measure 1 for ε = 1, 12 ,
1
3
, . . ., their intersection W =⋂∞
n=1W1/n has measure 1, and the relation v
+ ≤ lim infk→∞ σk holds at every point
of W where κ ≥ 0. Recalling that κ = min{v, κ∞} and that κ∞ = limk→∞ κk =
infk∈N σk, we may conclude that at any point ofW where v > κ ≥ 0, we must have
lim inf
k→∞
σk ≥ v+ = v > κ = inf
k∈N
σk, (86)
from which we may conclude that the infimum on the right side of (86) is achieved
at a finite k, and that if k is the greatest integer satisfying κ = σk then κ < infℓ>k{σℓ}.
G.4 First-best Procedure
Weitzman’s optimal search procedure generalizes, in the setting of multi-stage in-
spection, to the following descending-priority procedure. In describing the procedure,
we assume that steps of the procedure are numbered by (possibly transfinite, but
at most countable) ordinal numbers, so that it is meaningful to refer to a step in
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which one or more bidders have already completed all of the (countably many) in-
spection stages. When we specialize to a setting in which bidders are guaranteed
to learn all information about their value after performing a finite number of stages
of inspection, then we may assume without loss of generality that their inspection
stage advances to k = ∞ as soon as they have learned all information about their
value, and then we can assume that steps of the procedure are indexed by natural
numbers rather than transfinite ordinals.
The descending-priority procedure assigns to each bidder i a priority defined
according to her current inspection stage k(i) as follows: if k(i) < ∞ then the
priority is set to the generalized strike price σk(i)i ; if k(i) =∞ then the priority is set
to vi. In every step of the procedure, the bidder i with highest priority is selected,
breaking ties arbitrarily. If this priority is negative, we terminate the procedure
without allocating the item. If k(i) <∞ then we perform the next inspection stage
for bidder i, increment k(i), and recompute bidder i’s priority using this updated
value of k(i). If k(i) =∞ then we allocate the item to bidder i and terminate.
To analyze the descending-priority procedure, it will be useful to define a state
variable κ˜i for each bidder i. In any step of the procedure κ˜i is set equal to κ
k(i)
i
if k(i) < ∞, and otherwise κ˜i = κi. In other words, κ˜i is equal to the infimum of
the priority values assigned to bidder i at past and present steps of the procedure;
accordingly, we will refer to it as her min-priority.
The following property of the descending-priority procedure will be instru-
mental in its analysis.
Lemma 15. In any step of the descending-priority procedure, the priority and min-priority
of any bidder are equal unless she is the unique bidder with maximum priority; in the latter
case, her min-priority is greater than or equal to that of all other bidders.
Proof. The proof is by (transfinite) induction on the steps of the procedure. Initially,
when k(i) = 0 for each bidder, each bidder’s priority equals her min-priority. the
priority of each bidder i is equal to σ0i , which in turn equals κ˜i.
If the current step of the procedure is a successor ordinal, that let i denote the
bidder who performed a stage of inspection at the end of the preceding step. Any
bidder i′ 6= i could not have been the unique maximum-priority bidder (else the
procedure would have selected i′ rather than i to perform a stage of inspection)
so by the induction hypothesis, the priority and min-priority of i′ were equal in
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the preceding step. They remain equal in the current step because k(i′) remains
unchanged. As for bidder i, in the preceding step she had the maximum prior-
ity; by the induction hypothesis this means that she also had the maximum min-
priority. In the current step there are two cases: if her new priority is equal to her
min-priority, then the lemma’s conclusion is clearly satisfied. If her new priority
is strictly greater than her min-priority, then her min-priority must have retained
its value from the preceding step; this is greater than or equal to the min-priority
of all other bidders because they, too, have retained their min-priority from the
preceding step.
If the current step is a limit ordinal, then there are two types of bidders to
consider: dormant bidders, for whom the inspection counter k(i) reached its cur-
rent value at a strictly earlier step of the procedure, and active bidders, for whom
k(i) =∞ at the current step but k(i) <∞ at all strictly earlier steps.
For any dormant bidder i, the induction hypothesis guarantees that the priority
and min-priority are equal: consider the earliest step at which k(i) reached its cur-
rent value. We know that i could not have been the unique bidder with maximum
priority in that step, as otherwise she would have been selected to perform an ad-
ditional inspection stage. Thus, at that earlier step the priority and min-priority of
iwere equal, and neither of them has subsequently been updated.
On the other hand, for an active bidder i, since k(i) = ∞, her priority is equal
to vi whereas her min-priority is equal to κi. If vi = κi then the lemma’s conclusion
holds for bidder i, so assume henceforth that vi > κi. The descending-priority
procedure never selects a bidder with negative priority to perform an inspection
stage, so κi ≥ 0. Now applying Lemma 14 we find that there is some k < ∞
such that κi = σki < infℓ>k{σ
ℓ
i}. Let t denote the step of the descending-priority
procedure in which bidder i was selected to advance from inspection stage k to
k + 1. During step t her priority σki was greater than or equal to the priority of
all other bidders, and since σki < infℓ>k{σ
ℓ
i} it follows that her priority was strictly
greater than the priority of all other bidders in every step from t + 1 until she
reached inspection stage ∞. Thus, in the current step bidder i is the only active
bidder. Furthermore, the min-priorities of all bidders including i are the same as
they were in step t, which implies that the min-priority of bidder i is greater than
or equal to that of all other bidders, as claimed.
Theorem 3. The expected welfare achieved by the descending-priority procedure is equal
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to E[maxi κ
+
i ]. No other procedure can attain a higher expected welfare.
Proof. By Lemma 13, for any procedure the expected net utility of bidder i is at
most E[Aiκi], where Ai is the indicator of the event that the item is awarded to i.
Summing over bidders, the expectedwelfare of any procedure is atmostE [
∑
iAiκi],
which in turn is bounded above by E [maxi(κi)+].
To see that the descending-priority procedure attains this upper bound, we will
show that it induces a non-exposed inspection policy for each bidder, and that it
always awards the item to a bidder i in argmaxi{κi} unless κi < 0, in which case
the item is not allocated. From these two facts, Lemma 13 implies that the expected
welfare of the descending-priority procedure is equal to E [maxi(κi)+], exactly as in
the proof of Theorem 1.
Consider any step of the descending-priority procedure and suppose that either
1. k(i) <∞ and σk(i)i > κ
k(i)
i , or
2. k(i) =∞ and vi > κi.
In both case the priority of bidder i is strictly greater than her min-priority. By
Lemma 14 this means that i is the unique bidder with maximum priority. In the
first case this means she will be selected to perform another stage of inspection. In
the second case it means the item will be awarded to her. Thus, the descending-
priority procedure never stops inspecting bidder i when she is at a stage with
σ
k(i)
i > κ
k(i)
i , and it never fails to award the item to a bidder who has completed
all inspection stages and found that vi > κi. This confirms that the policy is non-
exposed.
To conclude we must show that the procedure always awards the item to a
bidder i in argmaxi{κi} unless κi < 0, in which case the item is not allocated. If
the procedure terminates by awarding the item to i, then k(i) = ∞, so the min-
priority of bidder i is κi. By Lemma 14 this is greater than or equal to the min-
priority of every other bidder i′, which in turn is an upper bound on κi′ , so i is
among the bidders with maximum covered call value as claimed. Furthermore,
it cannot be the case that σki < 0 for any k ∈ N — as otherwise the procedure
would never have advanced bidder i beyond inspection stage k — nor can it be
the case that vi < 0, since the procedure never awards the item to a bidder with
negative value. Accordingly, κi ≥ 0 as claimed. The remaining case to consider is
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that the procedure terminates without awarding the item to any bidder. This can
only happen if the priority of every bidder is strictly negative. Since each bidder’s
priority is an upper bound on her min-priority, which in turn is an upper bound on
her covered call value, this means that all covered call values are strictly negative
as claimed.
G.5 Application to Dutch Auction Analysis
We now sketch how our main results concerning the analysis of the Dutch auction
(main text Lemma 2, Theorem 2, and Corollary 2) extend to the setting of multi-
stage inspection, as claimed in main text Subsection 6.1. Since we are considering
a Dutch auction for a single item, we may drop the subscript j from our σ-fields
and denote them by Fk,τi .
In the Dutch auction, we will assume that the descending price is given by a
continuous non-increasing function t, with t(τ) denoting the price when the clock
time is τ . The σ-field Fk,τi is generated by bidder i’s private type θi, the outcomes
of her first k stages of inspection, and a random variable s(τ) describing the state
of the auction at clock time τ ; this state variable s(τ) takes the value (i′, τ ′) if some
bidder i′ was allocated the item at time τ ′ < τ and otherwise it takes a null value
⊥.
A strategy for bidder i is given by an inspection policy si, subject to the fea-
sibility constraint that the bidder cannot attempt to acquire the item if it has al-
ready been allocated to another bidder: Asi(ω, τ) = 0 unless s(τ) =⊥. We will use
A∗i (ω, τ) to denote the indicator random variable of the event that the item is allo-
cated to bidder i at time τ or earlier. The only case in which A∗i (ω, τ) may differ
from Asi(ω, τ) is when two or more bidders attempt to acquire the item at time τ ,
in which case the winner is decided by random tie-breaking. The price charged to
bidder i is
ti(ω) =

0 if A
∗
i (ω, τ) = 0 ∀τ
sup{t(τ) | A∗i (ω, τ) = 1} otherwise.
The covered counterpart of bidder i is a bidder (numbered i+n, as in main text
Section 4) whose inspection costs are identically zero and whose value is equal
to the random variable κi, the generalized covered call value of bidder i. A Dutch
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auction strategy for bidder i+n is an inspection policy si+n adapted to the filtration
{Fk,τi }, subject to the same feasibility constraint articulated above: bidder i + n
cannot attempt to acquire the item if it has already been awarded to another bidder.
By allowing the strategy si+n to be adapted to the filtration {F
k,τ
i }we are implicitly
assuming that bidder i+n is granted knowledge of all of bidder i’s inspection costs
and outcomes, as well as her value for acquiring the item. The justification for this
assumption is the same as the justification given in the first paragraph of the proof
of Theorem 2 and its accompanying footnote.
As in main text Section 4, we will use P to denote a (possibly correlated) dis-
tribution of types for n bidders, and P◦ denotes the distribution of their covered
counterparts.
Lemma 16 (Lemma 2 restated). The highest expected welfare achievable by any proce-
dure when types are distributed according to P is equal to the highest expected welfare
achievable when bidders are replaced with their covered counterparts, who face no inspec-
tion costs and have types distributed according to P◦.
Proof. The highest expected welfare achievable when agents’ types are jointly dis-
tributed according toP◦ isE [maxi(κi)+], achieved for example by running a second-
price auction. We have seen in the proof of Theorem 3 that this is also the expected
welfare of the first-best procedure when agents’ types are jointly distributed ac-
cording to P. A mechanism which implements this first-best welfare is the dy-
namic VCG mechanism in which every bidder reveals all of their private infor-
mation at the outset of the auction and subsequently updates their private infor-
mation each time they perform a new stage of inspection; the mechanism directs
each bidder to carry out their share of the sequence of inspections dictated by the
descending-priority procedure, allocates the item as dictated by that procedure,
and charges the winner a price whose expected value is equal to the negative ex-
ternality that the winner imposes on the other bidders by participating in the auc-
tion.
Rather than repeating the full proof of Theorem 2 — the correspondence be-
tween Dutch auction equilibria in our model and equilibria when bidders are re-
placed with their covered counterparts — in the interest of space we merely sketch
how to modify the proof to the setting of multi-stage inspection. First, in order to
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state the theorem, the definition of functional equivalence must be generalized to
the setting of multi-stage inspection.
Definition 13. Two auction outcomes are said to be functionally equivalent if they
award the item to the same bidder at the same price, and each bidder bears the
same inspection cost in both auction outcomes. Two strategies for a bidder are
functionally equivalent (against a given profile of opponents’ strategies) if they
always result in functionally equivalent outcomes. Two equilibria are functionally
equivalent if they result in functionally equivalent outcomes for every profile of
types.
Theorem 5. There is a mapping from equilibria of the Dutch auction in our model with
types jointly distributed according to P to equilibria of the Dutch auction with the covered
counterpart distribution P◦ where bidders know their values without inspection. This
mapping preserves bidder expected utility and auctioneer expected revenue, and it induces
a bijection on functional equivalence classes of equilibria.
Recall that the crux of the proof of Theorem 2 was a pair of mappings, µ and
λ, from strategies of bidder i to normalized strategies of her covered counterpart,
bidder i + n, and vice-versa. As before, we can define the strategy µ(s) for bidder
i + n to simply be a simulation of inspection policy s as executed by bidder i. In
fact, due to our convention that a strategy for bidder i + n is an inspection policy
adapted to bidder i’s filtration {Fk,τi }, we can literally define µ to be the identity
function µ(s) = s: for bidder i+ n there is no distinction between simulating s and
executing s.
The definition of normalized strategies for a covered counterpart bidder gener-
alizes in the obvious way: a strategy s of bidder i+ n is normalized if
1. it always performs all stages of inspection at the earliest possible moment —
i.e., s(ω, 0) =∞ for all ω;
2. the price at which it attempts to acquire the item (if it is not yet claimed by
another bidder) is given by a function b(vi) whose value depends only on vi;
not on the outcomes of intermediate stages of inspection;
3. the function b(vi) is non-decreasing.
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If b is a normalized strategy of bidder i+n then we can define λ(b) to be the strategy
for bidder iwhich operates as follows: if the current inspection stage is k <∞, then
λ(b) advances to the next inspection stage when the price is b(κki ); if the current
inspection stage is k = ∞ then λ(b) claims the item when the price is b(κi). This
policy λ(b) is non-exposed: if σki > κ
k
i then it immediately advances to the next
inspection stage without waiting for the price to descend further, and if k = ∞
and vi > κi then it acquires the item immediately.
The proof of Theorem 2 depended on four claims. The proofs of Claims 1,
3, and 4 are unchanged except for changes in notation and terminology; for in-
stance, “almost surely exercises in the money” changes to “is non-exposed” when
we generalize from one to many stages of inspection. In Claim 2, the proof that
bi+n and µ(λ(bi+n)) are functionally equivalent is unchanged but the proof that bi
and λ(µ(bi)) requires a non-trivial generalization. In place of the single threshold
binspi (θi) appearing in the original proof of Claim 2, a strategy si of bidder i defines
a sequence of random variables bki , each denoting the price at which si will per-
form the kth stage of inspection if no other bidder has yet claimed the item. More
formally, bki = t(τ
k
i ), where
τki = inf{τ | si(ω, τ) ≥ k}
Restricted to the set of sample points where s(τki ) =⊥, the value of τ
k
i (and hence
also bki ) must be F
k−1,0-measurable, due to our assumption that the event si(ω, τ) ≥
k is measurable with respect to the σ-field generated by i’s private type, her first
k − 1 inspection outcomes, and s(τ). Now, as in the proof of Claim 2, we reason
that bidder (i + n)’s normalized strategy µ(si) is specified by a bid function b that
satisfies b(κki ) = b
k
i , and hence that λ(µ(si)) advances to the k
th inspection stage
precisely at price bki , unless the item has already been allocated, just like strategy si.
Similarly, both strategies acquire the item at price b(κi), unless it has already been
allocated. This completes the proof that they are functionally equivalent. As in the
original proof of Claim 2, the functional equivalence of a normalized strategy si+n
and µ(λ(si+n)) is an easy consequence of the fact that bidder i+n has no inspection
costs.
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